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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

TURKEY

PART XL

JULY TO DECEMBER 1940

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

PART XL.—JULY TO DECEMBER 1940.

[N 5937/G] No. 1.

Sir S. Cripps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 400. Most Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Moscow, July 1, 1940.*

THE point of most immediate importance which emerged from my conversation with Molotov was that which concerned Turkey and the Balkans.

2. It is clear that the Soviet Government would welcome our assistance in arriving at better understanding with Turkey, particularly with regard to the Straits. If we could achieve this now we should, I feel, be in a fair way to harmonising the real interests of the three countries and thus creating best possible guarantee against German aggression in the Balkans.

3. The fact that the Soviet Union would welcome our intervention in this direction, gives us an opportunity of taking an initiative which should greatly increase our prestige in the Balkans and Near East.

[R 6703/G] No. 2.

Viscount Halifax to His Majesty's Representatives at Moscow, Angora, Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia and Budapest.

(No. 127. Circular.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 5, 1940.*

THE following commentary on the Turkish attitude and Soviet relations may be useful to you as background in assessing present developments in South-Eastern Europe:—

1. In the long run, Turkey's foreign policy is governed by that of Russia—the hereditary enemy, whose age-long ambition is to wrest the Straits from Turkey. Whatever country is opposed to Russia is, *ipso facto*, favoured by Turkey. Thus, in the last war, Turkey sided with Germany largely because Germany was Russia's enemy and Great Britain was Russia's ally. Last year, when we started our negotiations with Turkey which led in the autumn to the Tripartite Treaty, the issue was somewhat confused by—

(*a*) The belief, which lasted even after the Soviet Union's invasion of Poland, that the Soviet Government had no expansionist ambitions and did not, like the Tsarist régime, covet the Straits.

(*b*) The fact that at that time Italy had in Turkish eyes taken the place of Russia as Enemy No. 1, owing to her occupation of the Dodecanese.

(*c*) Turkey's suspicion that Germany wished again to revive the "Drang nach Osten" policy, and her resolve not to lend her herself again to this policy as she did in 1914.

2. It was in this atmosphere that our treaty was negotiated with Turkey last summer and autumn.

3. Since then Turkey has once more become aware and afraid of Soviet ambitions as regards the Straits, while her desire to take the offensive against the Italians seems to have weakened.

4. At the same time, Turkey has come to the conclusion that she cannot expect from us the help that she had hoped for under the treaty if she were attacked, especially now that France has collapsed. On Italy coming into the war she therefore found an excuse for not implementing her treaty obligations. The pretext for her abstention, however insincere it may be, was, in effect, based on the new facts of the situation. In other words, Turkey cannot risk coming into the war on our side unless she is sure that we can come to her defence if she is attacked—

(*a*) By Italy in the Ægean;
(*b*) By Germany through Bulgaria; and
(*c*) By the Soviet Government either through Bulgaria, the Caucasus, or by sea.

5. When Turkey signed her treaty with us she only had in mind (*a*) and (*b*). But now that the danger of (*c*) has arisen and is rapidly overshadowing both (*a*) and (*b*) in Turkish eyes, Turkey is fast reverting to her old attitude, when her foreign policy was dictated solely by her fear of Russia. This is so much the case that if this fear should at any moment turn to panic, she might very well perform a complete *volte-face* and enter into as close relations with Germany as she entered into with us last autumn. This might happen if she felt that either with our connivance or as a result of our impotence in the Mediterranean the Soviet Government were going to make a concerted effort to seize the Straits. In that event, it is possible that she would appeal to Germany to defend her against such an attack, and Germany would have every reason to respond to this appeal. In the first place, as long as the idea of the "Drang nach Osten" persists in the German mind, Germany naturally does not want to have Russia established across her path in the Bosphorus; and, secondly, Germany would naturally be only too willing to detach Turkey from her present connexion with us and set herself up once again as the protector of Turkey and the Near East against not merely Soviet but also British domination.

6. The seriousness, therefore, of a possible *volte-face* on the part of Turkey ought not to be underestimated, and we should leave nothing undone to hold Turkey where she is, *i.e.*, in the position of a benevolent non-belligerent; and this not merely on account of her importance as a military and strategic factor in the Near East, but because her example is bound to react on Egypt, Iraq and Iran.

7. It goes, of course, without saying that we should like to have Turkey in the war as a belligerent Ally, but failing that we must strive—

(1) To reassure Turkey that the alliance with us, even if it does not give her all the security she requires, still represents the best policy for her to follow in present circumstances.
(2) To ensure that no efforts that we may make to collaborate with the Soviet Government should be such as to throw Turkey out of our orbit.
(3) To prevent a breach or conflict between Turkey and the Soviet Government.

[R 6399 84 7] No. 3.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 703.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, July 5, 1940.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that he has received representations from the Bulgarian Government in regard to Turkish concentration on Bulgarian frontier. Representations follow usual lines, viz., that Bulgarian Government understand position perfectly well and have confidence, but that the General Staff are less confident and public opinion is disquieted. They go further, however, in that they represent that the Bulgarian Government

are forced to concentrate on their side and that this is extremely costly; could not Turks do something about it, *e.g.*, withdraw some distance.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs is taking the matter up direct with the Bulgarian Government and asking them to put forward suggestions. He tells me that he hopes at least to keep the ball rolling until the autumn, when the usual seasonal reduction of [? troops] will take place.

(Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia.)

[R 6670/203/44] No. 4.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 704. Very Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, July 5, 1940.*

PLEASE see my telegrams Nos. 620 and 667. I am convinced that any approach on the part of the Soviet Government, either direct or through us, would receive sympathetic reception here. It would be worth [? much] if the present Turkish suspicion of the Soviet Government could be allayed as regards Soviet nervousness in regard to sudden action by Turkey. I think there is no justification whatever.

2. If any approach is to be made I consider the present moment favourable. Turkish concentration on the Caucasian front has been decided on and the further it proceeds the less favourable will the atmosphere be. But I think Turks would be actually relieved if some approach were made to them with a view to improving the atmosphere. This would anyhow be the case if negotiations were confined to the immediate difficulties arising out of present situation. If the general question of the Straits régime came up it would, of course, be more complicated.

3. Publication by the German Government of reports [? by] my French colleague and General Weygand regarding air action against Baku, &c., is clearly designed by German Government to [? embroil] Turkey with Russia. Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned this to me to-day, and added that German Government had defeated their own purpose by publishing General Weygand's report, and all showed that the Turkish Government would have nothing to do with the suggestion. Minister for Foreign Affairs then told me *in very strict confidence* that the German Ambassador here has been urging on the Greek Ambassador the desirability of Turkey coming to some understanding with Russia. Minister for Foreign Affairs observed that he supposed that Herr von Papen was expressing his own personal views, as this advice did not correspond with the action of the German Government mentioned above.

4. I mentioned to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning that in trying to find out the line of action which Germany and Russia might follow here at present it seemed to me that either might argue that His Majesty's Government were now so far weakened as to be unable to provide any support for Turkey against the other, and that therefore Turkey would do well to rely on Germany for support against Russia, or *vice versa*. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that there had at present been no trace of such a suggestion either from Germany or Russia.

5. There have recently been rumours of intrigues to get rid of Minister for Foreign Affairs from the Cabinet. These intrigues may either be German or Russian. I have heard them described as either. If they are German they are no doubt designed to get rid of pro-British element. If Russian their object would be to secure an impressive illustration of pro-Russian sentiment. In either case Minister for Foreign Affairs is the person against whom they are chiefly directed. The Government are perfectly well aware of this, and I have ascertained on the best authority that intrigues have failed. I think Minister for Foreign Affairs' position is perfectly sound. His policy received an unanimous vote in the party meeting a few days ago.

6. In repeating to Moscow I beg paragraph 5 be omitted.

[R 6670/203/44] No. 5.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 716.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Angora, July 7, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 704.

Anatolian agency published on 5th July the text communicated by Deutsches Nachrichten-Büro of two telegrams alleged to have been sent by my French colleague to French Ministry for Foreign Affairs and now published by German Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Agency added publication has been made "with the obvious intention of disturbing Soviet-Turkish relations."

2. Following is summary of first telegram ("document No. 4") dated 14th March, which is described by Deutsches Nachrichten-Büro as French Ambassador's report of conversation with Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs about a projected bombardment of Baku and Batoum and Ambassador concludes Turks would be unlikely to make difficulties. French Ambassador reported that on the occasion of a visit to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter showed him on his own initiative telegram from "the Turkish representative" (correspondence with Turkish Ambassador in Moscow) to the effect that American Ambassador (Moscow) had stated that Soviet Government were anxious regarding Baku oil region in the event of air bombardment and that American engineers had informed them that owing to method of oil extraction bombardment would cause fires which would take months to extinguish. To a question of Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, French Ambassador had replied that modern aircraft had a sufficient radius of action to reach Baku from Jezireh or Northern Iraq, but that to do this Turkish and Persian territory would have to be flown over. Turkish Minister's reply was "do you then fear a protest from Persians?" which seemed to French Ambassador sufficiently clear hint that Turkish Government would raise no difficulty. Telegram concluded with statement that I had been informed of tenor of above conversation.

3. Following is summary of second paragraph of telegram ("document No. 6") which, according to Deutsches Nachrichten-Büro, shows that if action is taken against Baku and Batoum, it should be arranged not to compromise Turkey. The telegram is dated 28th March, and deals with (*a*) Soviet-Turkish relations; (*b*) the possibility of aerial bombardment of Baku from Jezireh; and (*c*) the possibility of cutting German-Soviet communications in Black Sea:—

(*a*) above: French Ambassador reported that it would be difficult to induce Turkey to attack Russia, but that it might be possible to get her to follow Allies in taking up position *vis-à-vis* Russia and concluded that Turkish Government were not fully convinced that Allies could defeat Germany and would maintain a very cautious attitude lest they should provoke Soviet hostility.

(*b*) above: in the event of an aerial bombardment by Allies of Baku, passage of aeroplanes would take place over extremely sparsely populated country and for that reason might even pass unnoticed and Turkish Government might profess ignorance of the matter in reply to Russian protest. It would be best not to inform the Turkish Government in advance and it would even be well that Turkish Government should protest to Allies so that if Soviet Government reacted by committing warfare acts Turkish Government could show that initiative in aggression had been taken by Russia. If, however, Soviet Government in consequence of such a bombardment adopted an hostile attitude it would be necessary to help Turkey. This would be difficult, since certain vital points of Turkey were open to air attack from Russia and, owing to climatic conditions it had not been possible to construct aerodromes in eastern part of country from which Soviet attacks might be countered. Moreover, certain British material had not arrived.

(*c*) above: Allied naval intervention in the Black Sea would be difficult since there was no possibility of concealment. He concludes that operation against Baku offers from every point of view the greatest likelihood of success.

4. These alleged documents have received a comprehensive *démenti* in the form of a letter addressed by the French Ambassador to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in which M. Massigli denies that he had ever, in any conversation either with the Minister for Foreign Affairs or with other members of the Ministry, requested permission for French aeroplanes to fly across Turkish territory for the purpose of bombing Baku, nor had the Minister for Foreign Affairs ever consented to such an operation. He might, in a report on which German publication is apparently based, have summarised information casually collected and made certain personal conjectures; but he could never have informed the French Government that the Turkish Government had agreed to permit any operation against Baku nor had he been authorised to seek such agreement.

5. Above letter is published by Anatolian Agency together with the German publication.

[R 6676/203/44] No. 6.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 717.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, July 7, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 704, paragraphs 3 and 5.

I presume from your telegram No. 207 to Moscow that text of the German white book is in your possession. I have, however, telegraphed summary in my telegram No. 716.

2. Turkish press is active in pointing out the correctness of the Minister for Foreign Affairs' attitude in refusing to have any part in the proposals for attack on Baku. General Weygand's report makes this easy, and my French collegue's letter is much appreciated by the press. Anatolian Agency last night published Deutsches Nachrichten-Büro counter-statement which describes my French collegue's *démenti* [? group omitted] better than falsehood, and contends Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs' remark about the possibility of a protest *from Iran* in the event of air attack on Baku is full proof that he was prepared to agree to the proposed attack.

3. Since publication of the white book the Turkish press has been at great pains to point out the loyalty of the Turkish Government to the Soviets, and their uninterrupted desire for friendship.

4. My Polish colleague in the light of his information is inclined to think that Germans amiability represents an intrigue against Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs personally, rather than an attempt to embroil Turkey with the Soviets. This may be possible. I am well aware of the danger of intrigue which you mention in your circular telegram No. 127 (last sentence of paragraph 5), and I think it requires careful watching. Up till now whenever I have enquired of the Minister for Foreign Affairs if he sees any sign of a German move with such objects he has replied in the negative. Information as regards these intrigues given in paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 704 comes from two sources: (*a*) a prominent member of the National party very well disposed to us and in the inner ring here of whom I caused enquiries to be made; and (*b*) the secretary-general, who spoke to me on the subject with very little prompting on my part. The secretary-general volunteered that in the present circumstances a man with Sarajoglu's quality of frankness and courage was necessary to the country.

[R 6670/203/44] No. 7.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 727.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, July 8, 1940*

(R.) MY telegram No. 717.

Turkish press of 7th July reproduced without comment Deutsches Nachrichten-Büro communiqué describing the statement in Massigli's letter of 5th July to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs (to the effect consent of Minister for Foreign Affairs had not been sought for the flight of the French aircraft over

Turkish territory to Baku) as futile in view of Massigli's previous report that the attitude of the Minister for Foreign Affairs had shown that the Turkish authorities were unlikely to raise difficulties if such a flight were made. Deutsches Nachrichten-Büro explained Massigli's letter as a lying attempt to extricate himself and some Turkish statesmen from a difficult position. (End of R.)

2. I had enquiries made at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as to why the communiqué had been reproduced in the Turkish press and without comment. Reply was that it was realised that the communiqué was a German manœuvre to discredit the Minister for Foreign Affairs and that the Turkish Government confidently counted on its publication uniting all Turkish opinion against Germany and in favour of Minister for Foreign Affairs. In effect this result was achieved.

3. I was also informed that, in the absence of von Papen at Therapia, the German Minister had called on the Director of Commercial Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and had asked whether the Turkish Government contemplated taking any measures in view of Massigli's compromising revelations about the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The director replied that the publication of the documents by Germany had made the position of the Minister for Foreign Affairs stronger than ever, and had rallied the Turks of all opinions solidly round him.

4. Deutsches Nachrichten-Büro communiqué and the German Minister's action afford additional evidence of Germans attempting to get rid of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Von Papen's action reported in the third paragraph of my telegram No. 704 can, I think, be explained as having the same object, viz., by encouraging improvement of Turco-Soviet relations, to establish the desirability of removing M. Saracoglu, who had refused to come to an agreement in Moscow last year.

5. Please repeat to Moscow.

[R 6730/1213/44] No. 8.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 359.)
My Lord, *Angora, June 26, 1940.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted on the 30th May last a number of laws ratifying various commercial instruments concluded between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government during the last few years. The instruments thus ratified, and the laws ratifying them, all of which were published in the *Official Gazette* of the 5th June, are recorded below :—

(1) Law No. 3857. Anglo-Turkish Trade and Clearing Agreement of the 2nd September, 1936, with protocol.

(2) Law No. 3858. Notes exchanged at London on the 14th November, 1938, for the addition of flower bulbs to schedule 4 attached to the Supplementary Trade and Clearing Agreement of the 27th May, 1938. (I do not appear to have received copies of the texts of these notes.)

(3) Law No. 3859. Notes exchanged at Angora on the 23rd August, 1939 for the inclusion in the Fourth Schedule attached to the Anglo-Turkish Trade and Clearing Agreement of the 2nd September, 1936, of all Turkish goods not already specified therein, other than those specifically named in article 4 (2) of the Supplementary Agreement of the 27th May, 1938. (Texts were enclosed in my despatch No. 500 E. of the 1st September, 1939.)

(4) Law No. 3860. Notes exchanged at Angora on the 10th October, 1939, to establish a supplementary quarterly quota of £T. 6,000 in respect of United Kingdom books and periodicals. (Texts were enclosed in my despatch No. 591 of the 12th October, 1939.)

(5) Law No. 3861. Notes exchanged in London on the 22nd November, 1939, for the utilisation of unused quotas under the Anglo-Turkish Supplementary Trade and Clearing Agreement, and for the suppression of article 1 of that agreement (*Treaty Series No.* 1, 1940 : Cmd. 6151).

(6) Law No. 3862. Agreement signed at London on the 3rd February, 1940, amending the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of the 1st March, 1930.

(7) Law No. 3865. Notes exchanged at London on the 17th July, 1939, transmitting and acknowledging receipt of the corrected Turkish text of the Anglo-Turkish Supplementary Trade and Clearing Agreement of the 27th May, 1938. The law also ratifies the corrected text of the agreement itself.

(8) Law No. 3866. Anglo-Turkish Trade and Payments Agreement, signed at London on the 3rd February, 1940, with the Agreed Minute, signed on the same date.

I have, &c.
H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[R 6732/203/44] No. 9.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 745.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, July 9, 1940.*

MY telegrams Nos. 737 and 717.

My Polish colleague has heard from a Turkish source, in which he has complete confidence and which he says is in touch with inner Government circles here, that there is great tension between Turkey and Soviets at present, that the Turkish Government are puzzled as to the reasons of this tension and that the German Ambassador is being active in attempting to arrange matters.

2. I think that my Polish colleague's information is best explained as a further movement in German intrigue which has two objects : (1) to get credit for arranging an amicable settlement of the dispute between the Soviets and Turkey. For this pacification it would be rational for Germany to promote and aggravate such a dispute, or even, if necessary, to invent it. Indeed, in the light of what M. Stalin has said to His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow regarding his relations with Turkey, it may be possible that the whole story of tension has been at least greatly exaggerated by the Germans for this purpose. (2) To get rid of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The existence of German intrigue for this purpose is common knowledge here now, but I still see no signs of success.

3. A further object on the part of Herr von Papen would clearly be to break up the Anglo-Turkish Treaty.

4. My Greek colleague has been to see me since I drafted the preceding paragraphs. He tells me that there is, in fact, great anxiety here as to Russia's intentions. The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires has spoken to a mutual colleague in terms of marked hostility to Turkey. There has also been an unfriendly article in the *Izvestiya*. From another source my Greek colleague learns that some Russian demand will be presented to Turkey as soon as the Soviet Ambassador in Angora reaches Moscow. This should be on 12th July. My Greek colleague has seen the secretary-general and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, both of whom are awaiting developments in a spirit of what he calls "fatalism."

5. I propounded to the Greek Ambassador explanation put forward in paragraph 2 above. He was not at all inclined to agree. He could not, however, understand why Germany had allowed matters to go so far as point of tension which he says now exists. He agrees that the original German move (publication of documents, &c.) was designed to get rid of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and thinks that the Germans have over-played their part and set in motion a force which they now cannot control. He feels confident that Germany at present is most anxious to avoid trouble between Russia and Turkey. Incidentally, he also agrees that the Minister for Foreign Affairs' position has been consolidated by recent German intrigues against him.

6. All his information is, of course, diametrically contradictory to the language used by M. Stalin to His Majesty's Ambassador. I suppose that it is possible that M. Stalin was attempting to throw dust in order to conceal his real intentions. But if there is serious danger of trouble it may be advisable for us to interpose before the Germans get credit for doing so (see my telegram No. 704,

paragraph 4). M. Stalin's language would at least provide justification for such a course.

7. I hope to telegraph my own impressions as to the extent of this "tension" as soon as I have been able to see the secretary-general or the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Moscow.)

[R 6670/203/44] No. 10.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 747.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, July 9, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 745.

I have now seen secretary-general. It is clear that Greek Ambassador has greatly exaggerated. Secretary-general tells me that Turkish Government are in no anxiety. They refused to allow publication of *Izvestiya* article referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, and when asked for their reasons by Soviet Embassy they explained that they wished to avoid mutual press recriminations. Turkish Ambassador in Moscow has been instructed to discuss the whole position with Molotov, including, as I understand, the German white book. In general, he thought the position was not bad.

2. Secretary-general's interpretation is more on the line of paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 745. He considers it to be a German intrigue with the object of finding out whether there is anything going to come between ourselves and the Soviet Government, and whether there is any danger of a rapprochement between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet or between Turkey and the Soviet. The Germans are, according to the secretary-general, desperately anxious to prevent any such rapprochements, and are aiming at themselves assuming in due course rôle of intermediary between Turkey and Russia. There is also the object of getting rid of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Secretary-general tells me that both their objects have failed and are seen through here.

3. Secretary-general saw German Ambassador to-day. The latter raised the question of the Straits and spoke of Russian desiderata, but secretary-general was unable to induce Herr von Papen to be more specific. Secretary-general on his side pointed out that all Russian desiderata had been examined at Montreux.

4. I told secretary-general that all I had heard here as regards possible Russian demands on Turkey conflicted directly with the information I received from Moscow. Secretary-general was interested, and seemed anxious that we should encourage Turco-Soviet rapprochement.

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 29.)

[R 6670/203/44] No. 11.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 759.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, July 11, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 747, paragraph 4.

I am certain that it would serve a useful purpose if I were authorised to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs or the secretary-general in detail of recent conversation between His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow and Stalin.

2. I have so far confined myself to giving very brief indication of tenor of what Stalin said, in particular indications of desire for closer approach to Turkey. What I have said has been very eagerly taken up by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the secretary-general, who appear anxious that the matter should go further without delay.

3. I thought it wise to give them some indication of Stalin's attitude in view of German intrigue referred to in my recent telegrams.

4. I am convinced that the sooner this matter can be followed up the better.

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 243.)

[R 6773/316/44] No. 12.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 589.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July 12, 1940.*

IN a statement yesterday in the House of Lords on matters arising from the present situation in the Eastern Mediterranean I made the following reference to Turkey and the Balkans:—

"As regards Turkey, we remain bound to Turkey by the closest ties. It will be remembered that on the entry of Italy into the war the Turkish Prime Minister declared that Turkey would maintain her present attitude of non-belligerency. His Majesty's Government fully appreciated the circumstances which led to this decision of the Turkish Government, who throughout have kept in close contact with His Majesty's Government. Meanwhile our treaty with Turkey stands, as does the friendship and sympathy between our two peoples on which the treaty is based, and which has rendered it in the past, as it also will in the future, a fruitful basis for constructive co-operation between us, both as long as the war continues and in the years of peace to come.

"Meanwhile your Lordships may have observed that the Germans are actively engaged in stirring up unwarranted suspicions and alarms wherever they can in the Balkans and the Near East in the hope of making these countries the dupes of German policy. But, as I have tried to indicate, I hope and believe that the peoples of that region, some of whom are not without experience of the methods of the States ranged against us, will not be deceived and will remain steadfast in their loyalty to those principles for which we are fighting. I am encouraged to think that we are showing ourselves to be capable of affording assistance and protection to our friends and Allies in that part of the world. We shall certainly, I need not add, maintain our effort. We shall prosecute the war with the utmost vigour, being confident in the ultimate success of our arms."

(Repeated to Athens, No. 393; Bucharest, No. 592; Belgrade, No. 333; Sofia, No. 255; Moscow, No. 245, and Budapest, No. 207.)

[R 6641/316/44] No. 13.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 771.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Angora, July 12, 1940.*

PRIME Minister made statement in National Assembly this afternoon. Statement had for sole object to comment upon documents recently published by Germany. Following are the most salient points:—

2. Circulation of these documents, whether correct or false, should in no way cause anxiety to the Turkish Government or people. Government [? ardently] desires that these documents should be published without alteration because such publication could only afford new proof of correctness of policy of the Turkish Government. Turkey would have nothing but contempt for those who tried to base on these documents accusations of lack of sincerity or to use them as an occasion for compromising Turkish statesmen.

3. New and vigorous Turkey is not to be compared with the old Ottoman Empire, therefore "maintenance, departure or replacement of Turkish statesmen could only take place by the decision of the National Assembly and could only be accomplished with its approval."

4. Turkish statesmen to-day are not of the kind that follow a policy favourable to one foreign country or another, they only serve Turkish interests and the security of the Turkish Republic.

5. Above considerations have been overlooked in the conception of the propaganda which has been conducted.

6. Prime Minister described the attitude of Turkey in the present circumstances.

7. "Faithful to its friends determined to defend its independence and liberty, Turkey united as one body awaits events. We do not seek to provoke or

attack our neighbours, and we notice with satisfaction evident proof that they have the same sentiments towards us."

8. Declaration went on to affirm the determination of the Turkish Government to continue their present policy, which only aimed at defending their country. In spite of the present world situation, Turkey did not seem in imminent danger and continued to be animated by the desire to maintain good relations with all States and, in particular, with its neighbours. Any threat to Turkey's independence or territorial integrity would result in Turkish people taking up arms to defend their country to the end. Turkey had no wish to see peace in Near East disturbed.

9. Prime Minister had the most enthusiastic reception and resolution was unanimously carried. Various Deputies spoke after him in the same sense.

(Repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia and Athens.)

[R 6776/203/44] No. 14.

Sir S. Cripps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 460.)
(Telegraphic.) *Moscow, July 13, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 237.

In view of the approach to Turkish Government suggested in paragraph 4, I should be glad, if the time comes, to learn the views of His Majesty's Government regarding the actual basis upon which an improvement of relations between U.S.S.R. and Turkey could be achieved.

2. Unless I am forearmed in this way, a further approach to Soviet Government on lines suggested will almost certainly be interpreted by them as a blank cheque, will encourage them to increase their demands and will create most dangerous dead-lock. Far from improving relations, my approach to Soviet Government would in these circumstances have precisely opposite effect and might well precipitate war in the Black Sea.

3. Main point at issue is, of course, régime of Straits, and therefore, unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to sponsor *some* modification of the Montreux Convention in return for a Soviet guarantee of Turkey, it will, in my opinion, do far more harm than good to revert to question with Soviet Government at present stage.

4. Recent information suggests that the present policy of Axis Powers is (*a*) to steal our thunder by encouraging Soviet Government to "stabilise" their relations with Turkey, and (*b*) by raising question of Straits to recreate dead-lock which preceded conclusion of Montreux Convention. By (*a*) they no doubt hope to stall off trouble in Balkans until they are ready to deal with it themselves. By (*b*) they will seek to produce the salutary explosion when the time for action comes. By encouraging Soviet Government to raise question of Straits without having any definite solution in view to put forward ourselves, there seems, therefore, to be little doubt that we shall be playing straight into Germany's hand.

(Please repeat to Angora.)

[R 6776/203/44] No. 15.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 790.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, July 15, 1940.*

MOSCOW telegram No. 460.

I agree with His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow. Unless we can achieve some *ad hoc* understanding between Turkey and Russia confined to covering possible emergencies arising out of the war, there seems no possibility of obtaining any results without opening the Straits question. In any case, the Soviet Government are sure to seize the opportunity to secure some satisfaction for themselves. Incidentally, I presume that "the Soviet guarantee to Turkey" (as in paragraph 3 of Moscow telegram) is not intended literally and that what we should aim at is mutual understanding on equal terms.

2. I have been examining reports of negotiations during the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs' visit to Moscow last October and have sent some notes with a private letter to Mr. Nichols by bag leaving on 12th July. At that time the Soviet Government attempted to secure from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, first[ly], some definition of the manner in which the Turkish Government would apply the Montreux Convention in so far as Russia is concerned, and, secondly, some admission of a specially favoured position for Russia as against other Powers in regard to the Straits régime. This might have taken the form of an agreement recognising the existence of a bilateral Russo-Turkish interest in the Straits Convention superior to the interests of other countries (see my telegram No. 607 of 14th October, 1939, paragraph 4, and my despatch No. 622 of 5th October). At that time and even since the Turks have adhered strictly to the outlook of the Montreux Convention, which I think represents their Magna Carta.

3. I have twice made it perfectly clear to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that we have no intention of pushing them into anything which would involve the involuntary sacrifice of Turkish rights. I have also said that in my opinion it will be difficult to secure any result without touching the Straits question. The Minister for Foreign Affairs must be perfectly alive to that fact. He told me this morning that the Turkish Government are still considering their reply to the question in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 585.

4. There have been leading articles in *Tan* on two consecutive days arguing that with the present German domination in Europe the position is altered. The danger of penetration by Great Britain to the Black Sea is now reduced, and the danger of land penetration to the Black Sea by Germany or Italy is common to Turkey and Russia.

5. It is worth mentioning that the conviction expressed in the first paragraph of my telegram No. 704 was the result of very clear indication given to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he would readily receive an approach from the Soviet Government. The secretary-general also seemed keen at the time. The question of the Straits was, however, not the foremost in their minds then, although they can hardly have ignored it.

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 268.)

[R 6776/203/44] No. 16.

Viscount Halifax to Sir S. Cripps (Moscow).

(No. 273.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 16, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 460 [of 15th July: M. Stalin's invitation to His Majesty's Government to help in bringing about an improvement in Turco-Soviet relations].

The reason for our readiness to take up M. Stalin's invitation to mediate between the Soviet Union and Turkey is not that we are hopeful of achieving a new settlement as regards the Straits, but partly because we do not wish to appear obstructive, partly because we feel it would be useful to bring M. Stalin into the open, and partly because we might ultimately by this means bring the two Governments to co-operate against the common danger of a German penetration to the Black Sea.

2. The instructions in paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 585 to Angora made it clear that we have no intention of fostering any settlement at the expense of Turkey. If, therefore, in reply to an invitation to state more precisely what he has in mind, M. Stalin should make proposals which are unacceptable to us and to Turkey, we should tell him so, and there could be no question of giving him a blank cheque. In short, apart from our own interests in the Straits, the views and wishes of the Turkish Government will decide not only whether or not His Majesty's Government approach the Soviet Government on the subject of the Straits, but also the manner in which to present the case to the Soviet Government, if it is decided to do so.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 611.)

[R 6776/203/44] No. 17.

Sir S. Cripps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 480.)
(Telegraphic.) *Moscow, July 18, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 273.

Question, as I see it, is not whether the Turkish Government oppose His Majesty's Government's wish to approach the Soviet Government on the subject of the Straits, and, if so, in what form, but whether we can prevent the Soviet Government from raising the question themselves if Turco-Soviet relations are to be discussed at all. And to this I feel sure that the answer is "No."

2. At a time when the Soviet Government are clearly manœuvring for defensive positions against Germany on all fronts, the question of Straits is bound to overshadow, in their view, all other aspects of their relations with Turkey; and they have long been known to regard Montreux Convention with dissatisfaction.

3. There are thus two courses open to the Soviet Government :—

(*a*) Attempt to frighten and weaken Turkey to the point of ceding to them a preponderant share in the control of the Straits;

(*b*) To gain some more modest share in that control by friendly negotiation and co-operation with Turkey against an eventual German attack.

The latter course is the wiser policy, since the former might defeat its own object by driving Turkey to seek German protection—an eventuality which we also must, in our own interests, do everything possible to avoid. But the Soviet Government do undoubtedly aspire to *some* share in the control of the Straits, by whatever means this is achieved. A mere platonic reaffirmation of traditional Soviet-Turkish friendship is not enough for them, in face of rapid German expansion, for they know that against that enemy Turkey could not hold the Straits single-handed, and they are naturally doubtful of our ability to afford adequate help in the present circumstances.

4. If therefore the Turkish Government and His Majesty's Government are prepared to concede some modification of the convention in favour of the Soviet Union, there is a good chance of bringing about a Turco-Soviet rapprochement, thereby barring Germany's advance towards Asia Minor and at the same time weaning the Soviet Union from German influence. If, on the other hand, we are not prepared for this sacrifice it would, in my opinion, be folly to raise Soviet hopes in vain by promoting Turco-Soviet discussion. Broadly speaking, we already know what Stalin wants from such discussions, and it is worse than useless to "bring him out into the open" if we merely bring him out on the wrong side. Disappointment as a renewed and positive refusal to reconsider the Straits régime would encourage the Soviet Government to adopt course (*a*) above, with all its dangers to ourselves; and although final objective of this course would be reinsurance against German attack [group undecypherable] tactics might well be some arrangement with Germany for the joint intimidation of Turkey

(Repeated to Angora, No. 35.)

[R 3612/1/44] No. 18.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 810.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, July 18, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 576.

The commercial secretary was informed on the 17th July that the Germans had been endeavouring to secure four further concessions in respect of *ad hoc* commercial arrangements: (1) Higher [group undecypherable] value of mark as against Turkish currency. (2) Use of funds owing to Germany under previous clearing agreement. (3) Use of all three Turkish schedules against first German list only (see paragraph 2 (*b*) of my telegram under reference) and for some limitation of goods to be obtained by Turkey against £8 million Turkish assigned for Turkish imports from Germany.

2. These claims have now been abandoned by the German Ambassador, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs connects this with the failure of von Papen's intrigue [? in connexion with] recent German white book.

3. The commercial secretary learns the final agreement has not yet been signed (though the conclusion was reported in yesterday's press), and the official dealing with the matter in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is hoping for a delay of signature for some weeks.

[R 6776/203/44] No. 19.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 818.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, July 19, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 776.

I have now received the following reply :—

"His Majesty's Government [? omitted: are] already aware that Turkey attaches much value to the development of Turco-Soviet relations as also of those between the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. The Turkish Government, therefore, sees nothing against Sir S. Cripps making necessary soundings with the Soviet Government in order to learn their point of view without committing the Turkish Government on the subject, and without entering into a fundamental discussion of the question, as Turkey is by no means disposed to accept a compromise which does not take fully into account her difficulties for the maintenance of her full sovereignty, and entire political independence and security."

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 39.)

[R 6776/203/44] No. 20.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 819.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, July 19, 1940.*

ALLUSION in final sentence of the Turkish reply is clearly to call attention to the question, but the Turkish Government have avoided saying so definitely, as they are most anxious to incur no accusation of having themselves placed this question on the tapis. They realise that it may come up and consider if it did and if it proved impossible to satisfy Soviet desiderata, things would be left in a less precarious position if it could be pointed out that it was entirely the Soviet Government who took the initiative in raising it. Moreover, article 29 of the Straits Convention already provides the machinery for the revision.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees with me that in the present uncertain situation, it would almost be impossible to make more than an *ad hoc* agreement, and that the elements necessary for any long-term revision of the treaty régime do not, in fact, exist at present.

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 295.)

[R 6776/203/44] No. 21.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 825. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, July 20, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 819 and Moscow telegram No. 480.

I agree with His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow that it is out of the question to expect matters to proceed further without the Soviet Government raising the Straits question, and I realise the danger of a deadlock if the Soviet requirements go beyond anything which the Turkish Government can concede. I think the Turkish Government were perfectly alive to this in drafting their reply.

2. Turkish position is that they will await more precise statement of the Soviet point of view, and will then examine it before declaring themselves further. I to-day read to the secretary-general my telegram No. 819, and he expressed agreement with what I had said in it.

3. Turks will never abandon their independence, sovereignty and security, nor will they compromise their ultimate control over the Straits. Secretary-general points out to me that if Turkey were to agree to allow or prevent passage of warships in war time she would, in the event of war, inevitably become the ally of the Power to whose warships she allowed passage, and the enemy of the Power to whom she refused it, and this without any choice of her own.

4. But if the last sentence of my telegram No. 818 is studied, I think we are justified in admitting the inverse sense of the words used, and assuming that Turkey would or might be disposed to accept (or at least examine) a compromise which did take full account of difficulties named.

5. Turkish reply was largely inspired by a desire to be as helpful as possible to ourselves in the negotiations we have undertaken. It was this argument with which Minister for Foreign Affairs prevailed upon his Cabinet colleagues to accept our offer. I understand at first they were unanimously opposed to pursuing the matter.

6. If we can rely on what I have said in paragraph 4 above, there may be some possibility of doing something on the lines of (*b*) in paragraph 3 of Moscow telegram No. 480, and in the course of any negotiations it should be possible to argue convincingly that the present moment is not one in which we can usefully discuss a long-term arrangement. Offer must depend on our own position in the Mediterranean and the ultimate decision there between ourselves and Italy

7. Meanwhile, only certain factor which exists is German threats, and as regards that, threats to all our interests are identical, Russian, Turkish and British. This should provide material for an *ad hoc* agreement more comprehensive than a mere platonic reaffirmation of Turco-Soviet friendship.

8. Minister for Foreign Affairs' own view, as I understand it, is that in face of German threats Turkish, British and Soviet interests are the same; that it is in our general interest that Turkey should retain control of the Straits as being neither a strong nor an aggressive Power, that as long as Great Britain retains command of the Mediterranean, it is not of vital importance whether Russia has free passage of Straits or at least a share in control, and that if only mutual confidence could be established between Russia and Turkey a solution should not be difficult given present German menace.

9. Incidentally, my conversation with him on 19th July left me more than ever convinced that possibility of Turkey turning to Germany for support against Russia, at least under present régime, is so remote as not to deserve consideration.

[R 6830/203/44] No. 22.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 849.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, July 24, 1940*

MY telegrams Nos. 790 and 825.

I have endeavoured to examine the factors which in the existing circumstances might contribute to Turco-Soviet understanding, and I submit the following for your consideration:

2. Although it seems clear that neither Germany nor the U.S.S.R. wishes to go to war with the other, a conflict of interests between the two is becoming increasingly clear. This conflict is due to the threat of the growing German influence and the possible military menace in the Balkans, a menace which is of concern to Russia, Turkey and ourselves. Indeed, until a decision has been reached in the Mediterranean, this can be said to be the only clearly defined factor on which an agreement can be based.

3. Such an agreement can only be designed to deal with the existing situation. Although the demands made by Stalin of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs last October certainly raised the matter unsuccessfully and bore the character of demands intended to ensure to her a privileged position in regard to control of the Straits, those demands appeared nevertheless mainly designed to cover the existing situation. U.S.S.R. had just concluded their agreement with

Germany and their object was to prevent the passage of the Allied fleets into the Black Sea to attack them. There seemed, however, to be no definite attempt to upset the Montreux Convention; in fact, some of Stalin's demands were for an interpretation of the convention, and the draft protocol given to the Minister for Foreign Affairs (my despatch No. 622 of 25th October last) actually contained in its final paragraph the words "in view of the war in Europe."

4. Indeed, the arrangement then proposed can hardly have been expected to cover more than the contingencies of the moment. None of the Straits' régimes for the last 150 years have been in essence more than *ad hoc*. Although some have lasted for long periods in peace time, all have been based on the relative strength of the Powers concerned or of Turkey, and they have been upset every time international equilibrium has changed. An agreement such as that now contemplated, being negotiated in war time, could hardly be expected to last more than the period of the war.

5. In existing circumstances, the desiderata of the three parties concerned would appear roughly as follows:—

(*a*) *Turkey.*—Maintenance of sovereignty and integrity and the certainty of being able to control the Straits in her own interests when any of these are threatened.

(*b*) *Russia.*—Security from attack via the Black Sea by any definite Power, security from attack by Germany via the Danube or the Balkans; freedom for her warships to pass into the Mediterranean.

(*c*) *Great Britain.*—Security from Russian naval threat in the Mediterranean, and freedom to send her warships into the Black Sea either to protect Turkey or for the better prosecution of the war or a possible *démarche* to assist Russia against Germany.

6. The situation since the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs' visit to Moscow has entirely changed. Russia's preoccupation now is to guard herself not against Great Britain but against Germany.

7. It may seem, therefore, that an agreement could be based on the following principles:—

(*a*) Turkey, Russia and Great Britain to agree not to attack one another.

(*b*) Only Great Britain and Russia to agree not to ask Turkey for passage of warships through the Straits for any purpose involving aggression on the other.

(*c*) Turkey only to allow such passage for mutual defensive purposes, and in return [*? group omitted*] assurances to that effect.

(*d*) In the event of Russia or Great Britain joining any Power or combination of Powers at war with the other, above engagements to lapse.

(*e*) Turkey to undertake not to allow her territory or territorial waters to be used by any Power as a base for hostile operations against Great Britain or Russia.

(*f*) Russia and Great Britain to guarantee not to threaten or attack Turkey's independence, security or sovereignty, and to admit ultimate right of Turkey to control the Straits if Turkey considers these to be threatened.
(N.B.—Turkey would anyway assume this right if threatened.)

(*g*) Finally, it would be necessary to reaffirm the validity of the Montreux Convention and to declare that nothing in the proposed agreement could override or vitiate that convention. Our object should be to maintain the Montreux Convention as the best permanent working arrangement in normal times.

8. I have not, of course, mentioned any of this to the Turkish Government, in any case [*? group undecipherable*] it seems right to await the reaction of the Turkish Government to more detailed statement of Stalin's point of view, for which we are now asking.

9. These suggestions do not take into account Stalin's ambitions regarding (*a*) a permanent share in the control of the Straits, (*b*) his opinion that all the Black Sea Powers should share in this control. But possibly he can be made to realise as regards (*a*) that no permanent arrangement is possible now, as regards (*b*) that the term "Black Sea Powers" is a little vague now, as if Russia and Turkey are allowed to take into account only Bulgaria and Roumania are left, and what can really be done now by "Roumania."

[R 6645/84/71] No. 23.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 848.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, July 24, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 703.

I asked secretary general this morning whether there had been any progress in talks between Turkish and Bulgarian Governments regarding concentrations in Thrace. Secretary general informed me that Bulgarian Government had been greatly pleased by Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs' proposal that they should put forward suggestions. They had followed up the matter and Turkish Government had been able to explain to them that, in point of fact, there were no Turkish troops nearer general frontier than usual winter quarters, *i.e.*, about 30 kilom away. Troops which Bulgarians had seen nearer frontier were those engaged in digging fortifications. These were being continually changed and this no doubt had caused Bulgarians apprehension that considerable movements were going on.

2. Bulgarian Government appears to have been entirely satisfied and I gather that matter is concluded.

(Repeated to Sofia.)

[R 6825/316/44] No. 24.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 306.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 25, 1940.*

THE Turkish Ambassador called on the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State on the 22nd July. He described the moment of his call as "the most striking in the history of England." The full grandeur of the traditions of this country, he said, would be observed now that we were fighting alone. Dr. Aras expressed himself as not unhopeful that if the war were to spread and become a world war the Soviet Union would follow the lead of the United States and join in on the side of Great Britain. Turkey would by then be with us, and we should be a long way along the road towards freeing the "Old World" from the Nazi domination which had overtaken it. The only way in which Herr Hitler could escape from his approaching fate would be by making peace.

2. Dr. Aras went on to say that he trusted that in any reply to Herr Hitler's recent speech an attempt should be made to dash from his hands the olive branch which he had proffered. His Excellency meant by this that the world should be prevented from thinking that Herr Hitler was the man who wished to make peace, and that it was Great Britain who wished to continue the war. This could be achieved by showing that it was Herr Hitler who, by his actions, made the continuance of the war inevitable.

3. Continuing, Dr. Aras observed that there were two ways in which the war might develop. First, it might develop in an attack against Great Britain. Secondly, it might develop in the way of a search for petrol. The second development was, in his opinion, on the whole more likely than the first. The search for petrol might lead Germany to the Dardanelles or to Egypt and the Suez Canal. In the former case, Turkey would immediately be implicated in the war, in the latter she would be involved eventually. Of the two courses which lay before Herr Hitler, he considered that the less difficult was to launch a drive into Africa, since an invasion of Great Britain might not prove tempting.

4. In conclusion, his Excellency said that it was interesting to notice how the German attempt to embroil Turkey and the Soviet Union had failed. The Soviet Union itself had denied the existence of a Soviet ultimatum to Turkey. Having failed in this attempt, Herr Hitler had now made advances to the Soviet Union in his recent speech. Though the Soviet Union had made no definite proposals to Turkey about the Straits, relations between the two countries were improving.

5. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo, Moscow and Washington.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[R 3612/1/44] No. 25.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 857.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Angora, July 25, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 810.

Turco-German Commercial Agreement signed to-day.

[R 6776/203/44] No. 26.

Viscount Halifax to Sir S. Cripps (Moscow).

(No. 318.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 26, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 480 [of 18th July: Possible Turco-Soviet understanding regarding the Straits].

The views expressed in your telegram under reference and in earlier telegrams on the subject of taking up with M. Stalin his suggestion that Soviet relations with Turkey might be improved (see paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 399) have been carefully studied. As you will have seen from telegrams exchanged with His Majesty's Ambassador in Angora, the Turkish Government seem ready to permit His Majesty's Government to act as a mediator, provided always that their "full sovereignty and entire political independence and security" are secured (Angora telegram No. 818). The tentative conclusions reached by His Majesty's Government are as follows:—

2. You should seek an early interview with M. Stalin and inform him that the remarks he made at your meeting with him on 1st July, as reported in your telegram No. 399, have been carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, who have, in their turn, consulted the Turkish Government. His Majesty's Government are naturally anxious to do all they can to see a progressive improvement in the relations of Soviet Russia and Turkey and would be quite ready to place their services at the disposal of the Soviet Government with this object in view. At the same time, they must make it plain that the control of the Straits, to which M. Stalin referred, is a matter of great difficulty and complexity. His Majesty's Government would be ready to study any suggestions which the Soviet Government may wish to put forward. But the Soviet Government will no doubt realise the practical difficulties in present circumstances of modifying the Montreux Convention. Moreover, His Majesty's Government do not conceal the view that any modification of the convention which would be of practical utility to the Soviet Government is unlikely to be acceptable to the Turkish Government or, for that matter, to His Majesty's Government. For their part His Majesty's Government consider that the most hopeful line of approach is supplied by the possibility that the Soviet and Turkish Governments, in conjunction perhaps with His Majesty's Government, might recognise that they have a common interest in protecting the security of the Straits against the ever-present threat of German and/or Italian aggression. Might it be possible to reach some *ad hoc* agreement on this basis?

3. Please let me know whether you see serious objections to speaking in the above sense to M. Stalin, it being understood that you would yourself avoid making any concrete suggestions in regard to an *ad hoc* agreement between the two countries for the defence of the Straits, but merely endeavour to elicit such suggestions from M. Stalin.

4. For your own information, since Turkey, under article 21 of the Montreux Convention, has the right to apply the provisions of article 20 when threatened with imminent danger of war, it occurs to me that this right might provide a convenient *point de départ* for an agreement between the two countries under which, during the present crisis, the Soviet Government, if requested to do so by Turkey, would lend her assistance in the actual defence of the Straits.

5. Your Excellency's telegrams show that you yourself are not convinced that an approach which would allow the Straits question to be raised will accrue to the benefit of His Majesty's Government and you seem to feel that in bringing M. Stalin "out into the open" we may push him on to the wrong side of the fence

I agree that there is some slight risk in taking the action suggested above, but I feel that this risk is more than balanced by the fact that (*a*) we shall thus, as we hope, obtain from the Soviet Government a statement of the true nature of their aims in regard to the Straits—for I still believe that the possible resultant disillusionment of the Turks will probably redound to our advantage, (*b*) to fail to take up M. Stalin's invitation might be construed as a rebuff at a moment when we are endeavouring to improve our own relations with the Soviet Union, and (*c*) we cannot afford to renounce any chance, however small, of helping to bring about an improvement in Turco-Soviet relations.

6. Angora telegram No. 825 seems to reinforce views expressed above as to feasibility of an *ad hoc* agreement for defence of Straits against German aggression.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 663.)

[R 6776/203/44] No. 27.

Sir S. Cripps to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received July* 29.)

(No. 529.)
(Telegraphic.) *Moscow, July* 28, 1940.

YOUR telegram No. 318, Angora telegram No. 849, see also my telegram No. 528.

It is not possible for ambassadors to see M. Stalin except on the very rarest occasions, and I do not see any chance of another interview with him under the present circumstances. It is most difficult to obtain an interview with M. Molotov, even on instructions from His Majesty's Government, and I am still waiting for an interview asked for three times. I have refused to see his deputy, to whom I was referred.

2. As I have already stated (see my telegram No. 521), I consider it would be dangerous and unwise for His Majesty's Government to attempt to act as middleman in any negotiations on this subject. The most that we can safely do is to let each party know that the other is willing to discuss the matter, indicating our own attitude, and then leave the initiative to one of two parties.

3. I agree that the only possible form of agreement is *ad hoc*, but such a one as you suggest in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 318 is, in my opinion, impossible. It is precisely the form of guarantee to which the Soviet Government have persistently taken exception, *i.e.*, liability of some other country to decide when and how the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should be called in to assist.

4. If there is to be any question of joint action by Russia and Turkey to protect the Straits, then the Soviet Government will demand the right to take a full share in deciding whether and how that protection is to be given.

5. I appreciate that the Montreux Convention must remain as a permanent basis, but it must be remembered that under article 29 any Government will be free to raise the question of revision in November 1941.

6. I understand that the legal basis for suggestions in Angora telegram No. 849 is that His Majesty's Government, the Soviet Government and Turkey are free to arrive at any arrangement as to how they shall implement their obligations and rights within the convention.

7. If Turkey considers herself threatened with immediate danger of war, she can, under article 21, apply the provision of article 20, which leaves the question of the passage of warships to the sole discretion of Turkish Government, and she can make what arrangements she wishes as to the use of this discretion. It would seem that it is only in such circumstances that there exists a possibility of a new agreement which does not in any way contravene the provisions of the convention.

8. If a statement were to be made to the Soviet Government in the terms of paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 318 commencing: "Moreover, His Majesty's Government do not conceal," this would be interpreted by the Soviet Government as excluding the possibility of revision or clarification of the terms of the convention after November 1941 and would, in my opinion, deter them from coming to an *ad hoc* understanding.

9. If, as I understand and agree, proposition (*c*) in your paragraph 5 is of overriding importance, then His Majesty's Government must be prepared to leave fluid the position after the war, and must not appear to close the door in advance to any modification of the Montreux Convention for which the Soviet Government would be entitled to ask under article 29, and which could be considered on its merits in the light of the existing circumstances.

10. I agree broadly with the first six paragraphs of Angora telegram No. 849. Sub paragraphs (*b*) and (*c*) of paragraph 7 would seem to depend on the Turkish Government taking the view expressed in paragraph 7 above, as otherwise (*b*) and (*c*) would be outside the terms of the Montreux Convention.

11. Subject to this, I agree that the basis laid down in paragraph 7 of Angora telegram is a possible one upon which to proceed, provided that it is possible and desirable to have a tripartite arrangement. In my opinion, it would be more hopeful to start with a two-party negotiation between the Soviet Government and Turkey and to get the latter to suggest our coming in on it at a later stage in the negotiations, if such a course seemed hopeful.

12. To this end I suggest that we make a communication to Soviet Government very confidentially:—

(*a*) We remind them of the fact that, while the Montreux Convention must remain as the permanent basis, it will be open to them to suggest a revision of it in November 1941, and we assure them that His Majesty's Government will share any blame, or, with an open mind in the light of the circumstances then ruling.

(*b*) We inform them that we have reason to believe that Turkey would be prepared on the basis of (*a*) to consider an *ad hoc* arrangement with Soviet Government.

(*c*) We ask, the Soviet Government whether in their view such a basis offers the possibility of useful negotiations and whether it would be possible from their point of view to make such an arrangement to become operative upon application by the Turkish Government of articles 21 and 20.

(*d*) We ask, whether they have any other suggestions as to how a useful *ad hoc* arrangement could be made within the jurisdiction of the Montreux Convention.

(Repeated to Angora.)

[R 6803/203/44] No. 28.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received July* 31.)

(No. 881.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, July* 30, 1940.

MOSCOW telegram No. 529.
Following are my comments:—

(*a*) Paragraph 2.—See my telegram No. 876. I am certain that it would be impossible to induce the Turkish Government to enter into direct negotiations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at present. They [group undecypherable] wish to avoid all responsibility of enquiry now on [group undecypherable] as to Stalin's more detailed views. They wish to avoid giving Union of Soviet Socialist Republics any undue encouragement to hope for concessions, at all events before they know what Stalin's desiderata are.

(*b*) Paragraph 3. I agree with His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow. In my view, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics want to be assisted and do not want to be called in to assist foreign [group undecypherable]. I had some conversation last week with M. Fe [group undecypherable] Okyar, who expressed the view that, so far as permanent requirements were concerned, what Russia wanted was an equal right with Turkey to decide all questions concerned in entry of warships of other Powers into the Black Sea, *i.e.* that the Straits are as much the front door of Russia as of Turkey. He agreed also that if Russia could be reassured as to our own intentions it ought to help matters.

(*c*) Paragraph 4. In the light of M. Fe Okyar's views, I am only suggest that if Soviet Government press a demand as anticipated by His

Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow, some system might be devised for distinguishing between the Dardanelles (which are clearly Turkey's front door more than Russia's) and the Bosphorus; and giving Turkey sole control as regards the former, while admitting to Russia some form of veto or joint control as regards the Bosphorus and [two groups undecypherable] came to a decision as regards protection of the Straits, making some arrangement for Turco-Soviet co-operation or consultation for Bosphorus.

(*d*) Paragraphs 6 and 7.—I agree. I assume reference in paragraph 7 to articles 21 and 20 means that any Turco-Soviet arrangement which may now come for joint protective action or for any interpretation of Turco-Soviet obligations and rights within the Montreux Convention would be, if possible, an expansion or [group undecypherable] Turkey's rights under articles 20 and 21, and would not come in force until a situation had arisen such as is envisaged in those articles. This, I conclude, is also what is intended in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 318 to Moscow.

(*e*) Paragraph 8.—I agree. I think inclusion of sentence quoted from your telegram No. 318 to Moscow would be dangerous now and that it would be better to confine ourselves to the wording of the Turkish reply in my telegram No. 818 in so far as the Turkish Government are concerned. On the other hand, I consider the last two sentences of paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 318 to Moscow would be helpful. But see also (*i*) below.

(*f*) Paragraph 9.—I agree. Position after the war is so unpredictable that we can hardly do anything else.

(*g*) Paragraph 11.—I imagine, in the long run, will have to be tripartite.

(*h*) Paragraph 12.—In principle, I agree all four points, though I am uncertain as to the advisability at present stage of including the reference in (*e*) to articles 21 and 20. In general, I am inclined to think communication on these lines, which could easily be brought into harmony with that proposed in the second paragraph of your telegram No. 318 to Moscow (for instance, (*e*) above), would present advantages that my simple enquiry suggested, in my telegram No. 818, as it sets up in advance certain limits to Soviet reply. But, if we make communication on lines suggested, we shall not exactly be carrying out the wishes of the Turkish Government as contained in my telegram No. 818 (which proposed merely [two groups undecypherable] without committing the Turkish Government). We should rather be putting forward proposals, although very widely and generally. I should like, therefore, to be authorised to consult, or at least inform, the Turkish Government as to this suggested communication before going further.

(Repeated to Moscow.)

[N 6109/40/38] No. 29.

Sir S. Cripps to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received August* 3.)

(No. 560.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Moscow, August* 2, 1940.

MOLOTOV'S speech to Supreme Council.

After stating that no essential change had occurred in Soviet-Turkish relations, Molotov went on to assert that Massigli's disclaimers could not alter character of German white-book documents. As far back as beginning April, Soviet Government had complained of flight of foreign aircraft over Batoum. Turkish Government had at first denied that any aircraft had come from Turkish territory, but had later undertaken to adopt measures to prevent flights of this kind in future. White-book revelations "made it obvious what kind of aeroplane this was."

(Repeated to Angora, No. 46.)

[R 6830/203/44] No. 30.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (*Angora*).

(No. 693.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 3, 1940.

YOUR telegram No. 881 [of 30th July: Communication to be made to Soviet Government regarding Turco-Soviet relations].

A communication to the Soviet Government on the following lines would seem to meet the view of His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow and your Excellency. Please ask Turkish Government whether they see any objection to such a communication:—

(*a*) Remarks regarding Turco-Soviet relations made by M. Stalin at his interview with Sir S. Cripps on 1st July have been carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, who have in their turn consulted the Turkish Government. His Majesty's Government are naturally anxious to do all they can to see a progressive improvement in the relations of Soviet Russia and Turkey, and would be quite ready to place their services at the disposal of the Soviet Government with this object in view. At the same time they must make it plain that the control of the Straits to which M. Stalin referred is a matter of great difficulty and complexity. His Majesty's Government would be ready to study any suggestion which the Soviet Government may wish to put forward.

(*b*) While the Montreux Convention must remain as the permanent basis, it will be open to the Soviet Government to suggest a revision of it in November 1941, and they may be assured that His Majesty's Government will consider any suggestions with an open mind in the light of the circumstances then ruling.

(*c*) For their part His Majesty's Government consider that the most helpful line of approach is supplied by the possibility that the Soviet and Turkish Governments, perhaps in conjunction with His Majesty's Government, might recognise that they have a common interest in protecting the security of the Straits against the ever-present threat of German and/or Italian aggression. They have reason to believe that Turkey would be prepared, while having regard to (*b*) above, to consider an *ad hoc* arrangement on such lines with the Soviet Government.

(*d*) Do the Soviet Government consider such a basis offers possibility for useful negotiations?

(*e*) Have the Soviet Government any other suggestions as to how a useful *ad hoc* arrangement could be made within the jurisdiction of the Montreux Convention?

2. For your own information, necessity for consultation has already caused some delay, and I should hope that Turkish Government will not wish substantially to modify above wording.

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 349.)

[R 6741/5/67] No. 31.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received August* 4.)

(No. 911.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August* 3, 1940.

I TRIED this morning to compare notes with secretary-general as to present developments of German policy in the Balkans. Minister for Foreign Affairs is still away on short holiday.

2. I said that, in addition to German hold on Roumania, we had now witnessed at Salzburg an attempt to carry German authority further by influencing Hungary and Bulgaria in regard to their claims on Roumania. This might be interpreted as an attempt to break up the Balkan *Entente* and thus threaten Turkey's position politically or otherwise.

3. I asked what he considered to be the position of the Balkan *Entente* at present. He replied that judicially it of course still existed. If Bulgaria were to attack Roumania the old question of obligations of the Balkan *Entente* would arise. Nevertheless, he thought it most unlikely that such an attack would take place, and he was certain that Bulgaria was waiting for the fruit to be well stewed before it dropped into her mouth without any effort on her part. On the political side, he said, there were rumours that Italy was making suggestions to Roumania that Roumania should come to some direct understanding with Turkey. Object of this was, presumably, further disruption of the Balkan *Entente*. He did not, however, think this proposal very feasible, and in any case it was only a rumour.

4. Speaking of Roumania, he agreed with private information that the German hold did not appear to be complete, and that, apart from the position of Russia with regard to the same country, there were signs of development of a national spirit which might upset German calculations. But he told me that the Turkish Ambassador at Bucharest reported that throughout his period in Roumania he had never seen the people so depressed and demoralised.

5. I then asked in these circumstances what he thought was the true reason of the present German desire for peace in the Balkans. Germany could not only be interested in the Balkan harvest, which in any case would be of very little use to her, unless she came and took it, as there might not be much to spare. He answered that in his opinion Germany was using the Balkans as a political reserve, on which she could ultimately draw to provide satisfaction for Italy and Russia in the event of her being victorious. From this point of view it was necessary to keep things quiet in the Balkans, and, in the event of victory, Germany would then be able to settle things peacefully and make small concessions in the Balkans as would be necessary to satisfy her friends.

6. I said that it was sometimes suggested that Germany would make a military move in this part of the world. It seemed to me that such a move could only be an alternative to invasion of Great Britain, as the effort of making both together would be too great, and Germany would probably not have enough strength left for a move in the Balkans if she tried conclusions with either on a large scale. Secretary-general agreed. He did not by any means rule out the possibility of a German advance in the Balkans, but he thought it would not be [? group omitted] because, as he put it, if this were to take place we should be more or less back in the position of 1918.

7. See also my immediately following telegram.

(Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest and Sofia.)

[R 3812/1/44] No. 32.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 912.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August 3, 1940.*

MY immediately preceding telegram. I spoke to the secretary-general this morning about signs which I have noticed of the resumption of German intrigue here. These appear both political and commercial.

2. On the political side I mentioned the article in the *Berliner Börsenzeitung* of 30th July by Megerle. This article expressed the view that since the Salzburg and Rome conversations, events were developing in such a way as to deny to the Balkan *Entente* any right to further existence. The end of the *entente* placed Turkish aspiration [? s in a difficult position]. She would have to decide whether to go on with her present policy which would render her final eviction from Europe definite. Turkey must choose between this and a "free and reasonable adaptation to the present European conditions which can no more be changed" (see also Sofia telegram No. 444).

3. On the commercial side, I mentioned certain articles in Turkish press and German propaganda which had been actively mobile since the signature of Turco-German Commercial Agreement, with a view to further expansion of Turco-German trade. The secretary-general said that Germans are taking the line that [? present] agreement is a matter between the Governments, and that the Turkish Government have control of the trade covered in the agreement. This

deprives individual Turkish firms which previously traded with Germany of any benefit, and therefore trade should be further increased to give them a settlement. Secretary-general stated that the German Ambassador had recently proposed a further agreement covering £T. 200 million worth of goods. With this there had been hint of the good prospects of the Turkish harvest. Secretary-general does not appear to have given an encouraging reply, and stated the figure was quite out of [? reach of] statistics in general. The secretary-general said that Turkish Government were fully alive to the fact that German intrigue would be continued.

(Repeated Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest and Sofia).

[R 6825/316/44] No. 33.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 314.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 6, 1940.*

I ASKED the Turkish Ambassador to call this afternoon in order to give his Excellency an opportunity for an exchange of views about the international situation.

2. In the course of a general conversation Dr. Aras said that he had never admired more than he did to-day the calm resolution of the people of this country, in the face of a situation the danger of which they fully realised. In the course of their history, his Excellency said, the British people had always shown the greatest obstinacy in defending their cause, but at the same time a perfect readiness to consider a reasonable compromise. More than once he expressed his conviction that, if Hitler were a really intelligent statesman, the best thing he could do to-day would be to come to a reasonable arrangement with Great Britain, by which the latter would be left in control of the seas. I told his Excellency that if by this he meant that Great Britain should allow Hitler to dominate Europe, a settlement on these lines would not appeal to British opinion for very obvious reasons. The Ambassador explained that it was no part of his meaning that this country would not also have a great part to play in the organisation of Europe, since the extent of the British Empire was such that no real settlement could be reached anywhere without its collaboration. Such an understanding between Germany and Great Britain was precisely what Italy feared, though, paradoxically enough, she also feared a long war. Turkey, however, for her part, would welcome an Anglo-German understanding on these lines, for so long as Great Britain were undefeated Turkey would have no reason to fear Germany.

3. His Excellency went on to say that, while he could not foretell whether Hitler had sufficient intelligence to resist the desire for further successes, he was sure that he must always have in mind the consideration that by launching a large-scale attack against this country he would inevitably incur losses which would leave Germany in a state of relative weakness *vis-à-vis* her so-called friends, Italy and the Soviet Union.

4. As regards the latter Power, his Excellency said that he had not been favourably impressed by M. Molotov's recent speech. As a friend of the Soviet Union he could only deplore the attitude which M. Molotov had adopted towards Great Britain, for it could not be in the interests of the Soviet Government to do anything to weaken Britain's power of resistance at this juncture. It should be remembered, however, that M. Molotov had an exaggerated fear of Germany which often caused his political judgment to err.

5. When we were discussing the various future courses of action open to Germany, the Ambassador expressed the view that action by Germany in the Eastern Mediterranean was unlikely, since it would entail great practical difficulties, as well as the use of considerable land forces, in an area where the British fleet could be particularly effective. The Germans, he said, knew enough about Turkey to realise that she would not desert Great Britain, and that threats would not move the Turks any more than they moved the inhabitants of these islands. In the circumstances German activities in Turkey were largely confined to the spreading of peace propaganda.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[R 6830/203/44] No. 34.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 935.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August 6, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 693.

I was unable to see secretary-general [until] afternoon of 6th August owing to his absence. I have now given him French translation of proposed communication and asked him to let me have views of the Turkish Government at the earliest possible moment, as it is important to avoid further delay.

2. Secretary-general will consult Prime Minister and I hope to receive the answer to-morrow.

3. After reading it through he expressed preliminary opinion that it opened the door too widely and gave the Soviet Government too many opportunities for assuming concessions in their favour without committing them to anything in return.

4. He informed me that he had received a telegram from Turkish Ambassador in Moscow stating that His Majesty's Ambassador took a very serious view of Molotov's speech. Secretary-general has replied to Turkish Ambassador expressing views similar to those reported in my telegram No. 908 and emphasising that he does not consider Molotov's speech in any sense alarming. He has also instructed Turkish Ambassador to inform Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs of his desire to pay a rapid visit to Angora, leaving about 9th August. Turkish Ambassador is to make it clear that he wants to be absent from his post as short a time as possible. He is also to ask Deputy Commissar whether Soviet Government can make any suggestions for improving Turco-Soviet relations and making them more cordial. He would communicate any such suggestions to Turkish Government while in Angora.

Secretary-general at first wished to defer the answer with respect to your draft communication until he had seen the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow, but I have urged him not to do this.

(Repeated to Moscow.)

[R 6920/17/44] No. 35.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 938.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August 7, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 154, Circular.

As regards external affairs, there is nothing to add to my recent telegrams.

2. As regards internal affairs, position of the Government appears perfectly sound and that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs has been fortified by recent German attempts to get rid of him.

3. Turkey has large army in Thrace, Caucasus and Western Anatolia ready and [group undecypherable]s.

[R 6830/203/44] No. 36.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 954.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August 9, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 935.

I have now received the views of the Turkish Government on the communication proposed in your telegram No. 693.

2. Briefly Turkish Government consider proposed communication leaves too many openings for Soviet Government, who, in their opinion, would take advantage of whatever offers are implied on our side and refuse any advance

on their own side. They adhere therefore to the view that it would be unwise to express any opinions or make any suggestions until Stalin's views are known, and that therefore the best course is to act on lines indicated in my telegram No. 818. Secretary-general repeated that the Turkish Government desired to keep entirely in the background at the present stage.

3. He handed me an oral communication to the effect that proposed communication went beyond framework of my conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs and himself, and that it was desirable to adhere to the method outlined in my telegram No. 818. Secretary-general's communication went on to remind me that Turkish Government on their part considered any examination of Straits question should have for its point exclusively the safeguarding of Turkish sovereignty, political independence and security within the limits of which special situation of the Black Sea States could be considered.

4. I pointed out that there had never been any question of Turkish or indeed British rights being infringed, and that we had made this quite clear. But secretary-general seems fearful that if communication is made in terms proposed in your telegram No. 693 Stalin will be able to score some points against these rights, and, while refusing an agreement with us on the lines proposed, to maintain for the future the use of the argument that we had shown willingness to make concessions. He explained also that he did not think any such offer as is implied in proposed communication would be likely to deter Stalin from joining Germany and Italy if he intended to do so, as in such a case he would clearly hope to realise his ambitions in regard to the Straits with their assistance, and it would not matter what we said.

(Repeated to Moscow.)

[R 6933/318/44] No. 37.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 957.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August 9, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 912.

I informed the secretary-general this morning that I had learnt on absolutely reliable authority that a secretary of the German Embassy had stated that the German Ambassador had returned from Berlin with information and instructions which would produce interesting developments.

2. The secretary-general informed me that Von Papen had visited him at Istanbul on his return and had pointed out that Germany was now engaged in rearranging the Balkans, and that it would be in Turkey's interest to accept the new régime and to use her influence to support it and to maintain peace. The Balkan *Entente* was dead, the Tripartite Treaty with Great Britain and France was dead, Turkey was isolated, she must therefore follow German lead. The secretary-general appears to have returned an uncompromising reply and spoke with some sarcasm in informing me of the above.

3. I remarked that Von Papen's conversation was much on the lines of the article referred to in my telegram No. 912, second paragraph. The secretary-general replied that the German Ambassador had expressed great annoyance that this article had not been reproduced in the Turkish press, and had stated that it came from an official source.

4. The German Ambassador had also tried to scare the secretary-general with the alarming nature of Molotov's speech. The secretary-general had replied that too much importance should not be attached to that speech, but that if the German Ambassador's view of its significance was correct he should remember that Molotov had said things which were not pleasant for Germany, *e.g.*, that the war would be a long one and that the United States were on our side.

(Repeated to Athens, Bucharest, Budapest, Belgrade and Sofia.)

[R 6987/203/44] No. 38.

Sir S. Cripps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 602.)
(Telegraphic.) *Moscow, August 11, 1940.*

ANGORA telegram No. 954.

After my interview with Stalin I originally advocated trying to bring about a Turco-Soviet rapprochement. I naturally assumed the Turkish Government would welcome this and be prepared to play their part as one of the two principals. It is now clear, however, that this assumption has proved incorrect.

2. Even if I could secure another interview with Stalin, to go to him again without a single helpful or concrete suggestion (after six weeks to consider his earlier remark) and with nothing but a request that he should hold forth afresh on his own attitude towards Turkey would merely be an irritant. His attitude, as we all know, is still inspired largely by [? resentment] at *non possumus* line taken by Saracoglu when he was last in Moscow; and in the light of recent Angora telegrams I do not see how I could honestly pretend that the Turkish Government [? were now very much] more forthcoming.

3. We cannot hope to secure a betterment of Turkish Government relations with Russia without their co-operation, and her unsuccessful attempt to do so, necessarily [? involving] some emphasis on the existing causes of difficulties, would merely prejudice our relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as increasing the danger of a combined Russo German move to alter the *status quo* in the Straits.

4. I suggest the time has come to make this position quite plain to the Turkish Government and to intimate that failing a more helpful attitude on their part we do not propose to do anything further.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 49.)

[R 6830/203/44] No. 39.

Viscount Halifax to Sir S. Cripps (Moscow).

(No. 381.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 13, 1940*

YOU will have seen from Angora telegram No. 954 that the Turkish Government do not agree to the proposed communication to the Soviet Government set out in my telegram to Angora No. 693, and prefer that you should simply "make the necessary soundings with the Soviet Government in order to learn their point of view, &c.," as indicated in Angora telegram No. 818.

2. Such soundings, if oral, could presumably be made only of either M. Stalin or M. Molotov. In view of the difficulty of seeing either of these, it would probably be necessary to make a written communication to the Soviet Government. This communication might be on the following lines:—

"Remarks regarding Turco-Soviet relations made by M. Stalin at his interview with your Excellency on the 2nd July have been carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, who have in their turn consulted the Turkish Government. His Majesty's Government are naturally anxious to do all they can to see a progressive improvement in the relations of Soviet Russia and Turkey, and would be quite ready to place their services at the disposal of the Soviet Government with this object in view. They would therefore be glad to learn the point of view of the Soviet Government in this matter."

3. Your Excellency may consider that such a communication is open to the objection referred to in your telegram No. 460, namely, that it will be interpreted by the Soviet Government as a blank cheque. I am inclined to take this view myself, and, if you share it, I shall be quite ready to drop the proposed communication altogether.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 762.)

[R 7048/203/44] No. 40.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received August* 15.)

(No. 980.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August* 14, 1940.

MOSCOW telegram No. 602.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has returned, and I spoke to him this morning pointing out that there seemed to be objection to both courses which had been proposed, viz., that in my telegram No. 518 and that in your telegram No. 693. I said I had not as yet received your views on Moscow telegram No. 602, but it seemed to me that certain considerations stood out clearly, viz., (*a*) either course proposed might have the effect of drawing from Soviet Government demands which could not be followed up; (*b*) in that event our last position would be worse than our first; (*c*) there seemed to be no call for haste, in fact it would appear to be imprudent to go too fast. I therefore suggested the best course now was to await the arrival here of the Turkish Ambassador who might be able to throw more light on the problem. He is due within the next day or two.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs entirely agreed. In his view Stalin will commit himself to nothing, either with Germany or ourselves, while the issue between the belligerents remains undecided, but that if the issue goes in our favour the Soviet Government will make some move towards us of their own accord.

3. Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow, in reply to the question indicated at the end of paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 935, had only obtained an answer to the effect that the Soviet Government would be most happy to receive any expression of views or suggestions from the Turkish Government. For the rest, he had been received in most friendly manner both by Molotov and by the Assistant Commissar.

4. The Minister for Foreign Affairs will explain Turkish policy fully to the Ambassador when he arrives (see my telegram No. 876).

5. In view of the above, and subject to your views on the Moscow telegram, it would seem best to leave matters as they are until it has been possible to discuss the whole position with the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow.

6. Your telegram No. 381 to Moscow has just arrived. Suggestion submitted above seems consistent with the views expressed in last paragraph of your telegram.

(Repeated to Moscow.)

[R 7119/5/67] No. 42.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 998.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August* 16, 1940.

GERMAN Ambassador saw Minister for Foreign Affairs and also President of the Republic on 15th August. Minister for Foreign Affairs has given me the following account :—

2. German Ambassador explained at both interviews that Hitler had desired him to inform the Turkish Government directly as to what had taken place at Salzburg; it was recognised that Turkey was an important element in the Balkans and had a right to know. Hitler had been most reluctant to take any initiative in settling small disputes, and particularly wished to avoid acting as arbiter. He had acted so at Vienna on one occasion without success, and did not wish to repeat the experience. Nevertheless, he had been approached from several quarters with requests to act in this capacity, and had finally decided to offer his services after receiving a letter from the King of Roumania asking him to do so. Nevertheless, he had done his best to confine himself to giving good advice and encouragement to the parties concerned to settle their disputes among themselves. Minister for Foreign Affairs asked whether this applied only to questions outstanding between Roumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, or whether anything had been said about other matters, such as Bulgarian claims against Greece or Yugo-Lavia. German Ambassador replied that matters had been limited to questions between Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria.

3. Herr von Papen then turned to Turco German relations. Germany fully recognised that Turkey would be loyal to Anglo Turkish alliance, and she had no desire to oppose this. Nevertheless, it did not seem to be a necessary consequence of this policy that Turkey should show so much hostility to Germany. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was not Turkey who had made rupture but Germany, who had cancelled the Turco German Commercial Treaty, and various contracts for war materials on order for Turkey. Putting aside the attitude of the press it would be impossible for the German Ambassador to point to any concrete case in which Turkey had adopted a hostile attitude to Germany. Herr von Papen at first tried to in the press, but had to accept Minister for Foreign Affairs' statement. Nevertheless, he pressed for a more friendly attitude in general. German Ambassador asked reason for Turkish mobilisation and concentration in Thrace, which he tried to interpret as offensive in purpose. He also mentioned reports about preparations for offensive from Salonica against Germany. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that these were purely defensive measures necessitated by the disturbing situations all round and the need for being prepared for any danger which might arise. He mentioned the present trouble between Italy and Greece which had suddenly appeared out of a blue sky. Moreover, early preparations were more necessary for Turkey, as she had no benefit of high industrial development and communications like European countries. As to Salonica it had been throughout a purely defensive matter, and in the existing situation General Staff would have been to blame if they had not prepared for every possible eventuality.

4. German Ambassador also suggested that some of the Turkish preparations might be directed against Russia. This was strongly repudiated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who mentioned protocol 2 of the Tripartite Treaty, and pointed out that in every political engagement or action undertaken by Turkey there was always a reservation in the sense of maintaining friendship with Russia.

5. German Ambassador spoke of the recent German white book and made some expression of regret at what had passed. He said that Germany had "eu beaucoup de torts" in consequence. Minister for Foreign Affairs asked why the Germans had falsified publication as reported in my telegram No. 798. German Ambassador tried to make little of this and stated that the person responsible had been dismissed.

6. On leaving Herr von Papen asked whether his Excellency thought Germany could do anything to alleviate friction between Italy and Greece. Minister for Foreign Affairs said anything that could be done to preserve peace would be effected. He commented on the fact that the German press and broadcasts had made no allusion to the Græco-Italian situation.

7. At audience with the President most of the above was repeated. In addition, the President asked the German Ambassador direct question why Germany did not make peace. Herr von Papen replied that Great Britain refused to do so. He then asked whether the President would be prepared to make some suggestion as regards peace. President replied that it would do more harm than good if he were to make such a suggestion at the prompting of one party alone as this would be indication of weakness of that party.

(Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, Sofia, Bucharest, Budapest and Moscow.)

[R 7058/764/19] No. 43.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 792.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 18, 1940.*

ATHENS telegrams Nos. 655 and 662 [of 13th and 14th August respectively] and my telegram to Athens No. 509 [of 17th August: Italian campaign against Greece and Greek preparations for defence of Crete].

It is not possible as yet to elucidate the motives which underly the present Italian campaign against Greece, but, as reported in paragraph 3 of Athens telegram No. 662, it seems not at all improbable that the real objective may be Crete. The Italians may intend actually to occupy the island or, alternatively, they may be hoping by methods of intimidation to induce in Greece a state of mind which would permit them to obtain the use of the island without fighting. On the other hand, Corfu, the Province of Tsamouria or Salonica are possible objectives.

2. You will see from my telegram No. 509 to Athens that Sir M. Palairet has instructions to enquire of the Greek Government whether they have any intention of reinforcing the garrison in Crete and of improving the defences of the island.

3. I shall be glad if you will draw the attention of the Turkish Government to the threatening attitude of the Italian Government towards Greece and will suggest to them that it would be well if our two Governments were to consult together on the existing situation on the basis of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. I leave it to your Excellency to decide whether it would be best to invoke any article of the treaty in support of the need for consultation, or whether it would be best to mention the treaty in general terms only.

4. The object of such consultation would be to inform the Turkish Government that we take a serious view of Italian threats to Greece and that, in particular, we are anxious that Crete should not fall into the hands of the enemy. You will gather, however, from paragraphs 3 and 4 of my telegram to Athens No. 509 that our aid to Greece would in present circumstances take an indirect form.

5. On the assumption that the Turks are agreed that consultation between our two Governments would be desirable, I shall be glad if you will give them our views as contained in the preceding paragraphs and will attempt to ascertain their own views on the situation, and in particular, and in as discreet a manner as possible, whether, if, in the event of an Italian attack, we came to the assistance of Greece under our guarantee of 13th April, 1939, the Turkish Government would co-operate effectively with us in accordance with article 3 of the treaty.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 516; Belgrade, No. 430; Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, No. 15; and Commander-in chief, Middle East, No. 12.)

[R 7211/764/19] No. 44.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 1017.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August 20, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 792.

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. I [group omitted], by saying that you were concerned at the attitude of Italy to Greece, which you

considered threat[? omitted : ening], [? and] that you were therefore desirous of exchanging views and information with the Turkish Government, in fact, of "consulting" with them. This consultation would be in accordance with the spirit of the treaty and I hoped that his Excellency would agree.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs at once expressed agreement and I therefore spoke in the sense of the rest of your telegram and of paragraphs 3 and 5 (last sentence only) of your telegram No. 509 to Athens. I also informed him, in strict confidence, of what M. Metaxas had said to Sir M. Palairet, as reported in Athens telegram No. 688, and reminded him even at the time of staff conversations at Haifa we had decided that we could not allow Crete to fall into enemy hands.

3. I then asked him on the basis of mutual consultation to give me information and views of the Turkish Government.

4. Minister for Foreign Affairs repeated the view already reported in my telegram No. 1006. He reiterated his conviction that Italy would not attack Greece and said that Greek Ambassador held the same view. I went on to say that I should be grateful if he would tell me how, in his view, Turkey stood in relation to this matter. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Turkey had some reason to be dissatisfied with her colleagues of the Balkan *Entente*. Turkey was, in fact, bearing the whole brunt of the Balkan *Entente* obligation and incurring all the expense: she was maintaining a large force in Thrace, whereas neither Greece nor Yugoslavia were doing anything. He had instructed Turkish Ambassador to complain about this in Athens.

5. I then said that, if I understood rightly, Turkey was getting [group undecypherable] concerned for three reasons, viz., the Balkan Pact, the Turco-Greek Alliance (which I believed was more definite in its terms) and our own treaty. I do not propose to ask question now, but it was clear that the question of Turkey's attitude under our treaty might arise automatically at any moment and I should be glad if he could give me some indication as to how he felt about it.

6. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he could make no categorical statement offhand. In principle, he was entirely in favour of fulfilment of treaty. It was difficult to say more. In further conversation, which was vague, he maintained that it would not do for Turkey to offend Russia and that relations with Russia were not so good as they were. I think that remark is significant, especially as his Excellency immediately afterwards agreed with me when I said that I considered that, in the light of what had been negotiated recently in Moscow, relations with Russia had, in fact, improved. I also said that the action in support of Greece could hardly be regarded as an offence to Russia.

7. My impression is that Minister for Foreign Affairs was leaving the door very wide open for [? eventually] avoiding anything beyond "consultation," though he appeared quite definite about consultations. I therefore avoided pressing the point and merely left the door very wide open for myself to resume the subject when necessary.

8. My own view is that if [group undecypherable] with his obligations under article 3, Turkey would make some excuse for [? group omitted] fulfilling its terms. This attitude might, however, be different if British success against Italy becomes marked, or in the event of conspicuous German failure in invasion scheme. But I should add that Admiral Kelly, who saw Deputy Chief of Staff this morning on a technical matter at the request of commander-in-chief, had some discussion on this matter and was informed by Deputy Chief of Staff that Turkey had no engagements to help Greece, and had no intention of doing so. He recognised the importance of Crete, but, in spite of the menace to Turkey and Turkish communications involved in enemy occupation of Crete, it was left to ourselves to deal with it. I learnt of Admiral Kelly's conversation just before going to see Minister for Foreign Affairs, but, of course, did not mention it.

(Repeated to Athens; Belgrade; and Commander-in-chief, Cairo (for Middle East).)

[R 6920/17/44] No. 45.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received August* 22.)

(No. 1021.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August* 21, 1940.

MY telegram No. 938: Fortnightly report.

In external affairs the focus of interest has shifted from Turco-Soviet relations to the events in the Balkans. Commercial and financial questions continue to bulk largest in Anglo-Turkish relations and progress tends to be unsatisfactorily slow.

2. *Internal.*—Suspension of pro-German *Cumhuriyet*, arrests of Germans on charges of spying, impending trial of a well-known German archæologist on a charge of espionage, and amendments to the law concerning the stay of foreigners in Turkey and demands [? group omitted : for] increased precautions against Fifth Column activities.

3. The President of the Republic has been touring various regions, including that of the recent earthquake, and speech-making campaign all over the country to explain the Government's policy continues. Campaign for increasing the membership of and subscriptions to the Air League has been launched.

4. Largely unsuccessful efforts to check the rise in the cost of living and to suppress profiteering and hoarding continue.

[R 7224/764/19] No. 46.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received August* 22.)

(No. 1037.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August* 21, 1940.

MY telegram No. 1028, last paragraph.

It seems important to be clear in order to grasp the nature and range of assistance which we should require from Turkey in the event of war between Italy and Greece. Last sentence of your telegram No. 792 seems to imply that we should expect the fullest degree of assistance provided for under clause III, article 8, which would not involve Turkey entering the war. On the other hand, as indicated in my telegram No. 1017, I think it most unlikely that Turkey would go so far and that she would probably stop short at "consultations."

2. Although in your Lordship's speech, of which I was informed in your telegram No. 589, you expressed the understanding of and agreement with the Turkish decision not to enter war when Italy did so, I feel there is the danger of unfavourable reaction at home if Turkey disappoints us a second time. Such a reaction might be damaging to the policy of the Anglo-Turkish Alliance, and would certainly give Germany an opening to make capital here. This is exactly what the Germans want and are looking out for. It seems therefore advisable to decide exactly what we consider would be Turkey's most useful contribution if only in order to know how disappointed we ought to be if we fail to get it.

3. I do not see that we should gain much advantage in present circumstances by having Turkey as a co-belligerent. (*a*) She would certainly not send troops to Greece. (*b*) She would only get at Italy in the Dodecanese, which would involve naval and air support from us, the latter of which would be impossible to provide at present. (*c*) She is not really fully equipped, and would continue to ask for more material and other help from ourselves, particularly now that the French have defaulted on a large amount of their obligations, especially as regards anti-tank guns. (*d*) Russia might be tempted to take advantage of Turkey's preoccupations elsewhere, especially to make demands regarding the Straits. In short, I feel convinced in present circumstances Turkey would prove to be more of a liability than an asset as a co-belligerent. Question seems to me to be entirely one of expediency and to have no effect on fundamental advantage of policy of alliance. But I mention these considerations to illustrate that in my opinion we ought not to be greatly disappointed if Turkey refuses to adopt a policy which would land her in war.

4. Between that course and "consultation" there may be intermediate courses, although it is difficult to suggest assistance which would not entail serious risk of involving Turkey [? in the] war. All three services are already on a war footing, though there is little disturbance of ordinary civil life. Need for naval and air bases in Turkey would seem to be less if we have bases in Greek islands and on the mainland.

I doubt inducing the Turkish Government to stop Italian merchant vessels or neutral vessels carrying cargo to Italy, though they might be persuaded to be as obstructive as possible. They are already doing a good deal in this connexion. As regards trade with Italy, there is practically none going on owing to heavy balance already existing against Italy in clearing account and owing to expense of overland route. Expulsion of Italians would, I think, not be agreed to, though we might ask for it.

5. Of measures which might be taken there remain closing of the Straits under article 21 of Montreux Convention and rupture of relations (or at least recall of ambassador).

6. I think the two points mentioned in preceding paragraph and possibly that regarding expulsion of the Italians represent the maximum which we could ask.

7. I recommend that the best course will be for you to inform me exactly how much I should ask for, and that I should be authorised to touch on these points with the Minister for Foreign Affairs tentatively in advance by way of exchange of views on the basis of "consultation" to examine what would be best course for Turkey to follow if crisis arises. I think that it would be most imprudent to face Turkey with any direct request or proposals based on article 3 at the last [? moment].

8. I also consider that [? in] any decision reached by Turkey as to her action, her treaty in the event of war between Italy and Greece should be represented publicly as having been reached after consultation and in agreement between His Majesty's Government and Turkey.

9. It is worth mentioning that our recent air successes and Prime Minister's speech have had most heartening effect here.

10. My service attachés and also Admiral Kelly entirely agree with above.

(Repeated to Athens; Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean; Cairo (for Middle East); and Belgrade and Sofia (Saving).)

[R 7224/764/19] No. 47.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 840.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 23, 1940.*

YOUR telegrams No. 1017 [of 20th August] and No. 1037 [of 21st August: Attitude of Turkey in the event of an Italian attack on Greece].

I agree with the views expressed in your telegram No. 1037, and request that you will proceed on the lines suggested in paragraph 7.

2. As regards the form which Turkish assistance should take in the event of an Italian attack on Greece, we would wish that the attitude of the Turkish Government should be in a general way as favourable to us as possible, *e.g.*, regarding the violation of Turkish air and waters, and as unfavourable as possible to Italian interests, *e.g.*, as regards the passage of Italian merchant ships in the Straits and elsewhere. I agree that you should mention the specific points referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 of your telegram No. 1037, omitting, however, reference to closing the Straits. Article 21 of the Montreux Convention gives Turkey the right to close the Straits only to warships, and this would not be of appreciable advantage to us in present circumstances.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 551; Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, No. 17; M.I.C.E., c/o Middle East, Cairo, No. 15; Belgrade, No. 464; and Sofia, No. 337.)

[R 7254/764/19] No. 48.

Sir M. Palairet to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 738.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, August 23, 1940.*

ANGORA telegram No. 1037.

I agree that it would be better to avoid any public quarrel with Turkey if possible. This does not, however, seem to me to be the crux of present situation.

2. If Greece is attacked now, the real question is not whether they are fully equipped, but whether it is better to fight having Greece as a partner or wait until Axis Powers (through Italian or Bulgarian agency) are established in Salonica and other air bases in Macedonia. To fight after that had happened would necessitate a far greater degree of preparedness. Is it likely that this will be achieved unless the Axis commit unprecedented folly of allowing a long time to elapse?

3. Fundamental question for His Majesty's Government seems to be this: if we cannot prevent Turkey from refusing to enter war if Greece is attacked, are we ever likely to be in a better position to get her to play her part? If Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen's arguments are accepted, one cannot help wondering why we were at such pains and expense to obtain Turkey's alliance. Moreover, I fail to follow suggestion of Turkey [two groups undecypherable] and give practical military, naval and air help to Greece ourselves as a co-belligerent. If required, I will submit detailed suggestions of service attaché.

4. It also appears to me possible that firm declaration by Turkey of her intention to enter war in defence of Greece might prevent an Italian attack on Greece altogether. General consequences of Turkey failing to fulfil her engagements to us seems to me likely to be very serious; and will anyone be taken in by Turkey making Russia a good excuse for evasion in this case?

(Repeated to Angora, Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, and Cairo (for Middle East).)

[R 7314/764/19] No. 49.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 1072.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August 26, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 840.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. Greek Ambassador had just been with him, and as I had learnt earlier from the Greek Ambassador that he views the situation with anxiety I began by saying that I understood the position was not as good as when I saw his Excellency on 24th August (my telegram No. 1065). Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed, and expressed some anxiety on his side.

2. I then said that after the conversation reported in my telegram No. 1017 I had reported fully to you what had passed, and that your view was that our consultations should continue with complete frankness, as it was evidently better that we should follow the situation together rather than that, when a crisis arose, I should come to him with some general request based on article No. 3. I added that we understood the Turkish position and difficulties, and that I felt confident that his Excellency understood ours.

3. I then said that I wished to carry the consultation further, though what I was about to say was, at present, in theory only and implied no concrete proposal. I went on to speak as instructed in your telegram No. 840, paragraph 2, adding that there was a further important consideration, namely, that mentioned in paragraph 2 of His Majesty's Minister at Athens' telegram No. 738.

4. Minister for Foreign Affairs began by saying that Turkey was doing a lot by maintaining her present concentrations in Thrace. He seemed sympathetically inclined to the suggestions in the first sentence of paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 840, though he said that difficulty would arise because of the [? British and French] flight over the Caucasus frontier, orders had been given to fire on any unknown aeroplane flying over Turkish territory. I suggest this

difficulty might be overcome if necessary warning were conveyed by us to the Turkish Government, or if any special area were indicated to them. Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed to concur, but did not give a final or decisive answer on this.

5. He [? unexpectedly] did not like the suggestion of the recall of the Ambassador, and remarked that, on the contrary, it might be useful to maintain Turkish Ambassador in Rome as one of the few remaining sources of information.

6. As regards the expulsion of Italians, he said that there were in Turkey about 1,100 Italians; most of them were Jewish. If there were expelled our difficulties as to admission of Jews into Palestine would only be increased. I said that the important thing was to expel undesirable Italians, and we agreed that Turkish Government were already pretty active in this matter, as indeed they are in the case of Germans.

7. Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed fully alive to the point mentioned in His Majesty's Minister at Athens' telegram No. 738, paragraph 2. He told me that the Turkish Government had not yet taken a decision as to the course they would pursue. I said that what I had been saying came therefore [? exactly] at the moment I had wished, and I trusted that in reaching their decision the Turkish Government would take what I had said into consideration.

8. Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked Turkish press had been taking a strong line, even to the point of announcing that if Italy attacked Greece, Turkey would go to war. He evidently thought the press had gone too far. He said that a strong line taken by the Turkish Government now might influence Italian action.

9. Knowing that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed my Greek colleague of our conversation reported in my telegram No. 1017, I asked his Excellency if he agreed to my keeping fully in touch with the Greek Ambassador as to what passed between us. His Excellency agreed.

10. I am seeing the Greek Ambassador very shortly.

(Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, Sofia, Commander-in-chief and M.I.C.E.)

[R 7224/764/19] No. 50.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 859.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 27, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 840 [of the 23rd August].

Whatever may be the intentions of the Turkish Government, I hope that they will try, by their military dispositions and their general attitude, to give the Italian Government the impression that they intend to intervene at once in the event of Italy attacking Greece. This would, I hope, act as a strong deterrent and thus indirectly conribute to the defence of Greece.

Please speak to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in this sense if you see no objection.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 564; Belgrade, No. 472; Sofia, No. 343; Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, No. 20; and Cairo (for Middle East Intelligence Centre), No. 19.)

[R 7334/764/19] No. 51.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 1099.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, August 28, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 859.

I spoke accordingly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. He first reminded me of tone of Turkish press (see my telegram No. 1072, paragraph 8), which he thought must have good effect. He also referred to Turkish concentrations in Thrace, and he told me that the Turkish Government were on the point of insisting on the expulsion of 160 foreigners; most of them were Germans and Italians or Hungarians. Foreign representatives concerned were being asked to secure their removal, otherwise they would be turned out by the Turkish Government.

2. He appeared to realise the force of my argument and gave me a generally reassuring reply, but it was very general.

3. He informed me that Turkish Ambassador in Rome had been told by the Soviet Ambassador that, when the latter had enquired as to the intentions of the Italian Government in regard to Greece, Count Ciano had replied that Italy did not intend to push the matter to extremes.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Ambassador in Rome had received a similar reply.

(Repeated to Athens, Belgrade, Sofia, Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, and M.I.C.E.)

[R 7314/764/19] No. 52.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 884.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 1, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 1072 [of 20th August: Attitude of Turkey in the event of an Italian attack on Greece]

In the course of your consultations with the Turkish Government you should bear in mind the need of a joint Anglo-Turkish declaration, covering Turkey's attitude, in the event of Italy attacking Greece (see paragraph 8 of your telegram No. 1037).

2. As you will remember, we tried, and failed, to obtain this in the case of Italy coming into the war, but on that occasion the situation was complicated by the sudden collapse of France. In the present case we must be adamant on this point, and it should be made clear to the Turkish Government that we consider their agreement to such a declaration as the acid test of their sincerity.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 581; Sofia, No. 348; Belgrade, No. 484; and Moscow, No. 470.)

[R 7432/593/44] No. 53.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 398. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Angora, July 16, 1940.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 379, Confidential, of the 5th July, 1939, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith my report on the heads of foreign missions in Turkey in 1939-40.

I have, &c.
H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

Enclosure in No. 53.

Report on the Heads of Foreign Missions in Turkey.

[Passages taken from previous reports are marked with an asterisk.]

Afghanistan.

*Sirdar Faiz Mohamad Khan presented his letters as Afghan Ambassador on the 6th February, 1939.

I met Faiz Mohamad in Kabul in 1935, when he was Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was good enough to give a dinner in honour of my wife and myself. I find him as friendly and well disposed as on that occasion. As representative of one of the Saadabad Powers, he has to some extent a special position here, though he seems to play no active part. His entertainments suffer more than most from the language difficulty among his guests. His wife appears to be completely inarticulate in all languages, though otherwise pleasant. He is a good cook, fond of shooting and talks good English. (Written in 1939.)

Faiz Mohamad's mission to Angora has not deprived him of his influence with his Government in matters of general policy. He has been active during the last few months in persuading them to come to an understanding with the Government of India in questions arising out of a possible Russian threat.

Albania.

M. Assaf Djadjuli presented his letters as Albanian Minister on the 13th October, 1938.

I remember exchanging calls with him, but no more.

Belgium.

M. Paternotte de la Vaillée presented his letters as Belgian Minister on the 14th May, 1940.

I knew M. and Mme. Paternotte in Tehran, where, apart from riding, their main preoccupations were their health and the altitude.

They do not seem to have changed. M. Paternotte, who is completely ineffectual, has made a bad start here by remaining in Istanbul and displaying great reluctance to impair his health by braving the altitude of Angora. He did, indeed, visit the capital to present his letters, but vanished immediately afterwards without paying calls on his colleagues. His activities so far seem to have been confined to believing and passing on those rumours which originate so continually in Istanbul.

My French colleague tells me that he has brought with him a lady secretary of German birth.

Bulgaria.

M. Sava Kiroff presented his letters as Bulgarian Minister on the 5th March, 1940.

M. Kiroff is an improvement on his predecessor in that he is balanced in his outlook and not carried away by irredentist passions. He has made a good impression in Angora, where the task of a Bulgarian Minister is not an easy one. I have found him frank and friendly and ready to discuss burning questions without catching fire. Recently he has shown a tendency to associate more closely with the German Ambassador and his satellites, the Italian and the Hungarian, as also with the Soviet Ambassador.

China.

*Mr. Dekien Toung, chargé d'affaires, presented his letters ("lettres de cabinet") on the 13th April, 1939.

Most friendly; talks barely intelligible French. He was chargé d'affaires in Vienna up to the *Anschluss*. (Written in 1939.)

Denmark.

*M. Sven Peter Duurloo presented his letters as Danish Minister on the 10th March, 1939.

I knew him first as chargé d'affaires in Kovno some years ago. Looks young, but is heavy in appearance and wears large glasses. The level of the Angora Palace Hotel, where he stays when in Angora, seems not to affect him, but he suffers from mild forms of mountain-sickness when he climbs to the altitude of this embassy. He seems to have little interest in Turkish affairs. Somewhat to his surprise, however, he has found that there are Danish interests to be protected in the Hatay. (Written in 1939.)

M. Duurloo has spent most of his time in Athens recently and has only appeared occasionally. The Danish Chargé d'Affaires, M. Friis, has somewhat added to the difficulties of his position by expatiating upon the satisfactory conditions of close co-operation which exist between himself and the German Embassy, although, as he has explained to me, he refused to meet them until he received instructions from his Government to model his relations on those established in Denmark.

Egypt.

Abdurrahman Hakki Bey presented his letters as Egyptian Minister on the 8th April, 1940.

Both he and his wife are agreeable and friendly and constitute a welcome addition to the Diplomatic Corps. Both talk English.

Finland.

Baron Yrjö-Koskinen presented his letters as Finnish Minister on the 30th April, 1940.

I have not seen much of Baron Koskinen, but enough to form a high opinion of his abilities and judgment. He and his wife are very friendly.

France.

*M. René Massigli presented his letters as French Ambassador on the 13th January, 1939.

M. Massigli is already so well known to the Foreign Office that it would be superfluous to describe him at length. We are old friends and have maintained close contact on all points. His extreme vivacity and quickness of mind constitute, I think, rather a difficulty for him with the Turks, who are slow in thought and expression. It was greatly to his credit that he came through the acrimonious Hatay negotiations last year without impairing his own personal relations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other Turkish officials. He is married to a pleasant and vivacious Swiss lady and they entertain on a large scale in their vast, new, white marble embassy. (Written in 1939.)

The recent disasters to his country and our own action against portions of the French fleet have not changed M. Massigli's feelings as regards the ultimate community of Franco-British interests.

Germany.

*Herr Franz von Papen presented his letters as German Ambassador on the 29th April, 1939.

His previous history as German Military Attaché in Washington is well enough known. After his removal from Washington, he was Chief of the General Staff of the IVth Turkish Army under General Liman von Sanders. His next public appearance on any large scale was as German Chancellor, shortly before the advent of Herr Hitler. He subsequently held the post of Vice-Chancellor under Herr Hitler; narrowly escaped death at the time of the purge on the 30th June, 1934, and emerged as German representative in Vienna with the personal rank of ambassador.

It would have been difficult for the German Government to hit upon a more unpopular nominee for their embassy in Turkey. Herr von Papen's conduct during his previous service in Turkey has never been forgotten and he is heartily distrusted and disliked. It can safely be conjectured that his reception here was something of a shock to him. It also seems incredible that the German Government should not have guessed that Anglo-Turkish negotiations were in an advanced stage. The declaration of the 12th May, 1939, was made a fortnight after the arrival of their new ambassador, and he and his embassy seem to have been largely taken by surprise. Herr von Papen is known to have remarked on more than one occasion that he had come too late. (Written in 1939.)

Before the outbreak of war I found Herr von Papen pleasant to meet and almost exaggeratedly friendly in manner. I should not be inclined to describe him as a heavyweight; there is a suggestion of dilettantism and superficiality about him, accompanied, however, by a certain artfulness which may constitute his chief claim to efficiency. He is always ready to discuss present international problems and puts his country's case with remarkable glibness and more dispassionately than some.

He finds work with his counsellor, Dr. Kroll, who is clearly a violent party man, the reverse of harmonious.

Herr von Papen's activities here since the outbreak of the war have not contributed to better feelings between Turkey and Germany.

Greece.

M. Raphael Raphael, who had been minister since 1936, presented his letters as the first Greek Ambassador to Turkey on the 27th October, 1939.

M. Raphael is one of the best informed of foreign representatives here, being naturally in the closest touch with the Turkish Government and other representatives of the Balkan *Entente*. He is intelligent and has an active mind, but I do not place complete reliance on his judgment. He is apt to be led away by sensational reports.

He is married to a pleasant Greek lady of an Alexandrian family.

Hungary.

M. Zoltan de Mariassy presented his letters as Hungarian Minister on the 10th June, 1935.

Previous reports have described M. Mariassy as popular in Angora society, possessed of ability and good sense, of an agreeable demeanour and very friendly towards Great Britain.

On the last point I must reverse the opinions previously expressed. M. Mariassy has, since the war, shown himself untrustworthy and insincere. His sympathies appear to be firmly rooted on the side of the Power most able to be unpleasant to him. I doubt whether he has any political principles. I regard him as pre-eminently superficial.

Iran.

M. Bagher Kazemi presented his letters as Iranian Ambassador on the 4th December, 1939.

My acquaintance with M. Kazemi, who was Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs during the years when I was in Tehran, ended with a scene of considerable acrimony. His Excellency's complaints as to the unsuitability of my attire at an audience with the Shah were designed to cover an acute difference of opinion on more important matters. M. Kazemi's smiles on the occasion of our first meeting in Angora provided instantaneous proof that these bad days were over.

I doubt whether he carries much weight here. For the first few months after his arrival he seems to have given himself airs as a former Minister for Foreign Affairs which rendered him displeasing. I think he has lived this down, but the task of representing the suspicions and anxieties of his Government here is, I should say, neither an agreeable nor an effective one.

Mme. Kazemi has recently taken to expressing the warmest pro-British sentiments.

The Iranian Embassy has been painted pink.

Iraq.

M. Kamil Gailani presented his letters as Iraqi Minister on the 4th September, 1939.

I find him and his rectangular lady pleasant and friendly. I continually encourage him to come to consult me on any point at any time, but his visits are rare, though when they do occur the conversation is perfectly frank. I think he is too timid to go straight to the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs with many of the tales which he hears of their designs against his country, and, considering the wildness of these rumours, I am not surprised; I do my best to prevent him believing them.

Italy.

*M. Ottavio de Peppo presented his letters as Italian Ambassador on the 29th August, 1938.

It is difficult to describe Signor de Peppo beyond saying that he does not impress me as possessed of great capacities. My French colleague treats him as a joke, and he may be right. Before coming to Angora he was "chef de cabinet" to Count Ciano. It is said that he had to choose between remaining in the service and marrying the non-Italian lady of his choice. In spite of his previous appointment, I doubt whether there is much either of energy or of cunning behind the Roman lines of his countenance. Boredom is his most salient characteristic, though he livens up somewhat in the company of ladies. (Written in 1939.)

Signor de Peppo appears so impassive that I sometimes wonder whether he realises that his country is at war.

Japan.

M. Toshihiko Taketomi presented his letters as Japanese Ambassador on the 15th March, 1937.

I have hardly seen M. Taketomi during the past year. He has been ill for a large part of the time. When I have seen him he has been agreeable and friendly. His wife is a lady of considerable dignity and distinction.

M. Taketomi was firmly put in his place by the Turkish Government two years ago over a rally of Japanese diplomats in Istanbul, said to have been convoked with the object of co-ordinating and intensifying anti-Soviet activities in the Balkans and Near East.

Netherlands.

Dr. Philip Visser presented his letters as Netherlands Minister on the 9th June, 1938.

He talks perfect English. Beyond certain commercial interests which have been giving him trouble, I do not think he can have much to do here. He is well-informed generally, and follows world events closely.

Mme. Visser died rather suddenly last autumn, since which Dr. Visser has been absent for a considerable time. He was to have been transferred to Copenhagen, but the German invasion rendered this impossible. He feels keenly the German treatment of his country.

Norway.

M. J. G. J. Raeder presented his letters as Norwegian Minister on the 17th November, 1939.

Loquacious and inclined to be vapid, but friendly.

Poland.

M. Michel Sokolnicki presented his letters as Polish Ambassador on the 12th June, 1936.

M. Sokolnicki's personal tastes are intellectual, literary and artistic. He impresses me as a man of considerable ability, though maybe not of abundant energy. He is distinctly friendly. Mme. Sokolnicka is an agreeable lady of good education and manners, and a keen and competent bridge player.

M. Sokolnicki's activities since the conquest of Poland have been restricted to the task of assisting his countrymen to escape from Poland and Roumania. Nevertheless, he keeps in touch, and occasionally expresses valuable opinions. He seems to have successfully resisted various intrigues on the part of the present Polish Government to displace him.

Roumania.

M. Radu Crutzescu presented his letters as Roumanian Ambassador on the 28th June, 1940.

Only arrived a few days ago. I find him intelligent and agreeable and a great improvement on his predecessor.

Soviet Union.

M. Alexei Terentiev presented his letters as Soviet Ambassador on the 21st April, 1938.

Formerly consul-general at Smyrna. Has a large, square wife. I see little of them, but when we meet he affects to be friendly. His health appears recently to have given out, and he has at the moment disappeared in a cloud of heart attacks and telegrams summoning him to Moscow, the exact inter-relation of which remains doubtful.

His manner is brusque, and it is impossible to gauge the inner meaning of what he says.

Sweden.

The legation is at present in charge of M. K. R. Thyberg.

M. Thyberg, when he paid his initial call upon me, created the worst possible impression, both for bad taste, bad manners, tactlessness and unfriendliness. He seemed to revel in our misfortunes in Norway, and to enjoy attributing them to our own mismanagement, if not duplicity. I have seen little of him since. His appearance inspires distrust. He has a good-looking American wife with, apparently, no brain.

Switzerland.

*M. Etienne Lardy presented his letters as Swiss Minister on the 9th June, 1938.

I knew him in China, where he was consul-general in Shanghai. He is pompous and fond of his own opinions. His wife is a pleasant and kindly lady.

and they have a nearly grown-up daughter, who appears on all social occasions. (Written in 1939.)

I have sometimes suspected that the German Ambassador puts M. Lardy up to sniff the air of the Allied camp for him, but I have no proof, and I am assured by colleagues that he is, in fact, very well disposed to the Allies. In any case, he strikes me as a laborious thinker and not a quick observer.

United States of America.

Mr. John van Antwerp MacMurray presented his letters as United States Ambassador on the 16th March, 1936.

Mr. MacMurray, who has now been here four years, is doyen of the Diplomatic Corps. I knew him when he was minister to the Baltic States, and met him again in the Philippines on my return from China. We maintain very close and constant touch, and in general I keep him fully informed of what is passing. He is most helpful on all occasions. He is unreservedly pro-Ally.

Mrs. MacMurray has been ill during the greater part of the time since my arrival, and we have seen little of her. Their elder daughter married an Englishman just at the time of the outbreak of war.

Yugoslavia.

M Iliya Shumenkovitch presented his letters as the first Yugoslav Ambassador to Turkey on the 25th September, 1939.

M. Shumenkovitch has scarcely been here a year. I find him friendly and intelligent and on the whole a good observer. He has lately shown signs of increasing nervousness at possible developments in the Balkans. I think his judgment is good.

Representatives not resident in Angora.

Brazil.

M. Celso de Ouro-Preto presented his letters as Brazilian Minister on the 9th December, 1939.

Chile.

M. Hector Briones Luco, Chilean Chargé d'Affaires, has made only one brief visit to Angora, in the course of which he called on me.

Estonia.

M. Hans Markus presented his letters as Estonian Minister on the 6th June, 1939. Is also accredited to Roumania.

Latvia.

M. Ludvigs Ekis presented his letters as Latvian Minister on the 30th April, 1940.

He was at the Latvian Ministry for Foreign Affairs when I was in the Baltic States, and became Minister of Finance after M. Ulmanis's *coup d'Etat*. He visited Angora a short time ago to present his letters. I found him, as before, friendly and also well-informed. Resides at Bucharest.

[R 7549/242/44] No. 54.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received September* 6.)

(No. 1136. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September* 5, 1940.

[? MY telegram No. 886] and Moscow telegram No. 727, last paragraph.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me on 5th September that the Turkish Ambassador will be returning to Moscow "soon." I have urged the importance of the earliest possible return, both on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and on the secretary-general.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me, confidentially, that he intended to instruct the ambassador to inform the Soviet Government of the attitude adopted by him in response (*a*) to our request [group undecypherable] for information as to the attitude of the Turkish Government with regard to the passage of the Straits in the event of our having to honour our guarantee

to Roumania, (*b*) his reply to the Roumanian Government on the same subject, and (*c*) his refusal of our offer to send hospital ship into the Black Sea for earthquake relief purposes.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs considers the Soviet Government, whom he has never informed on these points, will thus have proof of Turkey's strict loyalty to Montreux Convention and will realise Turkey has not intentionally interpreted that convention to Russia's disadvantage.

4. He will communicate further with me before deciding on instructions and does not intend to act without your concurrence. I may be able to telegraph further next week.

(Repeated to Moscow.)

[R 6920/17/44] No. 55.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received September* 7.)

(No. 1135.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September* 6, 1940.

MY telegram No. 1021 : Fortnightly report.

External Affairs.—Turkey, while deeply interested in Roumania and Greece, is not showing her hand.

Internal Affairs.—Most Ministers and officials are on holiday (Deputies are touring constituencies, explaining policy of Government to electors and taking note of electors' wishes).

[R 7567/316/44] No. 56.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (*Angora*)

(No. 930.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 11, 1940.

FOLLOWING is the background to the argument suggested in paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 919 [of 10th September : Turkey and Russia]

2. Fear of Russia is clearly in the forefront of the Turkish mind, but in assessing the danger constituted by Russia to Turkey should Turkey fulfil her obligations as our Ally, *e.g.*, if Italy were to attack Greece and conditions upon which our guarantee was given were fulfilled, the following considerations should be borne in mind :—

3. The course of events since the outbreak of war seems to show conclusively that it is a major axiom of Stalin's policy not to become involved as a belligerent in the Anglo-German conflict on one side or the other, while at the same time doing everything short of that to favour Germany. If, therefore, Turkey makes it plain that she will act as our Ally and as such will resist any German demands contrary to her obligations to us, by force if necessary, then it seems probable that the Russians will not join in any German pressure on Turkey, for fear of being involved in the war. If, on the other hand, Turkey either dissociates herself from His Majesty's Government or fails to make her position quite plain, then it is possible—and perhaps, on the Roumanian precedent, even probable—that the Russians, feeling that they can do so with impunity, will put pressure on her at German instigation. In short, a firm attitude by Turkey may well call the Russian bluff

4. Russia, however, is not likely actually to oppose any German action against Turkey. She will either favour it and perhaps even join in it if the Turks do not stand firmly by His Majesty's Government, or she will stand aside altogether if they do stand by us loyally. In short, the Turk's fate is really in their own hands.

5. Please take an early opportunity of speaking in the sense of the above paragraphs to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 517; Athens, No. 617; Sofia, No. 374; Belgrade, No. 513; and Bucharest, No. 883.)

[R 7549/242/44] No. 57.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 938.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 12, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 1136 [of 6th September: Turco-Soviet relations].

I cannot see that the Turkish Government stand to gain anything by taking such an apologetic line with the Soviet Government. If the latter had any reason to suppose that the Turkish Government had interpreted the Montreux Convention to their disadvantage they would no doubt have taxed them with it. Surely the Turkish Government, by going out of their way to justify themselves, will merely be parading their anxiety and inviting embarrassing demands. See in general my telegram No. 930.

2. I should be strongly averse to the issue of such instructions to the Turkish Ambassador, and I hope you will be able to persuade the Minister for Foreign Affairs accordingly.

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 524.)

[R 7396/764/19] No. 58.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 1176.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 13, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 919

Counsellor saw Minister for Foreign Affairs on 11th September and spoke in the sense of your telegram and I saw him this morning and went over same ground. I made perfectly clear the point brought out in Moscow telegram [1715], paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 909 and paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 919.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs is still disinclined to be disturbed by theoretical Russo-German collusion. He expressed view that Russo-German relations were not improving, and showed me a Tass communiqué according to which Soviet have informed German Government that they cannot accept German schemes for control of Danube navigation to neglect of interests of Russia as Danube Power. His view is that Russia will continue to play Germany and ourselves off against each other until some decision is clear without herself taking any definite action.

3. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks development of events between Italy and Greece must equally depend on how things go at home and in Egypt. He admits continuance of danger, but does not think it has actually increased or is likely to increase so long as there is no decisive development in main theatres of war.

4. Indeed, he expressed view that danger to Greece was reduced by three things [group undecipherable] mentioned in conjunction (*a*) Our increased strength in Mediterranean, (*b*) Greece's very extensive preparations, (*c*) [group undecipherable] Turkey's own military measures in Thrace. He at once referred to outspoken attitude of Turkish press and mentioned recent internment at Koma of an Italian pilot and seizure of an Italian bomber which had come down in Turkish territory.

5. He admitted that defeat of Greece would constitute a grave danger to Turkey, and agreed to my reporting to you that he had said so.

6. I said that we were still extremely anxious as to situation between Greece and Italy. We felt that three points mentioned by him (paragraph 4 above) should certainly act as deterrents in increasing measure, but would it not be advantageous for Turkey to increase these deterrent factors by making a clearer statement of her position? Could he not take some suitable opportunity to make a statement to the effect that fate of Greece was a vital interest to Turkey? His Excellency agreed to make such a statement on a favourable occasion, and said I could inform you.

(Repeated to Moscow, Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia.)

[R 7643/764/19] No. 59.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 1179. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 13, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 1176.

In discussing Italo Greek situation and its implications I have always had in mind the following considerations, which I have regarded as fundamental:-

(*a*) Your telegram No. 840, which expressed agreement with the views contained in my telegram No. 1037. These views were summed up in the statement that, in the present circumstances, Turkey would be more of a liability than an asset as a co-belligerent.

(*b*) Final paragraph of Sir O. Sargent's memorandum 17th July, with which I entirely agree, and which brings out the essential importance of avoiding anything likely to embroil Turkey and Russia. It seems to be generally admitted there is a danger that if Turkey were engaged in war with Italy, Soviet Government might seize the opportunity to press for concessions in the Straits. It also seems to be generally suspected (except by Turkish Government) that Russo-German collusion may be carried on to the point of some Russian threat to Turkey to paralyse Turkey in the event of an Italian attack on Greece. Between these two possibilities it seems out of the question to push Turkey into war without embroiling her with Russia, quite apart from (*c*) above and (*e*) which follows.

(*c*) The fact indicated in your telegram No. 608, that it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to give Turkey any encouraging assurance as to naval assistance in certain circumstances. Apart from (*a*) and (*b*) above, I feel that it would be useless to attempt to push Turkey to point of belligerence without being very [group undecipherable] definite what assistance (especially naval and air co-operation) we could provide, we should immediately be confronted with an enquiry on this point. The defects in Turkey's equipment, to which reference was made in my telegram No. 1037 make real an enquiry all the more certain. They also point to complete impracticability of expecting Turkey to spare any material for Greece, as suggested in Sir M. Palairet's telegram No. 827.

2. I trust that you agree that above considerations are those which govern the situation.

3. There is the additional one that whatever we may do it will never be possible to push Turkey into anything against her will. On the other hand, I think she is most unlikely to yield to any threat from our enemies. As I have said on previous occasions, I am confident that Turkey will act in any circumstances in which her interests are really threatened. As regards present Greek question, Minister for Foreign Affairs clearly realises that those interests may be threatened by an attack on Greece. I trust the statement which he has promised to make may do something to ease the position for Sir M. Palairet on the lines of paragraph 2 of his telegram No. 826. But in view of considerations mentioned above, I feel it would be imprudent, and indeed useless, to try and push Turkey to point of committing herself in advance to go to war in any given circumstances, though I am far from excluding likelihood of her doing so, prepared or unprepared, if she feels her interests and security threatened.

(Repeated Saving to Moscow, Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia.)

[R 7396/764/19] No. 60.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 950.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 17, 1940.*

PARAGRAPH 5 of your telegram No. 1176 [of 13th September: Turkey and Greece].

Please inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of the satisfaction with which I have learnt of his decision to make a statement on a favourable occasion to the

effect that the fate of Greece is of vital interest to Turkey. You should inform his Excellency that I am quite certain that the effect of such a statement will be excellent and will lessen the danger of an Italian attack on Greece, and of Russian intrigues against Turkey.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 633; Moscow, No. 528; Bucharest, No. 898; Belgrade, No. 531; and Sofia, No. 383.)

[R 7632/764/19] No. 61.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 1195.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 16, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 930.

I spoke to the Minister for Foreign Affairs accordingly this morning. I made it clear that you were anxious for some solid statement of Turkey's attitude and that you thought a display of firmness would be likely to discourage Russia, whereas, if Turkey gave an impression of weakness, the Soviet Government would be encouraged to adopt a threatening attitude.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that I could inform you that he saw the force of this argument. He said that Turkey would never yield to threats and that, if Russia threatened her, it would mean war. I asked if I could inform you of what he said and pointed out that his words, when embodied in a telegram, would appear more impressive than when uttered to me in conversation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that I could telegraph what he said.

3. I then said that you would naturally hope that any declaration made by him as promised (see paragraph 6 of my telegram No. 1176) should be as wide and as categorical as possible. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he understood this. He would make a statement at the appropriate moment, he might even create an opportunity for doing so. But at the present moment things seemed calmer between Greece and Italy, and he thought that it would be somewhat quixotic to make his declaration now. He added that he was certain that we did not wish to embroil Turkey with Russia, and I assured him that we were far from desiring this.

(Repeated to Athens, Moscow and Saving to Sofia, Bucharest and Belgrade.)

[R 7421/203/44] No. 62.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 961.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 21, 1940.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 1194 and 1195 [both of 10th September: Instructions to be given to Turkish Ambassador to Moscow on his return].

We had understood that the Turkish Government would communicate to us their views on their relations with the Soviet Government following on consultation with their ambassador at Moscow on his return; but, in point of fact, only indications we have of such views are contained in your telegrams Nos. 1020 and 1136, to the latter of which I have already replied. It is correspondingly more difficult to make suggestions as to the instructions the Turkish Government might now give their ambassador, but the following points occur to me:—

(*a*) That it is of the highest importance that the Soviet Government should be left in no doubt of Turkey's intention to act as a loyal Ally to His Majesty's Government; that the Turkish Government have, in fact, made their choice and intend to stand by it. In this connexion I take formal note of the statement made to your Excellency by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Turkey would never yield to threats and that, if Russia threatened her, it would mean war (paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 1195). I trust that the instructions to the ambassador and any public statement which may be made by Turkish Government will be inspired by this basic principle and undertaking.

(*b*) I see no objection to instructions suggested in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 1194 so long as the Turkish Ambassador is careful to ensure that the proposal will not encourage Soviet Government to interpret these instructions as a further sign of weakness of Turkish Government. The fear of Soviet penetration felt by Balkan Governments would surely make it impossible for the Soviet Government to participate in the construction of a Balkan *bloc* and in practice the only Power which can organise such a *bloc* is Turkey herself.

(*c*) Although I note the reluctance of the Turkish Government to make public at the present moment, the statement promised in paragraph 6 of your telegram No. 1176, I nevertheless trust that they will be ready to instruct their ambassador to inform Soviet Government confidentially, so soon as he returns to Moscow, that the fate of Greece is a vital interest to Turkey.

(*d*) Further, the ambassador should be instructed to make it plain on all occasions to Soviet Government that in the opinion of Turkish Government, Great Britain cannot be beaten and that the only question at issue is how long she will take to win.

2. In addition, I should be glad if you would consider whether it might be worth while to ask Turkish Government to instruct their ambassador to inform Soviet Government that the interest of which their fellow members in the Saadabad Pact, namely, Iran, is a matter of vital interest to them. Your Excellency will appreciate that, if the Turkish Government were to ask you what His Majesty's Government were themselves prepared to do if Iran's vital interests were in fact threatened by Russia, we should find it difficult to return a reply satisfactory to Turkey; and in these circumstances you may think it wiser not to press Turkish Government on this point. Nevertheless, if Turkish Government appear receptive to the other suggestions contained in this telegram, you should do your best to have this instruction also included.

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 541 Athens No. 649 Sofia No. 389, Bucharest No. 910; and Belgrade, No. 537.)

[R 7735/203/44] No. 63.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 1247.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, September 26, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 1235.

I had conversation this morning with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow.

2. The ambassador had yesterday had conversation with the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador here. He expressed himself as most favourably impressed with the Soviet Ambassador and with his conversation. The Soviet Ambassador, who was consistently friendly, gave every assurance of friendly intentions and of desire to encourage rapprochement with the Soviet Government and Turkey. Turkish Ambassador attaches the more importance to these assertions because the conversation was carried on in the presence of the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy, a lady whom the Turkish Ambassador previously knew in Moscow, and who had been present as interpreter at the conversations with the Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

3. I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs what step it was now intended to take to promote this rapprochement. The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the Turkish Government [? had] accepted the suggestions contained in your telegram No. 961. He then handed to the ambassador a copy of the communication I had made to him, as reported in my telegram No. 1235. The only suggestion unacceptable was that in regard to Iran, but the ambassador informed me that the Iranian Ambassador at Moscow [? adhered to the] performance of the task suggested by you by representing on all occasions that Turco-Iranian relations were closely connected.

4. As regards the suggestion previously made that Russian support should be asked for in the formation of a new Balkan *Entente*, the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that this suggestion in its original form had been now dropped. Turkish Government realised that it was for them to undertake the task of the [? reconstruction of] the Balkan *Entente* and they proposed to do this without [? group omitted] from Russia. The matter might be frankly discussed on the Turkish Ambassador's return [group undecypherable] Turkey realised that this was her task and intended to perform it alone. The Soviet Government could decide for themselves what part they should play.

5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed in general very hopeful as to the prospects of improving relations with Moscow. He again cited the prompt appointment of the new Soviet Ambassador here and mentioned also a Tass communiqué issued in Moscow (see Moscow telegram No. 785 to you) contradicting reports that the Soviet Government were trying to secure his own dismissal. He thought this communiqué was intended as an indication of friendly intentions.

6. Owing to the change of programme in sailings, the Turkish Ambassador will not be leaving till 2nd October and expects to reach Moscow on 6th October or 7th October. He is taking his wife and family with him.

(Repeated to Moscow and Saving to Athens, Sofia, Bucharest and Belgrade.)

[R 7396/764/19] No. 64.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 1032.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 6, 1940.

MY telegram No. 966 [of 22nd September: Public statement by Turkish Government regarding their interest in Greece].

Recent indications (renewed Italian press campaign and troop movements in Albania) that Italy may after all have decided to press matters to extremes against Greece make it more than ever important that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should make his promised statement as soon as possible. His Excellency's reasons for waiting hitherto have been that things were calmer between Greece and Italy (see paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 1195 [of 16th September]), and that to create an opportunity of making the statement would look far-fetched (see paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 1218 [of 19th September]). Neither of these considerations can be regarded as applying at the present moment.

2. Unless you see strong objection, please speak to Minister for Foreign Affairs accordingly.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 690; Sofia, No. 422; Belgrade, No. 573; and Moscow, No. 596.)

[R 6970/17/44] No. 65.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 1309.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October* 10, 1940.

MY telegram No. 1135.

Fortnightly report: Government solidly on our side, with anti-Italian feeling predominating over anti-German. Some anxiety *re* Egypt. Speedy appointment of new Russian Ambassador considered favourable sign. Turkish Ambassador, on the point of returning to Moscow from leave, told Turkish journalist that Turco-Soviet relations were normal and friendly. Attitude of France universally condemned.

Parliament in recess: Prime Minister visiting Hatay and other Ministers said to have been on tour in provinces.

[R 7967/203/44] No. 66.

Sir S. Cripps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 880.)
(Telegraphic.) *Moscow, October* 17, 1940.

TURKISH Ambassador had a most satisfactory interview with Molotov [? to-day]. He told me that he found him most cordial and believed him to be quite sincere.

2. Main points of importance were:—

(*a*) Molotov expressed great pleasure at the thorough preparations made by the Turks in Thrace.

(*b*) He did not think that the Italians would dare to attack Greece in view of these.

(*c*) He reaffirmed Soviet Government's friendship and loyalty to Turkey.

(*d*) He said it was as yet too early to say what the Germans were going to [? group omitted] in [? group omitted] or Roumania. He confirmed that the Germans had given the Soviet Government no indication whatever that they were sending troops to Roumania for "instructional purposes" and stated that at the appropriate moment they would demand an explanation from the Germans.

(*e*) He stated that the Axis-Japanese Pact only made clear the world line-up of Great Britain and America on the one side, against the Axis and Japan on the other.

(*f*) He said that if this pact had been made three months ago it might have had more significance in its statement as to the partition of the world into spheres of interest, but that, since the check Germany had received, it was of very little importance, since it was only a *still strong* and victorious group who could dictate such matters.

(*g*) He took particular note of the Turkish Ambassador's statement that His Majesty's Government [*sic*] were fully satisfied with their choice of friends and that they were now confident that they would be in the winning group; as also of her declaration that, if their vital interests were touched, they would fight and that they considered Thrace was greatest vital interest of theirs; he agreed that, while it was not yet time to come out openly with any fresh treaty with Turkey, it would be good to make their economic association closer. Ambassador will see Mikoyan on this question.

(*i*) [*sic*] No allusion whatever was made to the question of the Straits.

3. Turkish Ambassador considers it a most opportune moment for the Foreign Office to approach Molotov as instructed in your telegram No. 641, and I shall try to see him to-morrow.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 90, and Washington, No. 30.)

[R 8008/316/44] No. 67.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora)

(No. 339.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 23, 1940.

THE Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State met the Turkish Ambassador on the 16th October at the Spanish Embassy.

2. Dr. Aras in the course of his conversation observed that he was in favour of a just peace. On Mr. Butler asking him what he meant, he replied that he did not think that an out-and-out crushing humiliation of Germany would be in the interests of Europe. Mr. Butler replied that we must first see that we obtained a victory over Germany before we considered such questions.

3. Mr. Butler's attention was aroused when his Excellency said that he had had a conversation with the United States Ambassador prior to the latter's departure to the United States in which they both agreed that there was a need for a just peace. Dr. Aras said, however, that he had impressed

on Mr. Kennedy the need for preventing the Mediterranean falling under the domination of the Axis. He who was master of the Mediterranean, he said, controlled the Old World. The British had shown great wisdom in that they had extended their power to the Mediterranean without accompanying that power with any odious restrictions of the liberty of the inhabitants of the Mediterranean area. For these reasons Turkey was convinced that the Axis should be prevented from obtaining victory. His Excellency said that he had had good reports of the feeling in Turkey. His country would never allow the Dardanelles to be overrun, though at the same time she would be unwilling to enter into armed conflict unless this was absolutely essential.

4. Dr. Aras thought that after the conclusion of hostilities some such solution of the problem of the Dardanelles as was obtained at Montreux would be desirable. He did not wish to outline a definite settlement at present, but the sort of arrangement which he had in mind was the perpetuation of the freedom of the Straits. Here Mr. Butler reminded the Ambassador of the importance which he had attached earlier in his remarks to the successful resistance of Axis efforts to dominate the Mediterranean.

5. The Soviet Union, Mr. Butler noticed, did not play so large a part in the Ambassador's conversation as it usually does. His Excellency seemed to think that the Soviet Union would remain neutral, but that they would tacitly support Turkey in the event of hostilities. He considered that the Soviet Union would be interested in keeping the Straits open by international agreement.

6. Dr. Aras's opinion was that the entry of America into the war was even more important than the entry of the U.S.S.R. He thought the combination of the United States, Great Britain and Turkey would greatly impress Bulgaria. In this connexion Dr. Aras said he had impressed on Mr. Kennedy the psychological importance of bringing the United States into the war.

7. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's representatives at Washington, Moscow and Sofia.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[R 6920/17/44] No. 68.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 1354.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October 24, 1940.*

FORTNIGHTLY report.

Turks clearly manifested in the press and conversation intention of resistance to any German attempt to cross Turkey; rejoiced over British naval successes against Italians and aerial bombardment of Germany; confidence in British victory enhanced by Prime Minister's speech; gave usual prominence to British news; stressed truth of British communiqués, ridiculed Italy's claims to protect Islam; and resentment of French attitude to England.

2. Occasion of Squadron Leader McKeever, British instructor to Turkish authorities, killed at Istanbul in flying incident, utilised for magnificent spontaneous demonstration of Turkish friendship for Great Britain. Turks took charge of funeral arrangements, staged imposing parade of all arms of the Turkish forces through Istanbul with British and Turkish flags on coffin.

3. Government circles noticed increased Soviet friendliness, were optimistic as regards danger of war in the Balkans, took detached view of the German penetration into Roumania and inclined to disbelieve reports of impending Italian attacks on Greece.

4. General census took place 20th October; population of Angora increased 34,000 to 156,000 in five years.

5. Abolition by Turkish Council of Ottoman Public Debt pleased all Turks, who hope to see public debt question disappear as being relic of hated Capitulations period and foreign financial stranglehold on Turkey.

[R 8055/764/19] No. 69.

Sir M. Palairet to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 995.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 28, 1940.*

GREEK Government have informed the Turkish Government of the Italian ultimatum, but without asking for Turkish assistance, which is only assured to them if Bulgaria comes in.

So far they have no indication of the attitude of the German Government.

(Repeated to Angora, Belgrade, Sofia and Commander-in-chief, Middle East.)

[R 8069/764/19] No. 70.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 1375.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October 28, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 1374.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed my Greek colleague that he may rest absolutely assured that Turkey would act if Bulgaria attacked Greece. Minister for Foreign Affairs has also informed him that instructions have been given to the press to make a violent attack on Italy, but *not* on Germany.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs is inclined to think Italy has acted without approval of Germany.

(Repeated to Athens, Sofia, Belgrade, Bucharest, Moscow, M.E.C.E. and Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.)

[R 8069/764/19] No. 71.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 1376.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October 28, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 1374.

I have informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that, though as yet I have no instructions, I am certain that you will attach utmost importance to consultation and joint declaration of policy (your telegram No. 884).

2. The 29th October being national fête here some public statement on general lines is probable. As regards Italian-Greek situation I have urged that, if such a declaration is made, it should be to the effect that Turkish Government are examining the position in concert with His Majesty's Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs entirely agrees as to the need for solidarity and joint declaration, but wishes to consult with his colleagues before answering my suggestion.

[R 8069/764/19] No. 72.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 1381.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October 28, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 1375.

Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon informed my Greek colleague that, after consultation with the Prime Minister, he could confirm that Greece could count absolutely on Turkey in the event of Greece being attacked by Bulgaria. He added that instructions were being sent to Turkish Minister at Sofia to ask Bulgarian Government to state their attitude in the present situation.

2. My Greek colleague's view is that where Turkey continues to hold Thracian front against possible Bulgarian attack, this is all that Greece requires or could expect.

(Repeated to Athens, Sofia, Belgrade, Bucharest, Moscow, M.I.C.E. and Commander in chief, Mediterranean).

[R 8092/764/19] No. 73.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 1386.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October 29, 1940.*

I INFORMED Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening, as instructed in first two sentences, and then asked views of the Turkish Government on the present situation.

2. General outline of Minister for Foreign Affairs' reply was that the attack on Greece had changed public opinion from hoping to keep out of the war into wondering how soon they would be drawn in. If Bulgaria attacks Greece, Turkey would go to war. If Germany were to move through Bulgaria it would be a move against Greece and Turkey, and Turkey would go to war. As regards Italian attack on Greece, Turkish Government felt their best line was to contain Bulgaria, and this was what Greece had asked for. All leave in army in Thrace has already been stopped. Turkish Government realised that safety of Greece was a vital matter to them and they would do all that they could to assist Greece with supplies (he mentioned coal), but they could not go to war in the circumstances as they existed to-day, and they could not send troops to Greece, as to do so would be to weaken their flank in Thrace against Germany and Bulgaria.

3. As regards the proposal to address a general declaration to Bulgaria his Excellency said that the Turkish Minister at Sofia has already been assured that Bulgaria would do everything to preserve her neutrality *and protect her independence*. Minister for Foreign Affairs attached great importance to words in italics. Having received this assurance he was instructing Turkish Minister not to make the direct enquiry previously intended (see my telegram No. 1381) though the matter might still be pursued. But in view of the Bulgarian Government's assurance he did not think that a public declaration on the lines suggested would be politic. The Bulgarian Government were fully aware of the Turkish Government's obligations. (Bulgarian Minister told me to-day that his country intended to preserve neutrality and asked what the attitude of Turkey was. I replied that that depended very largely on Bulgaria.)

4. As regards possible assistance by Turkey (second paragraph of your telegram under reference), Minister for Foreign Affairs will certainly act as favourably as possible to us and as unfavourably as possible to Italy. It was difficult to devise any precise definition of this and the Minister for Foreign Affairs merely said that Turkey had for a long time been acting thus, and would continue to do so. I mentioned the possible use of air and territorial waters. Minister for Foreign Affairs did not see how in the present circumstances use of these would benefit us, but he agreed that if concrete suggestions could be put to him he would examine them. He remained as before, opposed to the rupture of relations and the recall of Ambassadors, and argued that this would look like a definite step towards war.

5. I then spoke of the proposed joint declaration, and explained the importance which you attached to it. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the President's speech (without my recommendation contained a passage about the consultation with His Majesty's Government in regard to the present situation (see my immediately following telegram). He suggested that we on our side, should make a corresponding statement in more or less the same words and that this would meet the case.

6. In view of the actual position as regards Turkish assistance as described in the telegram under reference, I am inclined to think that this would be the best solution. But I informed his Excellency that I was uncertain whether this would satisfy you. I suggest, therefore, that if you required more than this you should propose text of some joint declaration which the Turkish Government could examine. His Excellency agreed to this.

7. It appears to me that it would be difficult to embody in any joint declaration the actual position of the Turkish assistance, and that if this were done the effect would fall rather flat. On the other hand, separate statements on the line of the Turkish President's speech might have the correct effect.

8. Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he had sent for the German Ambassador and spoken very strongly to him about the Italian attack on Greece and its effect. Among other things, he had said that the question whether Turkey came into the war or not rested with the other countries, and not with Turkey, and depended on the attitude which other countries took up in the present question.

9. My comments follow as soon as possible.

(Repeated to Athens, Sofia, Belgrade, Cairo, Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, Middle East Intelligence Centre and Madrid. Foreign Office please pass to Washington.)

(Repeated to Washington, No. 2885, by Foreign Office.)

[R 8092/764/19] No. 74.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 1387.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October 29, 1940.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following are translations of relative passages from draft of the President's speech for retransmission as it stands at present:—

"1. Our attitude of non-belligerency cannot constitute an obstacle to the maintenance of normal or even friendly relations, not only with our neighbours but also with belligerents, provided that they too show the same good faith.

"2. Our friend and neighbour, Greece, who lies within our security zone, and whose safety and protection are of vital interest to us, is to-day, unfortunately, forced into war. We are in the course of considering and [group undecypherable]ing in consultation with (de concert) our ally Great Britain, the situation which has thus arisen. No one will gain by extension of the war to this part of the world. On the contrary, we are of opinion that such an extension will do harm to all [two groups undecypherable] satisfaction is expressed at return to friendly relations with the U.S.S.R.

"4. At a moment when England is conducting, under difficult conditions, a heroic struggle for her existence it is my duty to proclaim that the bonds of alliance which unite us to her are firm and unshaken."

(Repeated to Athens, Sofia, Belgrade, Cairo, Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, Middle East Intelligence Centre and Madrid. Foreign Office please repeat to Washington.)

[R 8069/764/19] No. 75.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 1153.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 30, 1940.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 1376, 1380, 1381 and 1382 [all of 28th October: Attitude of Turkey in face of Italian attack on Greece].

There has not yet been time for me to receive your reply to my telegram No. 1138 [of 28th October], but in the meantime I would agree that a statement by the Prime Minister at the opening of the National Assembly on 1st November on the lines indicated in your telegram No. 1380 would be useful.

2. I note with satisfaction that Greece can count absolutely on Turkey in the event of Greece being attacked by Bulgaria (paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 1381), and that the Turkish Minister at Sofia is to ask the Bulgarian Government to state their attitude. It does not appear, however, that up to the present the Turkish Government have made their attitude crystal clear to the Bulgarian

Government, and, if the maximum effort is to be made to prevent the latter from acting "as the standard bearer of the Germans" (see Sofia telegram No. 746), it seems important that the Turkish Government should inform the Bulgarian Government quite clearly of their intentions. How this should best be done is obviously a matter for the Turkish Government to decide, but I should be glad if you would suggest immediately to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the importance of leaving the Bulgarians under no illusion.

(Repeated to Sofia, No. 479.)

[R 8137/764/19] No. 76.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 345.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 30, 1940.*

I ASKED the Turkish Ambassador to come and see me this afternoon and enquired whether he had any information from his Government about the war in Greece.

2. Dr Aras said that he had just received a telegram from Angora, but that it had not yet been deciphered. As soon as this had been done, if it contained new information, he would ask to see me again. As I knew already, he and his Government were taking a firm line with regard to Bulgaria, and he himself thought that this was the most effective service which they could render to Greece at the present time. He also attached great importance to close collaboration between Turkey and Yugoslavia, not only in the interests of Greece, but also in the interest of Yugoslavia herself, who, if the Italians were to reach Salonica and the Bulgarians took concerted action with Italy, would be placed in a hopeless position.

3. When I asked his Excellency whether in his view the Italian attack on Greece had been made in collusion with Germany, he said that he now felt pretty sure that it had been agreed between Hitler and Mussolini at the Brenner meeting that Germany should take Roumania, and Italy Greece, with a view to putting pressure on Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and as part of a larger plan for the domination of the Mediterranean from Spain to the Straits. The Ambassador thought, however, that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Germans even if they reached the Straits to succeed in advancing across Asiatic Turkey. Geographically, such an advance would be difficult enough even if Turkey were to give the Germans every assistance. But as I knew well enough the Turks were absolutely decided to resist. Moreover, so long as the British fleet were in control of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Greek islands, he did not think that the Straits could possibly fall into German hands. In the circumstances he felt pretty sure the German plan was above all to intimidate Turkey, and, if possible, to persuade the Bulgarians to attack Turkey instead of doing it themselves.

4. When I asked Dr. Aras what he thought the attitude of the Soviet Union would be in the circumstances, he replied that, according to all his information, relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey were now very good, and that the Soviet Union would at least adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards his country. He did not think, however, that she would dare to oppose Germany openly, unless perhaps the United States of America were to enter the war. But even her benevolent neutrality could be very useful to Turkey.

5. I asked his Excellency what importance he attached to Greek resistance. He replied that he himself had always counted on Greece more than on any of the other Balkan States. He thought that, provided Greece were given all possible moral and material support, she would be able to hold out for a few weeks, and that the time thus gained might be very valuable. If, however, she were not supported he had not very much faith in her powers of resistance.

6. I said that in that case there was clearly much that Turkey could do to help Greece. His Excellency agreed and said that the two Governments were in the closest contact. He repeated his view that close contact between Turkey and Yugoslavia was also essential and expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government would use their influence on Bulgaria to restrain her from attacking Greece. I told him of the action which he had already taken in that sense.

7. Before he left Dr. Aras told me that there would be a statement of Turkish policy by the President of the Republic in the Turkish Parliament on the 1st November. I said that I hoped, and, indeed, I had no doubt, that President Inönü would take a firm line.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[R 8117/242/44] No. 77.

Sir S. Cripps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 938.)
(Telegraphic.) *Moscow, October 30, 1940.*

THE Yugoslav Minister, who yesterday had long interview with the Italian and German Ambassadors, gained the very strong conviction that yesterday an offer to, or an arrangement with, Soviet Government had been made as to some share in the control of the Dardanelles.

2. Although I am convinced that the suggestions that His Majesty's Government have made are of the greatest interest to Soviet Government and are being most carefully considered, it is possible that more immediate promise of advantages in the Straits may counteract these.

3. There is no doubt from the point of view of the psychology of the Soviet Government and public reaction in support of the régime any participation in the control of the Straits is a most important factor.

4. In order to counter danger of an Axis success by means of some offer as to the Dardanelles is it not possible to get the Turkish Government now to make some offer sufficiently attractive to minimise this danger?

5. Within danger offer by his Government of consultation it should be possible to arrange a temporary concession to Russia the whole matter to be reconsidered in post war consultations.

6. I regard some such action now on behalf of Turkey as of supreme importance, inasmuch as it may bring the whole possibility of success of the policy that his Government has already put forward.

7. Very quick action is necessary as with the development of the war in Greece it is not unlikely that Bulgaria may move and Turkey become embroiled, when it may be too late or the price demanded by the Soviet Government may be too high.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 102.)

[R 8148/5/67] No. 78.

Sir S. Cripps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 942.)
(Telegraphic.) *Moscow, October 30, 1940.*

BUCHAREST telegram No. 1388.

Turkish Ambassador saw Vyshinski last night, to whom he had been referred by Molotov, who seems to be seeing no one now.

2. He explained the attitude of Turkish Government, and enquired what attitude Soviet Government would be if Turkey became involved.

3. Vyshinski replied that this was too important a matter for him to deal with: he would refer Turkish Government's questions to Soviet Government, and they would be [? considered] within framework of continued neutrality of U.S.S.R.

4. Turkish Ambassador gave the views of his Government on Bulgaria, saying that it was clear that Bulgaria was completely under German domination, and that secret preparations and arrivals of Germans and large quantities of war materials in Bulgaria caused them to suppose Bulgaria was preparing for an attack on Thrace despite the assurances to the contrary.

5. Vyshinski observed that it was difficult for the Soviet Government to form any opinion, though they had similar information, but that "Bulgaria had

not consulted them at all," and that he was inclined to agree with Turkish hypothesis. Turkish Ambassador also told me that Russian General Staff had had long and detailed talks with his military attaché on the Greek situation, and had given indications which he took to mean that help in materials would be forthcoming from Russia in the event of war.

6. He also told me of a talk between Yugoslav and Bulgarian Military Attachés in which the latter (a very honest soldier) had said he feared Bulgaria would have to fight.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 97; Athens, No. 25; and Sofia, No. 26.)

[R 8135/764/19] No. 79.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 1393.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October 30, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 1386.

Although there is a certain vagueness in the Minister for Foreign Affairs' reply to my enquiry as to possible Turkish assistance, I feel that in the present circumstances this is inevitable. We have not asked for definite measures of co-operation, and we are guided by the view that Turkey should not enter the war at present unless compelled to do so. We are therefore limited to asking for general assurances while avoiding asking for anything which might precipitate a premature entry of Turkey into the war.

2. These general assurances have been readily given, and the speech to be made by the President of the Republic on 1st November in the form communicated to me impresses my Greek colleague and myself as very firm and outright. (Summary of salient passages is given in my telegram No. 1387.) In addition, we both notice a remarkable solidification of public opinion here since the attack on Greece.

3. Turkish Government have made their position perfectly clear to the Bulgarian Government. As requested, both the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have spoken very plainly to the German Ambassador, as stated in my telegram above mentioned. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out to him the absurdity of accusing Greece of supplying the Royal Navy when she was buying coal from the United Kingdom, had no petrol and was largely dependent on Turkey for cereals. He added that Italy's action was "a dishonourable, dirty businesss" which would recoil on Germany.

4. As an instance of their desire to help Greece with supplies, it can be stated that they have agreed to send at once a supply of ammunition for anti-tank rifles provided to Turkey by us which is urgently required in Greece.

5. I therefore think that in the present circumstances we are getting all we can, and I am satisfied that the Turkish Government and public opinion are, if possible, more solidly with us than ever before.

6. I therefore feel strongly that maximum advantage will be obtained by keeping Turkey out (subject of course to situation rendering this possible) till the spring, and meanwhile giving continued supplies and increased technical assistance, also preparing all possible support for her for the spring as indicated in your telegram No. 1141.

7. General Smith entirely agrees with the above. We both feel the ideal to be that when Turkey comes in she should do so at full strength and as something of a trump-card.

8. This, however, renders issue of any joint declaration difficult, apart from any delay which may result from negotiating an agreed text, and you may find that Minister for Foreign Affairs' suggestion in paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 1386 may prove more rapid and more effective.

(Repeated to Athens; Middle East; Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean; and Air Officer Commanding-in-chief, R.A.F., Middle East.)

[R 8092/764/19] No. 80.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 1159.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 31, 1940.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 1386 and 1387 [of 29th October] and my telegram No. 1153 [of 30th October: Turkish attitude in face of Italian attack on Greece].

I am prepared to accept passage in President's speech quoted in your telegram No. 1387, but you should press strongly for the omission of paragraph 1, which may well be interpreted to mean that Turkey does not desire that her relations with Italy should be disturbed. I should also much prefer the omission of any reference to extension of the war, as in paragraph 2 of draft, which may lead to misconception of Turkish position here and abroad. At the same time, you might inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government much appreciate reference to this country in paragraph 4.

2. You will have seen from Athens telegram No. 1016 that the Greek Commander-in-chief is anxious, failing full military support from Turkey, for a public declaration by the Turkish Government that Turkey will go to war with Bulgaria if the latter attacks Greece. I have already suggested in my telegram under reference that the Turkish Government should make their attitude crystal clear to the Bulgarian Government, but the Athens telegram suggests that this might best be done by a passage to the required effect in the President's speech to-morrow. Please suggest this also to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3. His Majesty's Government will consider making some corresponding statement in near future. We will await the reception accorded to the President's speech and the corresponding statement by His Majesty's Government, if made, before deciding whether a joint declaration is necessary.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 709; Sofia, No. 482; Belgrade, No. 660; Cairo, No. 1134; Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, No. 52; M.E.I.C., No. 53; Madrid, No. 963; and Washington, No. 2888.)

[R 8135/764/19] No. 81.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 1397.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October 31, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 1153.

I called on secretary general on receipt of your telegram and explained your views. He assured me that Turkish attitude has been made absolutely clear to Bulgarian Government.

2. Carrying on sequence of events from position as reported in paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 1386, he told me Turkish Minister had called a second time on Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs and enquired the Bulgarian attitude. The Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had renewed assurances of [? intention] to remain neutral, Turkish Minister had made it clear that if Bulgaria did not do so Turkey would be [? forced] into war.

3. Bulgarian Minister here called this morning on the secretary-general and enquired attitude of Turkish Government. Secretary-general made it perfectly clear as above adding that this was no statement hostile to Bulgaria with whom he hoped that friendliest relations would continue: it was merely an exact description of situation.

4. Secretary-general also mentioned to Bulgarian Minister that Turkish Government were in close consultation with His Majesty's Government and left a loop-hole as to possible results of this consultation.

(Repeated to Sofia.)

[R 8160/1213/44] No. 82.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 461 E.)

My Lord, *Angora, September 13, 1940.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 607 E. of the 21st October, 1939, regarding the final figures for the 1937-38 Turkish budget, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the accompanying copy of a memorandum, prepared by my commercial secretary, showing the final accounts of the Turkish budget for the fiscal year 1938-39, ended the 30th June, 1939.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

Enclosure in No. 82.

THE final Turkish budget accounts for the fiscal year 1938-39, ended the 30th June, 1939 (as published by the Turkish Treasury) compare with those of the preceding year as under:—

Receipts:	*1938-39.* £T.	*1937-38.* £T.
Ordinary	257,088,972	260,171,164
Extraordinary	54,860,100	39,085,730
Sivas/Erzerum loan	4,639,597	4,140,000
Surety	2,240,740	1,002,478
Treasury refunds	4,104,440	8,871,438
	322,933,849	314,170,810

The ordinary receipts are those scheduled in the general budget. They show for 1938-39 a decrease of £T. 3 million approximately as compared with those for 1937-38 and an increase of £T. 7 million as compared with budget estimates (£T. 250,049,000) for 1938-39. This decrease of £T. 3 million figured above is due to the diminution of customs revenue in 1938-39, which amounted to £T. 3,500,000 as compared with 1937-38.

The extraordinary receipts are made up as follows:—

	1938-39. £T.	*1937-38.* £T.
1. Carried forward from previous year	10,021,695	7,242,260
2. Minting of silver money	2,461,900	2,660,377
3. Product of 5½ per cent. bonds (against bankers' deposits) ...	6,379,709	3,746,085
4. Product of nine monthly bonds ...	18,408,767	22,168,077
5. Product of Monopoly bonds ...	30,000,000	...
6. Current account with the Agricultural Bank	3,960,110	...
7. Sale of bonds	70,600	2,021,290
8. Refunds on credits granted to agricultural purchase co-operatives	901,172	...
9. Bonds mortgaged	...	1,056,743
10. Sundry	...	190,889
	73,103,953	39,085,730
Unexpended amount transferred to a special account and carried forward to next fiscal year ...	18,243,853	...
	54,860,100	39,085,730
Product of fifth block of internal loan Sivas/Erzerum (called in November 1938)	4,639,597	4,140,000

Sundry revenue and Treasury refunds have been obtained in virtue of special laws. The principal item in the former category is made up by receipts from arrears of real estate and building taxes, due to the Treasury, viz.:—

	£T.
1938-39	1,567,013
1937-38	1,508,204

The Treasury refunds include—	*1938-39* £T.	*1937-38.* £T.
Gifts for aviation	1,218,508	3,744,205
Treasury's share (15 per cent.) in the Bridges and Roads Tax	1,551,341	1,838,423
Customs Revenue and other taxes paid by the Treasury on constructional material imported for Government account	925,144	2,131,416

Most of the revenue figuring under Extraordinary Receipts was made up by loans. These are indicated at 3, 4, 5 and 6 above and, including the fifth portion of the Sivas-Erzerum Loan, amount to £T. 63,388,183 as compared with £T. 31,110,905 in 1937-38, obtained in the same way.

	£T.
Of the amount	63,388,183
obtained by loans a sum of	18,243,853
was not spent in 1938-39 and has been carried forward to the succeeding fiscal year. Thus, the funds from loans contracted in 1938-39 which were actually used to cover expenditure in 1938-39 only amounted to	45,144,330
Expenditure incurred in the same fiscal year amounted to	311,121,148
of which amounts paid totalled	296,221,427
and still to be paid total	14,899,721
On the other hand, a debt of	226,387
incurred in 1938-39 has been carried forward for liquidation in the following year.	

National Defence has absorbed 32·5 per cent. = £T. 101,185,000
and Public Works has absorbed 14 per cent. = £T. 43,499,000

[R 8186/316/44] No. 83.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 1409.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Angora, November 1, 1940.*

FOLLOWING is translation of passage relating to foreign affairs in speech by President of Republic at opening of Grand National Assembly to-day. (Applause as indicated on Beaufort scale).

"Gentlemen, the European War, of whose beginning I spoke to you with sincere regrets at the opening of the last session, has been raging now for fourteen months. Its developments are such that the tragedy may quite possibly extend beyond the confines of Europe and assume proportions of world-wide conflagration. During the past year a great many free and independent countries have become victims of foreign invasion. However, the fact that attacks which after the defeat of France were directed against England encountered obstinate resistance, has led the war into a new phase. It seems likely that this phase will be of long duration and that the suffering and misery of mankind will continue for a long time to come.

"It is impossible not to feel deeply grieved by this dark prospect, not to note with great sadness and bitterness this regression of civilisation.

"Our country has lived through these difficult times without being shaken, united as it is in its ideal of independence and security. The secret of our firmness lies in our confidence in our own rights, our respect for those of others and our resolution to defend the Fatherland. (Applause.) In defining our foreign policy I wish again to emphasise that our only guide is principle of utilising the numberless virtues of our people in manner most efficacious and most productive of results for our country.

"At the opening of previous session I outlined our attitude regarding the war. No change has taken place since then in foreign policy of Turkish Republic.

"Primary reason is that this policy is based on maintenance of political independence and territorial integrity, and that it has nothing to do with ambitions aims that shall according to events. Our Government has stated to you on several occasions that Turkey doesn't covet an inch of territory outside its frontiers, that it has no intention of trespassing on anyone's rights. Country that has no intention of attacking us, of doing damage to our security or vital interests attached thereto needn't take offence at our policy and cannot blame us for wishing to protect our rights. (Applause.)

"Our attitude of non belligerence needn't constitute obstacle to completely normal relations with all countries which show and practise towards us the same goodwill. This attitude of non belligerence makes impossible without exception the use of our territory, our waters and our air by belligerents against each other, and will continue to make such use categorically and absolutely impossible as long as we take no part in the war.

"New developments in conduct of war require our close attention. Our neighbour and friend Greece whose territory lies in that security zone the calm and tranquility of which are of primary importance to us, unfortunately finds herself drawn into war. Together with our ally Great Britain we are now carefully considering and studying resulting situation. (Applause.)

"We hope political principles which I have stated previously and which serve to this day kept our country from horrors of war, will help maintain in same manner our security of to-morrow.

"In every crisis which world has been having our relations with neighbouring or distant States have followed their normal course.

"Our relations of confidence with U.S.S.R., which have a past of nearly twenty years, after experiencing difficulties which cannot be attributed to either of us, have returned to their norm of friendship. 'Tis with satisfaction that I note this. (Applause.) In midst of world vicissitudes Russo Turkish relations are a fact of intrinsic value and our two countries need to perpetuate this fact independently of all other influences. We are convinced that considered from this aspect this policy will be as fruitful for both parties to morrow as it was yesterday, and that 'twill only serve interests of our two countries without harming anybody.

"'Tis possible and even probable that there lies before us a long period of suffering for humanity. During this period while remaining sensitive to everything that affects our vital interests we shall continue to be faithful to our friendships and alliances. (Applause.)

"At a time when England carries on heroic struggle for its existence under difficult conditions, 'tis my duty to proclaim that bonds of alliance which unite us to her are solid and unbreakable." (Applause.)

2. Translation of other salient passages follows. Please repeat to Washington.

(Repeated to Athens, Moscow, Cairo, Commander-in-chief, M.I.C.E., and Madrid.)

[R 8202 242 44] No. 84.

Viscount Halifax to Sir S. Cripps (Moscow).

(No. 735.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 2, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 938 [of 30th October: Suggestion that His Majesty's Government might persuade the Turkish Government to make some offer to the Soviet Government about the Straits].

Even if it were possible to persuade the Turkish Government to make the Soviet Government an attractive offer in regard to the Straits, I doubt whether this would really affect the attitude of the Soviet Government, whose chief preoccupation is fear of Germany. Moreover, it is surely in the interest of the Soviet Government to maintain the *status quo* in regard to the Straits, if it can be maintained, rather than to share control with Germany, which would inevitably mean in practice complete German control. It seems to me, therefore, that the first object of British and Turkish policy at Moscow should be to try to convince the Soviet Government that the *status quo* can be maintained.

2. But, apart from these considerations, you will remember that our efforts hitherto to devise proposals which would be at the same time sufficiently attractive to the Soviet Government and acceptable to the Turkish Government have been unsuccessful, and, making all allowance for subsequent developments, I scarcely think that further efforts are likely to be any more availing now. Surely the only offer which would really be attractive to the Soviet Government is the offer of some share in the physical control of the Straits, *i.e.*, a naval base in the Straits area, and it is out of the question to try to persuade the Turkish Government to agree to such a concession.

3. The only possibility which occurs to me is that His Majesty's Government should tell the Soviet Government that, in view of their offer to consult with them at the end of the war in regard to a post-war settlement of Europe and Asia (see paragraph 2 (*a*) of your telegram No. 913 [of 23rd October]), it will be open to the Soviet Government to raise any question connected with the Straits, though this should not be regarded as in any way committing the Turkish Government. I should not, however, be prepared to authorise a statement on these lines without the concurrence of the Turkish Government, and His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora is being asked urgently for his views on the desirability of broaching the suggestion with them (see my telegram to Angora, No. 1174).

4. Turkish Ambassador's conversation reported in your telegram No. 942 [of 31st October] suggests that it is not impossible that Soviet attitude may, in any case, prove satisfactory and that there may be no need to raise this delicate question. You will no doubt report any further information which Turkish Ambassador gives you on this subject.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 1173.)

[R 8202/242/44] No. 85.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 1174.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 2, 1940.*

MOSCOW telegram No. 938 [of 30th October] and my telegram to Moscow, No. 735 [of 2nd November: Suggestion that His Majesty's Government might persuade the Turkish Government to make some offer to the Soviet Government about the Straits].

I should be glad of your comments.

2. Would you see serious objection to asking the Turkish Government whether they will agree to a statement being made to the Soviet Government on the lines suggested in paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 735 to Moscow?

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 736.)

[R 8202/242/44] No. 86.

Sir S. Cripps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 960.)
(Telegraphic.) *Moscow, November 3, 1940.*

MY immediately preceding telegram. Your telegram No. 735.

I suggest that it might be urgently suggested to Turkish Government that they should put the following proposition before the Soviet Government.

2. If Soviet Government alone, or in association with Roumanian Government, can secure control over Danube mouths and will consult Turkish Government as to passage of any warships other than Soviet or Roumanian into Black Sea, then Turkish Government will agree to consult Soviet Government in same way as to passage of non-Turkish warships through Straits, in so far as they have power to control traffic under Montreux Convention.

3. This should assist in creating difficulties between Russia and Germans over Danube, and would give Turkish Government an equivalent advantage to that offered to them.

4. If something on these lines could be offered immediately it might be extremely effective.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 105.)

[R 8117/242/44] No. 87.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 1415.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 2, 1940.*

MOSCOW telegram No. 988 [*sic*: ? 938].

Secretary-general mentioned this to me and asked me to point out that Turkish Government would regard it as most dangerous to make an offer as regards the Straits. They feel if they did so they would easily be over-bid by Axis Powers, so that negotiations would be set in motion in which the Axis Powers could always have last word and make most capital, while Turkish Government might be forced to make too great a concession, as it would be impossible to let the Soviet Government go away empty-handed once the subject had been opened. Axis Powers could agree to promises and offers on their side, but he did not think that these would be taken seriously, nor be likely to divert the Soviet Government from their settled policy.

[R 8186/316/44] No. 88.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 1418.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 2, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 1409, paragraph 2.

Referring to defence, President said, *inter alia*: "To-day duty of defence has become goal most dear to heart of whole nation. We can say with pride that the sacrifices made by nation are justified."

2. In his loudly applauded peroration he declared that true basis of right of nations to live was national unity, spirit of sacrifice and heroism. Turkish national unity was stronger than ever. He concluded: "We are all of us firmly resolved to make any sacrifice we may be called on as nation to make. Sons of Turkish nation to-day will be worthy of heroism of their ancestors. At time when the future of nations is decided in last resort by heroism and spirit of sacrifice Turkish nation looks with pride to future that will be unclouded and secure."

[R 8260/8/67] No. 89.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 1190.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 5, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 1159, paragraph 3 [of 31st October], and your telegram No. 1409 [of 1st November].

In the course of my speech in the House of Lords on 5th November I spoke as follows in regard to Turkey:—

"His Majesty's Government have been in close consultation with the Turkish Government regarding the situation which has arisen as a result of the Italian attack on Greece. The attitude of the Turkish Government has been clearly and resolutely stated by the President of Turkey in his speech at the opening of the Turkish Parliament on 1st November. Thanks to the wise and far-sighted policy of her Government, Turkey constitutes a solid barrier against aggression, and we may fully share the confidence of her President in the ability of the redoubtable Turkish army to carry out any tasks which it may be called on to perform. I now take this opportunity of endorsing and repeating, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the words used by General Inönü when he said that the bonds of alliance which unite our two countries are solid and unbreakable. We have the same faith in Turkey as we hope and believe Turkey has in us."

(Repeated to Sofia, No. 495.)

[R 8225/316/44] No. 90.

Sir M. Palairet to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 1072.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, November 4, 1940.*

I HAVE just seen the Turkish Ambassador, who was a personal friend of Ataturk, and find that he disapproves of the attitude of his Government (in which we seem prepared to acquiesce) as strongly as I do. He considers they should give all possible aid (including despatch of troops) to Greece, who, he says, is fighting their battle. He regards their policy of waiting to play "trump card" as most mistaken and considers that now is the moment to strike, when Germany obviously is hesitating to start a south-eastern campaign. To wait until spring is playing Germany's game, and she may have induced Bulgaria to remain quiet just merely in order to ensure that Turkey does not move now.

2. His views, which I urged him to press on his Government, must [? group omitted: not], of course, be disclosed to them by us, but are they not sound? Has not Turkey, as well as we, everything to gain by an immediate declaration of war upon Italy, or at any rate by support of Greece by every means in her power? Or is it the [? Russian] bogy which still deters her? I heard that the Greek Minister in Moscow had a most friendly reception at Ministry for Foreign Affairs there.

3. I hope when future of Dodecanese comes to be settled it will be remembered that Greece took up the challenge without hesitation, though unprovided with help so liberally bestowed on Turkey, who now chooses to slip out of her engagements and to fight only with words.

4. I notice that Turkey's supine attitude is proclaimed by Italian press as a definite set-back for us.

(Repeated to Angora and Headquarters, Middle East.)

[R 8202/242/44] No. 91.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 1435.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 6, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 1174 and your telegram No. 735 to Moscow.

I think my telegram No. 1415 [? supplies the] answer to your request for my comments on Moscow telegram No. 938.

2. As regards paragraph 3 of your telegram to Moscow, it would appear to me that article 29 of Montreux Convention gives the Soviet Government the necessary power to raise questions connected with the Straits. If your proposed statement goes beyond what is intended by article 29, I feel convinced that the Turkish Government would not entertain it. Nor would it be of much use to the Soviet Government unless the Turkish Government were committed.

3. It might perhaps be possible to propose to the Turkish Government some common understanding that the five-year period provided for in article 29 shall be revised in consequence of the existing circumstances and that the article shall be regarded as applicable to any conference held at the end of the war. But this might entail difficulty if consent of all signatories were necessary.

4. I could certainly broach the subject generally with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but, in view of my telegram No. 1415, I hardly think that we should get anything out of him.

5. I think Turkish feeling is as described in paragraph 1 of your telegram. They regard Russia as much too frightened of Germany to cut any ties with Turkey, [group undecypherable] would be likely to check Germany, and as much too suspicious of Germany to place any faith in German offers.

(Repeated to Moscow.)

[R 8202/242/44] No. 92.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 1198.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 7, 1940.*

MOSCOW telegrams Nos. 959 and 960 [of 3rd November: Suggestion that Turkish Government should make an offer to the Soviet Government in regard to Straits in return for an undertaking by the Soviet Government in regard to the Danube mouths].

I am naturally anxious to take advantage of any opportunity of furthering an improvement in Turco-Soviet relations. And Turkish Government will be best judges of how to further their interests in this matter, which are also ours. At the same time I see the following objections to the proposal in Moscow telegram No. 960:—

(*a*) It depends on the supposition that the Soviet Government will obtain complete control of the mouths of the Danube, which, in fact, seems unlikely.

(*b*) Even if Soviet Union do obtain control of the mouths of the Danube it would still be possible for Germany to assemble submarines at Constantsa.

(*c*) Your telegram No. 1415, just received owing to delay in decyphering, suggests that Turks are instinctively averse from raising at this moment the delicate question of the Straits, and I share their apprehensions. Under the present proposal Turkey would be offering a substantial concession to the Soviet Union, which could only be justified if she were certain of obtaining a corresponding advantage. I am not at all sure that this would be the case, since I still doubt whether any offer about the Straits is really likely, at the present moment, to affect the attitude of the Soviet Union (see paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 735) [of 2nd November].

2. The foregoing represents my preliminary views. Admiralty comments on the implications of the proposal will be telegraphed as soon as possible.

(Repeated to Moscow, No. 753, and Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, No. 63.)

[R 8200/316/44] No. 93.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 1205.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 7, 1940.*

ATHENS telegram No. 1078 [of the 5th November: Withdrawal of Greek divisions from Bulgarian frontier].

I am not prepared to press the Turkish Government further in regard to their making a public declaration addressed to Bulgaria. You should, however, communicate the gist of Athens telegram No. 1078 to the Turkish Government and call their attention to the fact that the Greek President of the Council would remove one more division from the Bulgarian frontier if the Turkish Government made the declaration.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 860, and M.E.I.C., No. 63.)

[R 6920/17/44] No. 94.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 1465.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 10, 1940.*

FORTNIGHTLY report.

Italian aggression against Greece universally condemned by the Government, the people and the press. Greek resistance is admired. Tribute is paid to fighting qualities of the Greek troops. Anti-Axis attitude of Turkey and the mobilisation of Turkish forces mainly on European frontier considered as having restraining effect on the Axis and Bulgaria and as indirect help to Greece.

President's speech at the opening of the Grand National Assembly approved. In some Turkish quarters it is not considered aggressive enough. All pleased at affirmation stated of bonds of alliance with His Majesty's Government and a reference to the return of friendly relations with U.S.S.R.

Reception at Soviet Embassy on the anniversary of the Soviet revolution thronged with leading Turks as manifestation of cordiality.

Census revealed population almost 18 million. This is 1¼ million more than in 1935.

Anniversary of Turkish Republic celebration 29th October, army and air force warmly applauded. Popular party organised all celebrations and stressed positive vigorous Republican régime in comparison with effete rule of the Sultans.

General Wavell's goodwill message to Turkish Allies on the occasion of the anniversary was given wide publicity.

General Arthur Smith, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Forces, Middle East, visited Turkey at the invitation of the Turkish Government. He was present at the anniversary celebrations and was received in audience by the President of the Republic. He made tour of part of Turkey to see the Turkish troops and defence dispositions.

Private coal-fields in Eregli are to be acquired by State and a Bill for workmen's insurance is to be presented to the Assembly.

[R 8530/316/44] No. 95.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 1530. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 21, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 1508.

Turkish Government are clearly disturbed at King Boris's visit to Germany, and especially at the secrecy with which it was surrounded.

2. I think it probable that they may press somewhat insistently for information as to what took place and as to Bulgarian policy. Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that Turkish Minister has so far only succeeded in obtaining from Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs vague assurances of Bulgaria's

desire to keep out of the war, but no reference to visit. In speaking to Minister for Foreign Affairs, I purposely avoided alluding to Sofia telegram No. 822.

3. Meanwhile, it was decided, at a Cabinet meeting here yesterday, to declare martial law within the next few days in the whole of Thrace, Istanbul and Izmit, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles district. Necessary administrative details are being worked out. In addition, evacuation from Istanbul of superfluous inhabitants will be begun and demolition of superfluous houses in such a manner as to reduce the danger of fires spreading.

4. Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked that Turkey might not be at war until the spring, but it was wise to take all precautions now.

5. Minister for Foreign Affairs also informs me confidentially of very satisfactory audience of Turkish Ambassador in Belgrade with Prince Regent (see Belgrade telegram No. 953), during which the Prince had given every sign of firmness and desire to co-operate with Turkey. Turkish Government are following this up and will respond. They will instruct their ambassador to seek an audience to uphold similar assurances. My impression is that this may develop into staff conversations.

6. I said no more than that our information from Belgrade indicated an increasing degree of determination on the part of Yugoslavia. Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed. I then remarked that, if Turco-Yugoslav co-operation could be developed, this should have a healthy effect on Bulgaria and that it might be possible to exercise pressure on that country. He agreed and I gathered that he already had this in mind.

(Repeated to Athens, Sofia and Belgrade.)

[R 5897/4/7] No. 96.

Viscount Halifax to His Majesty's Representatives at Angora (No. 1296) and Belgrade (No. 742).

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 22, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 1256/717 [of 17th November: Proposal, based on a personal suggestion of the Turkish Ambassador in London, that Turkey and Yugoslavia should make joint representations to Bulgaria.]

King Boris's visit to Hitler—whatever may have actually passed at Berchtesgaden—shows the degree of pressure to which Bulgaria is now being subjected by Germany. Instructions have already been sent to Angora with a view to inducing the Turkish Government to make a public declaration addressed to Bulgaria, or, failing that, to explain once again and immediately in the clearest terms to the Bulgarian Government their intentions should Bulgaria lend herself to Axis designs.

2. Should, however, the Turkish Government be prepared to take this action, it is by no means certain that alone it will have the effect we desire. Some further notification to Bulgaria seems necessary, and the present appears likely to be the last opportunity we shall be offered; even now we may be too late.

3. I am favourably impressed by the suggestion of the Turkish Ambassador contained in my telegram under reference, and I shall accordingly be glad if you will suggest to the Government to which you are accredited that they should immediately concert with the Yugoslav/Turkish Government with a view to taking the following steps:—

> The Turkish and Yugoslav Governments together should at once notify the Bulgarian Government that they are under the necessity of guarding their own vital interests. One of those interests is to ensure that Bulgarian territory is not made use of by German armed forces for the prosecution of German military aims. They are aware that the Bulgarian Government have frequently stated that it is their object to maintain and even to defend their neutrality, and King Boris in a recent speech echoed these sentiments. Nevertheless, they are also aware of the danger to which Bulgaria is exposed as a result of the German occupation of Roumania, and they think it only right to explain to the Bulgarian Government that, should use be made of Bulgarian territory by German armed forces with the object either of attacking Greece or threatening Turkey or Yugoslavia, they, the Turkish and Yugoslav Governments, will feel obliged to take immediate and forcible action to defend their interests.

4. If the Turkish and Yugoslav Governments can be brought to agree to make a joint communication to the Bulgarian Government on the lines suggested in the preceding paragraph, it would be desirable that they should also agree to one further step. I would suggest that they should couple the foregoing notification with another to the following effect:—

> That while under the necessity of making this notification in common fairness to Bulgaria, they would suggest that the Bulgarian Government, if they feel themselves threatened by the Germans, or anticipate demands by Germany for the passage of troops and occupation of Bulgarian territory, should at once concert with the Turkish and Yugoslav Governments with a view to the three countries taking common action to oppose any German advance, and to defend the integrity and independence of the Balkan Peninsula against aggression. His Majesty's Government would be ready, if desired, to join in this *démarche*, and to concert, if necessary, measures in common with the three Balkan Powers. The Bulgarian Government might also be asked, as an earnest of their good intentions, to abstain from any measure of mobilisation except in consultation with Turkey and Yugoslavia, who would in return presumably be asked to give similar assurances to Bulgaria.

5. It may be that neither the Yugoslav nor the Turkish Government would be prepared to go as far as is suggested in the preceding paragraph, and it is for this reason that I should not wish the two halves of my proposal to be regarded as an indivisible whole. The first step is, in my opinion, the essential one; the second, though desirable, is not essential.

6. In putting forward these proposals to the Government to which you are accredited you should point out that His Majesty's Government have already done all they can themselves to keep Bulgaria on the right path: their own powers of suasion are, however, limited, and in present circumstances they feel that the proposals now put forward are the only ones which may possibly be effective. Speed is of the utmost importance, since it appears that Bulgaria is at this moment considering her future policy in the light of the King Boris–Hitler meeting.

7. The above was drafted before the receipt of Angora telegram No. 1539, but the last paragraph of that telegram suggests that the mind of the Turkish Government may well be moving in the same direction as our own.

(Repeated to Sofia, No. 530; Athens, No. 966; and Moscow, No. 806.)

[R 8426/316/44] No. 97.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 1552.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 22, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 1288.

1. I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs without delay. He asked me to reply that the best form of declaration was about to be made, namely, martial law, as reported in my telegram No. 1539. This was to be announced in the National Assembly this afternoon. Measures were also about to be taken to evacuate universities, schools, &c., from Istanbul into Anatolia. I urged that the fullest possible announcement of these measures should be made with the least possible delay.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs thought that in face of the above facts a declaration would have no effect. Germans could contradict or explain away a declaration, but not actual measures now introduced.

3. I think that there is force in his argument. However, I urged him as strongly as possible to speak again to the Bulgarian Government as desired in paragraph 3 of your telegram. He again pointed to the action taken as indicated in paragraph 1, and argued that anything further would be ineffective or directly offensive to the Bulgarian Government. He told me that the Turkish Minister had yesterday seen Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs on instructions, and had enquired what had passed during King Boris's visit and why such secrecy had been maintained. He had received reassuring reply.

4. Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed the conviction that the Bulgarians' one desire was to remain neutral. He entirely agreed with me that it was most important to prevent Bulgarians from joining Tripartite Pact, though he was inclined to discount the effects of her doing so. But I, however, am afraid that [group omitted: ? I was] quite unable to get more out of him than is reported above.

(Repeated to Sofia.)

[R 8530/316/44] No. 98.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received November* 23.)

(No. 1556.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November* 22, 1940.

MY telegram No. 1539, paragraphs 5 and 6.

1. Minister for Foreign Affairs gave me to-day further details of instructions sent to the Turkish Ambassador at Belgrade.

2. In addition to reciprocating sentiments already expressed as regards Turkey by Prince Paul, ambassador was to state Turkish attitude, viz., if Bulgaria attacked, Turkey would fight, and if Germany attacked through Bulgaria, Turkey would equally go to war [group undecypherable]. Ambassador was to enquire views of the Yugoslav Government on this.

3. I asked whether his Excellency had envisaged possibility of joint or identic Turkish and Yugoslav *démarche* at Sofia, and his Excellency replied that he thought Yugoslavia was much too scared to come so far out into the open.

(Repeated to Belgrade, Sofia and Athens.)

[R 8727/17/44] No. 99.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received November* 24.)

(No. 1560.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November* 22, 1940.

FORTNIGHTLY report.

Allied successes in Græco-Italian war continue to arouse greatest enthusiasm. Italians are despised and derided. Attitude of Government is one of non-belligerency and readiness to afford Greeks all possible facilities while [group undecypherable] Bulgaria against [group undecypherable] attack by latter and/or Germany.

2. [Two groups undecypherable]s visit to Berlin has caused concern, especially after President's reference to Russo-Turkish relations in Parliament on 1st November, which is thought to have been over-optimistic. Government are attentively awaiting next German movement and are determined to resist pressure and refuse concessions over the Straits. Speaking generally, tendency is towards increasing firmness.

3. Telegrams were exchanged between Turkish and British Prime Ministers on the occasion of Chamberlain's death.

4. Black-out regulations have been enforced in towns and important villages from 1st November.

5. Sale of petrol for private cars is being restricted in order to conserve supplies. A number of train services have been suspended. In view of world situation, measures are being taken to put country in a state of preparedness for any eventuality.

6. Minister for Communications has resigned for health reasons.

7. German Ambassador expected back 22nd November.

[R 8534/4/7] No. 100.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received November* 24.)

(No. 1580.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November* 23, 1940.

ATHENS telegram No. 1187.

As regards paragraph 3, my Greek colleague tells me that he saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 23rd November and urged that a formal statement should be made to the Bulgarian Government. The Minister for Foreign Affairs took the same line as that shown in my telegram No. 1552. However, he eventually agreed to send for the Bulgarian Minister and explain to him in a friendly manner that, though martial law, &c., was to be explained by the Turkish anxiety at recent developments, he remained convinced that Bulgaria had no intention to make any move by herself, and that the Turkish precautions were really taken with a view to possible German action.

2. Greek Ambassador also, in course of conversation, raised the question of the Turkish attitude to possible developments, and in particular to a German advance through Bulgaria against Greece without threatening Turkey. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who evinced surprise that the Greek Ambassador was not informed on this point, replied that it had been covered in his conversation with Great Britain and that the only point which had not been covered was that of a German advance through Yugoslavia. The Turkish Government were studying this point, but they did not think such a development likely.

3. As regards advance through Bulgaria, Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed the view that Germany could not advance to Salonica and leave the whole Turkish army intact to threaten her left flank. She would have to attack Turkey also.

4. My Greek colleague considered the Minister for Foreign Affairs' reply as reassuring.

(Repeated to Athens, Sofia and Belgrade.)

[R 8598/4/7] No. 101.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received November* 24.)

(No. 1583.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November* 23, 1940.

YOUR telegram No. 1206.

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs and secretary-general as soon as possible and gave them orally communication in the sense of your telegram.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs told me he had now altered his decision reported in my telegram No. 1580, and intended to address a communication to the Bulgarian Government through the Turkish Minister at Sofia. He read me his rough draft, which had still to be submitted to the Prime Minister. Briefly, his draft, while maintaining the friendliest references to Bulgaria, expressing confidence that Bulgaria would spontaneously undertake no hostile action, expressed the opinion that the Bulgarian political orientation was different (*i.e.*, opposite) from that of Turkey. Turkey was watching developments very closely, and was conscious of danger that events might occur which would place Bulgaria and Turkey in opposite camps. Turkish Government hoped that this would not occur.

3. Above [? is the] general outline of the proposed communication. Minister for Foreign Affairs described it as an ultimatum wrapped up in a love letter.

4. Returning to proposals in your telegram, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that matters had not advanced so far with the Yugoslav Government for the Turkish Government to concert such a joint communication with them. Moreover, to follow such procedure would entail scrapping his proposed communication outlined above. I agreed that, in view of the importance of not losing time, he should proceed with this communication, and his Excellency agreed that

if Yugoslav Government expressed themselves to you as ready to concert with Turkish Government as suggested, Turkish Government would be ready to examine matters further. We agreed, however, that if his Excellency went ahead with his own communication to Bulgarian Government, it would be difficult for him to address a further communication to them in the sense suggested in your telegram, and I suggested that in that case the best course would be for Yugoslavs to address a communication to Bulgarian Government on lines resembling as closely as possible those of proposed Turkish communication. If any further concerted Turco-Yugoslav communication had to be made, it would be more appropriate in the event of threats of German passage through Bulgaria than of Bulgarian adherence to a pact. I felt above suggestion was the one least likely to lose time. On returning home I learned that the B.B.C. had again announced that Bulgarian President of the Council was proceeding to Berlin very shortly. I informed Minister for Foreign Affairs by telephone and urged the importance of speed.

(Repeated to Athens, Sofia and Belgrade.)

[R 8147/318/44] No. 102.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received November 24.*)

(No. 1585.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 23, 1940.*

GERMAN Ambassador returned on 23rd November and has already seen secretary-general and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. To former he remarked that he returned as "the angel of peace."

3. To latter he adopted suave tone and argued, as on occasion of his last return from Berlin, that Germany had no wish to quarrel with Turkey's pro-British tone, but there were many things which Turkey could do in relation to Germany which were compatible with Anglo-Turkish Treaty.

4. He spoke a good deal of the "new" order in Europe, and urged that Turkey might fall in with it. Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked that this new order involved German domination over a number of countries which were not free. German Ambassador replied that the new order only affected Germany and her Allies and their neighbourhood [*sic*]. The important thing was to ensure that when Germany dealt with her neighbours, latter should be immune from British influence.

5. As regards Italian and Greek war, Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he retained the impression that German attitude was that they would not intervene so long as Great Britain did not create a "land front" in Greece: *i.e.*, presumably so long as we did not make use of Greece as a factor in the general war against German.

6. Herr von Papen's line seems in general to have been to foster Turkish neutrality and to give all necessary assurances to German good intentions. He has asked for audience with the President.

7. Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that the German Ambassador was greatly taken aback by the introduction of martial law in Turkey, and enquired the reason. Minister for Foreign Affairs told him that there was more to come

(Repeated to Athens, Sofia, Belgrade and Moscow.)

[R 8426/316/44] No. 103.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 1316.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 26, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 1583 [of 24th November: Proposed representations by Turkey and Yugoslavia to Bulgaria].

I agree that in the circumstances the Minister of Foreign Affairs should lose no time in proceeding with his proposed communication to the Bulgarian Government.

2. But I would urge that the Turkish *démarche* should not be merely limited to a warning, but should include an invitation on the lines suggested in my telegram No. 1296, to the effect that the Bulgarian Government, if they feel themselves threatened by the Germans, or anticipate demands by Germany for the passage of troops and occupation of Bulgarian territory, should at once concert with the Turkish Government with a view to the two countries taking common action to oppose any German advance, and to defend the integrity and independence of the Balkan peninsula against aggression.

3. Please suggest to Turkish Government that, as soon as decision to make proposed communication is reached, they should instruct their representative at Belgrade to inform Yugoslav Government, and at the same time, in concert with His Majesty's Representative at Belgrade, urge Yugoslav Government to make communication to Bulgarian Government on similar lines.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 995; Sofia, No. 540; and Belgrade, No. 761.)

[R 8598/4/7] No. 104.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received November 27.*)

(No. 1593.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 26, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 1583, paragraph 2.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has promised me copy of the instructions as finally sent to Sofia. I will telegraph these as soon as possible.

2. In the meantime, I asked his Excellency this morning if he had had any reply. He read me telegram from the Turkish Minister at Sofia, who, on receiving his instructions, had first seen the secretary-general and then the President of the Council (the Minister for Foreign Affairs being laid up).

3. The secretary-general had stated that Bulgaria's idea was not to be drawn into war, and that therefore the Turkish suggestions were deserving of study. As Bulgaria was of the same opinion as Turkey as to the desirability of Bulgaria not being drawn into war, the Minister for Foreign Affairs would take the Turkish suggestions into consideration, because Bulgaria realised that, even in the event of victory, the entry of a small Power into war in co-operation with a Great Power always involved loss.

4. The Turkish Minister then saw the President of the Council, who stated that Bulgaria had no claim or animosity against Turkey, and desired to keep out of the war at all costs. The slight concentration of troops on the Thracian frontier was not really such, but had been necessary to calm Bulgarian public opinion. It was intended to reduce it in the winter, and a beginning had already been made.

5. The Turkish Minister said that if Turkey and Bulgaria entered into contact for the purpose of avoiding war in the Balkans, while maintaining relations with their respective friends, good work would have been done. The President of the Council agreed, and said he would discuss this with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

6. The Turkish Minister asked the real position as to the alleged forthcoming visit of the President of the Council to Berlin. The President of the Council replied that the Bulgarian Government had not been confronted with a German proposal, they only understood such a desire existed: but as the position of Bulgaria was not that of Hungary or Roumania, they were continuing to study the matter, and no decision had been taken.

(Repeated to Athens, Sofia and Belgrade.)

[R 8598/4/7] No. 105.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 1595.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 26, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 1593.

Until I have seen [group undecypherable] Minister for Foreign Affairs' instructions to Turkish Minister in Sofia, I cannot tell whether or not they include any concrete proposal for some Turco-Bulgarian understanding to keep out of the war. Turkish Minister's observations (my telegram under reference) tend to suggest some suggestion may have been made.

2. I therefore remarked to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I trusted no understanding would be come to between Turkey and Bulgaria which might hamper Turkish freedom to go to war in case of need. His Excellency replied he was convinced that Bulgaria would never bind herself to any such understanding, and that Germany would not allow her to do so.

(Repeated to Athens, Belgrade and Sofia.)

[R 8598/4/7] No. 106.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 1600.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 26, 1940.*

FOLLOWING is translation of instructions sent to Turkish Minister at Sofia :—

1. The following three points are to be raised with M. Popoff : (*a*) significance of the extraordinary defence measures taken by the Turkish Government ; (*b*) object of Papen's statements to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs; (*c*) attitude to be adopted by Turkey and Bulgaria towards danger of war in the Balkans.

2. These three points are to be respectively developed as follows : (*a*) special measures taken by Turkish Government are in no way aimed at Bulgaria. Though convinced that the Bulgarian Government entertain no suspicions concerning their attitude, Turkish Government are nevertheless prepared to furnish every assurance in this connexion. War is approaching the Balkans more and more swiftly, and the measures in question are designed to provide for any eventuality. Establishment of a Great Power in the Balkans would create from points of view of independent and future Balkan States disquieting situation to which Governments concerned cannot remain indifferent (" manquer d'être sensibles ").

(*b*) The following is a summary of interview between Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and German Ambassador.

German Ambassador stated that Germany would remain indifferent to Italian-Greek war so long as British troops did not create a front in the Balkans. After speaking at length on Germany's proposed " new order," German Ambassador assured Minister for Foreign Affairs that Germany had no demands on Turkey incompatible with friendly alliances. Only cause of complaint related to anti-German campaign in Turkish press; German Government desired latter should restrict itself to reasonable criticism. Should this proposal be favourably received, Germany and her allies were prepared to furnish every assurance to Turkey.

In respect of point (*c*) Turkish Government consider a resemblance exists between situations of Turkey and Bulgaria. Relations of the two countries appear to have taken different directions owing to [exigencies of] their respective geographical situations, nevertheless neither wishes to enter the war. If Bulgarian Government share this view prevention of extension of war in Balkans and safeguard of independence and security of two neighbouring countries essentially depends on an atmosphere of confidence and improved mutual relations. If, on the other hand, either country were involved in war in any way there could be no doubt that the other would inevitably, whether it wished or not

3. Finally [? group omitted : it] arises whether [? group omitted : there] is any possibility of discovery of [group undecypherable] specific (" particulière ") and parallel policy for the two countries which, while enabling them to maintain their prudent attitude and leanings (in French " sympathies ") of their higher policy, would [? group omitted : enable] them to avoid being involved in war.

4. Turkish Government would be glad to learn views of Bulgarian Government on this subject.

(Repeated to Athens, Belgrade and Sofia.)

[R 8626/2101/44] No. 107.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 508.)
My Lord, *Angora, October 16, 1940.*

IN accordance with the suggestion made in your Lordship's despatch No. 200 of the 19th April regarding an exchange of visits with the Œcumenical Patriarch in Istanbul, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, on the 14th October, accompanied by my wife, I paid an informal visit to His All-Holiness, which was returned the same day.

2. Having previously ascertained by verbal communication from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the Turkish Government would apparently raise no objection to the proposed exchange of visits, I asked Archdeacon Oakley, chaplain at the embassy, to make arrangements for me to call on the Patriarch. These were duly completed and I was received informally by His All-Holiness on the morning of the 14th October. It may be worth recording that, in accordance with the protocol of the Phanar, on my extending my hand to greet him, he took it in both of his and saluted me on the cheek. My wife, the archdeacon and a member of my staff who accompanied me were greeted in a similar manner but without the accolade.

3. After the usual formal expressions of politeness, His All-Holiness, whose remarks were interpreted by his chief dragoman, conversed with me on various unimportant matters. In the course of this conversation, however, he did find occasion to remark that I had spent a long time in Turkey before paying him a visit but expressed satisfaction at my calling on him at the present moment. He also recalled the visit of His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury some eighteen months ago. During this conversation the customary rose jam was brought in and offered to us.

4. After some twenty-five minutes the conversation came to an end and we were invited to inspect the throne-room of the Phanar, the cathedral which contained several relics saved from St. Sophia, and the Treasure Chamber, where, in addition to a very fine collection of ikons and embroidered vestments, I was interested to see an illustrated Greek New Testament of the 13th century in a remarkably good state of preservation. Owing to his infirmity, the Patriarch did not accompany his visitors on this tour of inspection, which was made in company with the Grand Vicar, the Metropolitan of Heliopolis and two younger priests. In the course of conversation the Grand Vicar observed to me that he hoped that we should win the war. I replied that truth and justice were certainly on the side of Great Britain.

5. Arrangements were made for His All-Holiness to pay a return visit the same afternoon, and I received him at 4 P.M. in my study in the embassy building at Istanbul, together with the Grand Vicar, the secretary to the Holy Synod and another priest. Encouraged by a glass of Madeira, His All-Holiness displayed more alacrity and vivacity and conversed on a number of topics. No subject of any political nature was touched on. After some thirty-five minutes the Patriarch took his leave

6. I should like to place on record my gratitude to Archdeacon Oakley for concerting arrangements for the visits with the secretary of the Holy Synod, with whom he has succeeded in establishing excellent relations.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
JAMES MORGAN.

[R 8697/316/44] No. 108.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 1612.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 28, 1940.*

FIRST sentence of paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 1310, calling for an estimate from me of the Turkish attitude.

In recent telegrams, back to my telegram No. 1386, I have reported statements made to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. First four sentences of paragraph 2 [? of that] telegram indicated Turkish attitude at the moment of Italian attack on Greece. As reported subsequently, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has confirmed this to me on more than one occasion.

2. I and my staff regard it as certain that Turkey would go to war (1) if Bulgaria attacked Greece, (2) if Germany and Bulgaria together attacked Greece and (3) if either Germany, Italy, Bulgaria or Russia attacked Turkey separately or together.

3. There are, however, two other possibilities which require closer examination, and on which we cannot express quite so definite an opinion. These are (*a*) German attack on Greece through Bulgaria, Bulgaria remaining passive, and (*b*) German attack on Greece through Yugoslavia.

4. As to (*a*), I was greatly encouraged by the Minister for Foreign Affairs' remark reported in my telegram No. 1556. This must perhaps be qualified by Mr. Campbell's telegram No. 983, paragraph 2, and my telegram No. 1596, although when I questioned the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 26th November he was generally reassuring. Paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 1580 is relevant, and Greek Ambassador, with whom I have again discussed the point, seems perfectly satisfied. There is, however, another important point, namely, that in a recent conversation the Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff said to Admiral Kelly that, if Germany invaded Greece through Bulgaria while Bulgaria remained passive, the Turks would ask Bulgaria for explanations "in terms possibly leading to a breach of the peace." I heard of this shortly after sending my telegram No. 1508 which reported the Minister for Foreign Affairs' confirmation of the Turkish attitude as stated in my telegram No. 1386. As the statement of the Deputy Chief of Staff did not exactly correspond with my understanding of the Turkish attitude, I went at once to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said that I was forced to ask him to clear up the discrepancy. The Minister for Foreign Affairs at once [group undecypherable] Deputy Chief of Staff and renewed his original assurances. I had repeated them to him in the form reported to you. The Minister for Foreign Affairs went on to explain that his interpretation of the Deputy Chief of Staff's remark was that different plans would be put into execution if Bulgaria attacked alone or if the Turks had to deal with Germany. In the first case they would adopt aggressive, in the second defensive tactics.

5. I felt this to be as satisfactory as I could expect, having in mind the strategic problems with which Germany would be confronted if she attempted such an operation, viz., that if she directly invaded Turkey it would be extremely risky for her to penetrate via Bulgaria to Salonica leaving the knife of the Turkish army unthreatened and intact on her left flank. I also had in mind the Minister for Foreign Affairs' earlier admission that a threat to Salonica would be serious for Turkey, though it is true that his Excellency shows no signs of intending to take action in the case of such a threat. I continue, however, to rub it in.

6. Nevertheless, the Turkish Government's instructions to their Minister in Sofia (my telegram No. 1600) and the Bulgarian Government's reply (my telegram No. 1593) seems to make it necessary to examine the point further. In my view, Turkish representations to the Bulgarian Government, though very wrapped up, constitute a fairly clear [warning against allowing Germany to descend upon the Balkans. The Minister for Foreign Affairs actually said to me that the allusion in paragraph 2 (...) of my telegram No. 1600 to the establishment of a Great Power in the Balkan was meant to apply definitely to Germany.

7. There is, of course, a possibility that these representations to the Bulgarian Government may produce some [...] Bulgarian arrangement to keep

the Balkans out of the war. As to this, see my telegram No. 1505. My Greek colleague is also satisfied with these Turkish representations [? submitted] to them. It appears to me, however, that there exists in them an opening for Bulgaria to propose an agreement with Turkey which would keep her out of the war. Germany might encourage this, and, if such an agreement were made, it might facilitate German descent through Yugoslavia [group undecypherable] neutralising Turkey. I will mention this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs again, and express my conviction that nothing will be concluded contrary to our treaty.

8. I can only add to the general considerations that Turkish public opinion and press appears increasingly determined and accustomed to the idea that the war is approaching them. It is also worth while remarking that Turkish public opinion (*i.e.*, the National party) would hardly tolerate a failure to follow Greece's brilliant example. On the other side, it is perhaps only natural that a Government which finds itself steadily approaching a possible war crisis should hold back and avoid finally committing itself as long as possible.

9. As regards the German threat to Greece via Yugoslavia, the Turkish position is much less definite. My telegrams Nos. 1508 and 1580 show the position, and conclusion to be drawn is that they regard this threat as further away from themselves and hope it will remain so. If it involves a threat to Salonica, they would be more likely to be impressed. I think the Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the Yugoslav Government of the action taken by him at Sofia (my telegram No. 1600), but he told me last night that he did not expect a reply.

10. Conclusion from above is that (*a*) and (*b*) must be regarded as borderline cases. We think, as regards (*a*), chances are about 70 per cent. in favour, especially if we can impress on the Turks the necessity, in their own interest, of going to war. In both cases I think it important to continue putting to them the significance of Salonica. Even so, an essential consideration with them will be the amount of support which we can give.

11. It must be observed that all that the [group undecypherable]s deals with [? ambiguous] cases. There remains the case of Turkey coming in as part of the planned general war policy, with no special direct reason for doing so. This would depend on circumstances which have not yet developed. There would be an element of offensive action in it, and everything would depend on our position and power to encourage and support. In the present circumstances I do not consider Turkey would agree to any such proposal.

12. I conclude, however, from your telegram No. 1311 that on balance you regard it as preferable that Turkey should not enter the war until we are able to give her more support (materially presumably till the spring). [? If this] conclusion is right it would appear undesirable to press the Turkish Government too hard on points (*a*) and (*b*). I have followed this line so far, though, as you will see, I have gone some distance in trying to clear up point (*a*). I feel it is best not to be too insistent with direct questions on these two points, partly because to do so would lack confidence, and partly because I should almost certainly not get any more definite answer then that I have already received. It seems better to assume that all is well and to assist the Turkish Government to move slowly towards the right decision. I think that recent events show that they are doing this, but when the moment comes we may have to press the Salonica argument very hard.

13. Meanwhile, Herr von Papen is doing all he can to spread the belief that Germany wishes to ensure peace in the Balkans. Some of my colleagues have already told me that, through Herr von Papen's assurances, the Turkish Government are already much easier in their minds. But in view of the Turkish preparations, and of the attitude adopted, I doubt whether this "politique de chloroforme" will be effective. In any case, if we do not wish Turkey to come in till later, he is playing our game for the time being.

(Repeated to Athens, Sofia and Belgrade.)

[R 6703/4/7] No. 109.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 1617.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, November 29, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 1316, though dated 28th November, did not reach me till the afternoon of 28th November. In the meantime you will have had my telegram No. 1600 reporting *démarche* made by the Turkish Minister at Sofia on 25th November, and my telegram No. 1593 showed the reply of Bulgarian President to the Council.

2. I have just seen the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I suggested that the *démarche* reported in my telegram No. 1600 should be followed up with another in the sense desired, and that the Yugoslav Government should be urged to follow suit. His Excellency replied that the Yugoslav Government had already refused to respond to his earlier enquiries (my telegram No. 1597), and that he felt it would be of no use to approach them again. He had informed them of the instructions to the Turkish Minister at Sofia (my telegram No. 1600), but did not expect a reply.

3. As regards Bulgaria, he expressed the conviction that the Bulgarian Government would never go so far, from fear of annoying Germany. He thought we must go much more gradually and that the Bulgarian Government, whose intentions were good, were handicapped owing to fear of provoking Germany.

4. He then told me that, since the Turkish Minister's conversations reported in my telegram No. 1593, minister had been sent for by the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, although the latter was laid up. M. Popoff had said that he was ready to follow up the Turkish move, but that he must avoid "spoiling one thing while trying to attain another," *i.e.*, he must at all costs avoid provoking Germany. Nevertheless, he was sending for Bulgarian Minister at Angora to report and discuss the matter. Minister for Foreign Affairs considers that in the present circumstances this is an unexpectedly good sign.

5. I took the opportunity again to mention that I supposed that any arrangement reached with Bulgaria would not hamper the operation of the Anglo-Turkish Alliance (see paragraph 7 of my telegram No. 1612). Minister for Foreign Affairs said this could certainly not occur: Turkey was [? tied] by the Alliance, Bulgaria had no ties. Any rapprochement with Bulgaria would bring that country nearer to us.

(Repeated to Athens, Sofia and Belgrade.)

[R 8598/4/7] No. 110.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 1365.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 1, 1940.*

YOUR telegram No. 1600 [of 27th November: Turkish communication to the Bulgarian Government].

I am not impressed by the Turkish communication, in which I can see no hint of the ultimatum referred to in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 1583 [of 24th November] unless it be the last sentence of paragraph 2 of your telegram under reference; and the only inference I can draw from the phrase quoted in paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference regarding the maintenance by Turkey and Bulgaria of "the prudent attitude and leanings of their higher policy" is that Bulgaria would be free, as far as Turkey is concerned, to join the Tripartite Pact as long as that did not actually involve her in the war. On this point see my telegram to Sofia, No. 558. You should inform Turkish Government of these instructions.

(Repeated to Sofia, No. 557; Athens, No. 1934; and Belgrade, No. 793.)

No. 111.

ANGLO-TURKISH FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS OF DECEMBER 2, 1940.

CONTENTS.

1 Accord de Paiement entre le Gouvernement du Royaume Uni et le Gouvernement de la République Turque.
2 Protocol.
3. Exchange of Notes regarding Premiums.
4 Exchange of Notes regarding Financial and Commercial Facilities.

No. 1.

ACCORD DE PAIEMENT ENTRE LE GOUVERNEMENT DU ROYAUME UNI ET LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE TURQUE

LE Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique dans le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et de l'Irlande du Nord et le Gouvernement de la République Turque désireux de faciliter dans la plus large mesure possible les paiements commerciaux et extra-commerciaux entre les deux pays ont convenu ce qui suit :

ARTICLE 1.

La Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie ouvrira un "Special Account" auprès de la Banque d'Angleterre. La Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie et toutes autres banques et institutions en Turquie peuvent, après accord entre la Banque Centrale et la Banque d'Angleterre et enregistrement auprès de la Banque d'Angleterre, ouvrir aussi des "Special Accounts" auprès des banques en Angleterre. Tout compte ouvert en vertu de cet article sera dénommé "Turkish Special Account."

ARTICLE 2

Tous versements des personnes domiciliées dans le Sterling area aux personnes domiciliées en Turquie, à l'exception des montants prévus à l'article 4, seront versés aux "Turkish Special Accounts." Les montants versés aux "Turkish Special Accounts" seront utilisés :

(*a*) pour des transferts à un autre "Turkish Special Account",
(*b*) pour des paiements à n'importe quelle fin, à des personnes domiciliées dans le Sterling area.

ARTICLE 3.

La Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie maintiendra, durant la validité du présent Accord, son cours d'achat de la livre sterling à piastres 520 pour autant qu'une modification ne sera pas apportée à Londres au prix d'achat de l'or.

ARTICLE 4.

Les montants devant être payés par le Gouvernement turc conformément au "Guarantee Arrangement" du 27 mai 1938 et conformément aux arrangements du 8 janvier 1940 continueront à être réglés suivant les stipulations desdits arrangements.

De même les montants qui seront versés en Turquie et en Angleterre conformément à l'Accord du 3 février 1940 seront réglés suivant les prescriptions dudit Accord.

ARTICLE 5.

Le présent Accord aura la même durée de validité que celle de l'Accord de Commerce et de Paiements du 3 février 1940.

Fait en double exemplaire en langue française à Ankara le deux décembre mil neuf cent quarante.

H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN. N. MENEMENCIOGLU.

No. 2.

(Confidentiel.)

PROTOCOLE ADDITIONNEL

ARTICLE 1er.

(*a*) I.—Tout paiement en Sterling effectué par la "United Kingdom Commercial Corporation" pour le compte de la Turquie sera porté en premier lieu à un compte ouvert auprès de la Banque d'Angleterre intitulé "Central Bank of Turkey-United Kingdom Commercial Corporation Account."

(*a*) II.—Dix pour cent des montants virés à ce compte seront transférés à un compte intitulé "Central Bank of Turkey Account No. 1." Le solde sera porté au "Special Account" de la Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie auprès de la Banque d'Angleterre ouvert conformément à l'article 1er de l'Accord de Paiement en date de ce jour.

(*a*) III.—Tous montants portés au "Compte No. 1" seront convertibles en or par la Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie. Cet or sera mis à la libre disposition de la Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie par la Banque d'Angleterre à Ottawa à un prix calculé sur la valeur en dollars Etats-Unis de l'or à Ottawa et les dollars au cours moyen du dollar à Londres au jour de l'achat et pourra être éventuellement exporté vers de tiers pays.

(*b*) Au cas où le total du solde des "Special Accounts" de la Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie auprès de la Banque d'Angleterre dépasserait, à un moment quelconque, £400,000, la différence sera virée à un compte intitulé "Central Bank of Turkey Account No. 2."

(*c*) Tout montant porté au "Compte No. 2" sera convertible en or par la Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie aux conditions prévues à l'alinéa (*a*) III.

Pendant les périodes définies à la fin du présent alinéa cet or sera gardé à Ottawa et ne sera disponible que pour la revente à la Banque d'Angleterre. Dans le cas où le total des soldes des comptes prévus à l'alinéa (*b*) serait moins de £400,000, la différence sera comblée par le produit de la vente d'or du "Compte No. 2." Le prix de l'or ainsi revendu sera calculé selon les conditions ci-dessus basé sur les cours du jour de revente.

Le "Compte No. 2" sera arrêté à la fin de chaque période de quatre mois à partir du 4 décembre 1940. L'or se trouvant au crédit de la Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie au moment de l'arrêté du compte sera à la libre disposition de cet institut, qui pourra éventuellement l'exporter vers de tiers pays.

ARTICLE 2.

La Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie fournira les livres sterling nécessaires au paiement des marchandises importées en Turquie du Royaume-Uni et des Territoires inclus dans le Sterling Area jusqu'à concurrence de la balance de ses "Special Accounts." A défaut d'une disponibilité suffisante auxdits comptes, la Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie se procurera les livres sterling nécessaires par une vente d'or ou de devises libres à la Banque d'Angleterre jusqu'à concurrence de la valeur de l'or qui lui aurait été cédé, dans les douze mois précédents, par la Banque d'Angleterre par conversion de la balance du "Compte No. 2."

ARTICLE 3.

Au cas d'une modification dans le prix officiel de l'or sur le marché de Londres, les avoirs figurant au crédit des comptes spéciaux de la Banque Centrale seront ajustés de manière à s'accorder avec le nouveau prix officiel de l'or.

ARTICLE 4.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique et le Gouvernement Turc faciliteront dans la plus grande mesure l'achat des produits de la Turquie par les intéressés britanniques contre paiement en Sterling et des produits britanniques par les intéressés turcs contre paiement en livres turques.

ARTICLE 5.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique accordera toutes les facilités en ce qui concerne les licences d'exportations, le transport, assurances, &c., pour les achats effectués par la Turquie dans le Sterling Area.

Le Gouvernement Turc accordera, de son côté, toutes les facilités du même ordre.

Les modifications et adaptations nécessaires seront faites dans l'Accord du 3 février 1940 pour réglementer et préciser les facilités dont il s'agit.

ARTICLE 6.

La Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie pourra demander la conversion en or du 25 pour cent des livres sterling libres détenues par les banques en Turquie auprès de leurs différents correspondants en Angleterre à la date du 4 décembre 1940 et du 25 pour cent après un délai de trois mois. Cet or sera mis à la disposition de la Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie à Ottawa et pourra être librement exporté vers de tiers pays. Les soldes qui resteront aux comptes de la Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie seront virés au "Special Account" prévu à l'article 1er de l'Accord de Paiement signé en date de ce jour.

ARTICLE 7.

Les modifications suivantes seront apportées à l'Accord de Commerce et de Paiements du 3 février 1940 :

1. Les achats que l'United Kingdom Commercial Corporation effectuera en Turquie, y compris ceux destinés au Royaume-Uni, ainsi que les ventes en Turquie de cet organisme resteront en dehors des dispositions de l'Accord du 3 février 1940 et feront l'objet d'un arrangement ultérieur.

2. Au cas où les disponibilités du compte de compensation prévu à l'article 8 de l'Accord du 3 février 1940 seraient insuffisantes pour le règlement des ordres de paiement de la Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie, la Banque Centrale alimentera ledit compte, dans la mesure des disponibilités de ses "Special Accounts."

De même la Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie aura la faculté de transférer à ses "Special Accounts" les disponibilités existant dans son compte de compensation.

3. Les 20 pour cent des montants inscrits au "General Account" suivant les stipulations de l'Article 8, alinéa 2, de l'Accord du 3 février 1940 et mis à la libre disposition de la Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie seront versés au "Compte No. 1," prévu à l'article 1er, alinéa (*a*) II, du présent Protocole.

ARTICLE 8.

Les territoires qui, outre le Royaume-Uni et l'île de Man, font partie du Sterling Area sont les suivants, à l'exclusion toutefois du Canada, de la Terre-Neuve et du Hong-Kong :

(*a*) Tous les Dominions;
(*b*) Toutes autres parties des territoires de Sa Majesté Britannique en dehors des Îles Britanniques;
(*c*) Tous territoires à l'égard desquels un mandat a été accepté par Sa Majesté au nom de la Société des Nations et exercé par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni ou dans les Dominions;
(*d*) Tous Protectorats Britanniques ou Etats protégés;
(*e*) L'Egypte, le Soudan Anglo-Egyptien et l'Irak.

ARTICLE 9.

Le présent Protocole fait partie intégrante de l'Accord de Paiement signé en date de ce jour.

Fait en double exemplaire en langue française, à Ankara le deux décembre mil neuf cent quarante.

H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN. N. MENEMENCIOGLU.

No. 3

M. Numan Menemencioglu to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Ankara, le 2 décembre* 1940.

J'AI l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement Turc applique actuellement un régime de primes sur certaines opérations de change, d'importation et d'exportation dans ses rapports avec l'Angleterre.

Me référant à l'Article 6 du Protocole annexé à l'Accord de Paiement en date de ce jour, je m'empresse de vous confirmer qu'aucune modification ne sera apportée à ce régime en ce qui concerne le montant et les destinations des primes, qui sont principalement les suivants :

Il est accordé une prime de 40 pour cent :

(1) Pour les livres sterling qui, en vertu des règlements en vigueur, peuvent être achetées par la Caisse d'Amortissement;

(2) Pour les livres sterling provenant d'encaissement de nolis;

(3) Pour les livres sterling provenant d'une exportation vers le Sterling Area de marchandise d'origine turque et donnant droit à une importation;

(4) Pour les livres sterling versés au " General Account " prévu à l'Article 8 de l'Accord du 3 février 1940.

Il est perçu :

Une prime de 48 pour cent sur :

(1) Les livres sterling destinées au paiement de marchandises importées du Sterling Area;

(2) Les livres sterling payées en règlement de marchandises importées du Royaume-Uni conformément à l'Accord du 3 février 1940;

Une prime de 41 pour cent :

Sur les livres sterling fournies en règlement de nolis.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

N. MENEMENCIOGLU.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to M. Numan Menemencioglu.

British Embassy in Turkey,

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Ankara, le 2 décembre* 1940.

J'AI la lettre en date de ce jour, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître ce qui suit :

" J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement Turc applique actuellement un régime de primes sur certaines opérations de change, d'importation et d'exportation dans ses rapports avec l'Angleterre.

" Me référant à l'Article 6 du Protocole annexé à l'Accord de Paiements en date de ce jour, je m'empresse de vous confirmer qu'aucune modification ne sera apportée à ce régime en ce qui concerne le montant et les destinations des primes, qui sont principalement les suivants :

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" (1) Pour les livres sterling qui, en vertu des règlements en vigueur, peuvent être achetées par la Caisse d'Amortissement;

" (2) Pour les livres sterling provenant d'encaissement de nolis;

" (3) Pour les livres sterling provenant d'une exportation vers le Sterling Area de marchandise d'origine turque et donnant droit à une importation;

" (4) Pour les livres sterling versées au ' Général Account ' prévu à l'Article 8 de l'Accord du 3 février 1940.

" Il est perçu :

" Une prime de 48 pour cent sur :

" (1) Les livres sterling destinées au paiement de marchandises importées du Sterling Area;

" (2) Les livres sterling payées en règlement de marchandises importées du Royaume-Uni conformément à l'Accord du 3 février 1940;

" Une prime de 41 pour cent :

" Sur les livres sterling fournies en règlement de nolis."

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Excellence de cette communication, sur les termes de laquelle le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni est d'accord.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

No. 4

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to M. Numan Menemencioglu.

British Embassy in Turkey.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Ankara, le 2 décembre* 1940.

LORS des pourparlers relatifs à l'Accord de Paiement en date de ce jour, la délégation turque chargée de négocier cet accord a demandé de quelle manière le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique pourrait faciliter les achats turcs des pays neutres, tels que les Etats-Unis et les Indes Néerlandaises.

Je viens donner à votre Excellence l'assurance que mon Gouvernement est d'accord de faciliter dans la plus grande mesure possible les achats turcs des pays précités pour la durée de l'Accord, soit par l'octroi des facilités de transport, assurance, &c., soit par l'octroi des facilités de paiement.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

M. Numan Menemencioglu to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Ankara, le 2 décembre* 1940.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre lettre en date de ce jour ainsi conçue :

" Lors des pourparlers relatifs à l'Accord de Paiement en date de ce jour, la délégation turque chargée de négocier cet accord a demandé de quelle manière le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique pourrait faciliter les achats turcs des pays neutres, tels que les Etats-Unis et les Indes Néerlandaises.

" Je viens donner à votre Excellence l'assurance que mon Gouvernement est d'accord de faciliter dans la plus grande mesure possible les achats turcs des pays précités pour la durée de l'Accord, soit par l'octroi des facilités de transport, assurances, &c., soit par l'octroi des facilités de paiements."

Veuillez agréer, &c.

N. MENEMENCIOGLU.

[R 8767/4/7] No. 112.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 1659.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, December 4, 1940.*

YOUR telegrams No. 1361 and No. 1365.

1. I was unable to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs until this morning.

2. I began by speaking in the sense of your telegram No. 1365. I pointed out that you were seriously concerned lest Turkish phrase about " the prudent attitude and leanings of their higher policy " might leave it open to Bulgaria to join the Tripartite Pact while avoiding the obligation to go to war.

3. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that up till now Bulgaria had not joined the pact and seemed less likely to do so. He was not certain whether this improvement was due to Russian or Turkish action in Sofia or to both.

4. I said that what you also feared was that some Turco-Bulgarian understanding might result from the present conversations which might neutralise Turkey in the event of Germans advancing through Yugoslavia without threatening Bulgaria. The Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed the view that this fear was groundless (I should mention that on 3rd December I asked my Greek colleague to mention this point to the Prime Minister, who had sent for him. My Greek colleague did so and received the reply that the Turkish Government had already thought of this and were " not so ' naif ' as all that "). I went on to say that my interpretation of the position was that Turkish Government might make an arrangement with Bulgaria to the effect that neither would go to war with the other unless (*a*) one attacked the other directly, or (*b*) one allowed a foreign army to pass through its territory. I said this would surely not hamper Turkey from going to war, *e.g.*, in the event of a German advance through Yugoslavia leaving Bulgaria and Turkey threatened. I said that it also seemed to me clear that whatever arrangement were made, if Bulgaria attacked Turkey or allowed Germany to attack Turkey through her territory, the agreement would lapse and Turkey would go to war. It was here that the Minister for Foreign Affairs made the remark reported in my telegram No. 1658 that if Germany attacked through Bulgaria " either alone or together " (which he repeated). Turkey would necessarily be at war. He also expressed complete agreement with my definitions of the situation, viz., that such an agreement with Bulgaria would not hamper Turkey in the event of a German attack through Yugoslavia.

5. Returning to the question of possible action to prevent Bulgaria from joining Tripartite Pact, Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke strongly in favour of gentle as against severe treatment of Bulgaria. He did not [? group omitted : think] it advisable to admonish them with threatening language. Bulgaria was in an exceedingly delicate position, governed by the fear of provoking Germany. Speech of the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs on 3rd December had been very adroitly balanced, and his Excellency saw signs of Bulgarian desire for rapprochement with Turkey. Nor did he agree that his own language to Sofia (my telegram No. 1600) had been weak. He had spoken of the consequences of Turkey and Bulgaria finding themselves in opposite camps, and he had also spoken of similar consequences if Bulgaria found herself " entachée " (stained) by her relations with other Powers, *i.e.*, Germany. He had wrapped his language up as he realised the danger that threats would have driven Bulgaria further into the arms of Germany, but his language had nevertheless been perfectly clear. He hoped to establish a continuous contact with the Bulgarian Government. Soon after the Bulgarian Minister returned here from Sofia he intended to invite the Turkish Minister at Sofia to come to Angora.

6. Proceeding to summarise the situation in the Balkans as he now saw it, he said that Bulgaria had already drawn a little way from Germany. Yugoslavia, whose main fear was encirclement, benefited by this new development in Bulgaria. The best thing that Turkey could do would be to continue to work on Bulgaria as the more Bulgaria could be drawn away from Germany the more determined Yugoslavia would become in proportion as her fear of a German attack through Bulgaria or a hostile Bulgaria on her flank diminished. He agreed that the essential thing was to draw Bulgaria closer to Turkey and Yugoslavia.

7. I here made an appeal that the Turkish press should reciprocate the recent friendly tone of the Bulgarian press (Sofia telegram No. 893). Minister for Foreign Affairs did not demur.

8. I then informed him of Moscow telegram No. 1046 and acted on the instructions in your telegram No. 1361. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had had similar information from Moscow. Speaking in the sense of paragraph 2 of your telegram, I instructed him that he should concert with the Yugoslav Government some joint action to support Bulgaria in her effort to free himself from the German hold on her. I quoted the suggestion in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 742 to Belgrade. The Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed to think that joint action was out of the question owing to the attitude of Belgrade. He quoted Prince Paul's language reported in my telegram No. 1597 as indicating negative attitude of the Yugoslav Government, and said that we should address ourselves first to Belgrade. He made no comment, at least certainly no negative comment, when I enquired whether he would be willing to act if Belgrade agreed to do so.

(Repeated to Athens, Sofia and Belgrade.)

[R 8597/4/7] No. 113.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 365.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 6, 1940.*

ON the 19th November, in the course of one of his customary *tours d'horizon*, the Turkish Ambassador observed to Sir Orme Sargent that recent developments in the Balkans were tending in such a way that the actions of the Bulgarian Government would have a decisive effect, not merely on the course of the war in the Balkans, but on the *tempo* of the war between Great Britain and Germany. His Excellency was convinced that Herr Hitler had decided to send his armies through Bulgaria. When asked whether, if Herr Hitler's objective was Salonika, the route through Yugoslavia would not be far easier and more direct than that through Bulgaria, Dr. Aras maintained that the German objective was not Salonika. The Italians, he said, would have the honour and glory of occupying that town, while the German armies occupied Bulgaria and Thrace, and thus encircled and paralysed Yugoslavia and at the same time threatened Turkey. The success of such a campaign and its ultimate results thus depended largely on whether Herr Hitler could count on the co-operation or even tacit acquiescence of Bulgaria. This, in his Excellency's opinion, was what made the decision of the Bulgarian Government, and more particularly of King Boris, of such vital importance at the present juncture. The ambassador would not admit the argument that King Boris was perhaps not personally in a position to control the situation in Bulgaria, and expressed himself as certain that the King, if he wanted to, could take and put through whatever decision he wished.

2. So convinced was his Excellency of the importance of leaving nothing undone in regard to Bulgaria that he had recently, with the authorisation of his Government, put to the Yugoslav Minister in London the proposal that the Turkish and Yugoslav Governments should combine together to summon the Bulgarian Government to join with Yugoslavia and Turkey in common action to resist German pressure and penetration into Bulgaria. Unfortunately, however, he had received no reply from the Yugoslav Government, and felt bound to conclude that they were not prepared to take such drastic action (in this connexion it is perhaps worth while to compare Mr. Campbell's telegram No. 949 of the 17th November).

3. As regards the Turkish Government themselves, the ambassador was at pains to explain that, in the event of Bulgaria permitting the entry of German troops, it would be in the best interests of both Turkey and Great Britain if the former remained passive so as to give herself more time to complete her defences and to choose her own moment for an active intervention. ' Sir Orme Sargent demurred strongly to this view, and pointed out that a German occupation of Bulgaria would weaken the whole strategic position of Turkey and would go far to neutralise the increase in Turkish armaments which she might effect during the period of waiting. Bulgaria was a natural bastion, which Turkey could surely

not afford to abandon to the enemy without a struggle. A German occupation of Bulgaria would bring the German air force within close range of Istanbul, whereas the Bulgarian mountain ranges offered Turkey the strongest possible defensive position, as had been shown at Plevna in 1878. Quite apart from this, however, the Turkish Government had recently stated that they would be bound to intervene in self-defence if the Germans entered Bulgaria. At this point his Excellency began to hedge, but it was quite clear that, so far as he had any influence, he would do his utmost to keep Turkey passive, whatever action Germany might take in the Balkans.

4. Dr. Aras also had much to say about the Soviet Union. On being asked whether he thought the Soviet Government, as a result of M. Molotov's visit to Berlin, would now proceed to exercise pressure on Turkey in order to neutralise her (see Mr. Rendel's telegram No. 816 of the 16th November), he replied that he did not expect this, since his view was that M. Stalin was glad in present circumstances to see Turkey allied to Great Britain. M. Stalin, his Excellency said, dreaded nothing more than the collapse of Turkey in the face of German pressure, for he fully realised that a Turkey completely subservient to Germany would mean the ruin of the Soviet Union, since it would mean the encirclement by Herr Hitler of the whole of European Russia. What M. Stalin now hoped for was the removal of the German armies from the Soviet Union's western frontiers and their transfer to the Balkans, where he hoped that they would be nailed down indefinitely as a result of Turkey's policy of passive resistance (compare paragraph 3 of Sir Robert Craigie's telegram No. 2263 of the 18th November). In reply to the question whether, if M. Stalin was so anxious for Turkey to hold Germany in this war, he, Dr. Aras, expected that the Soviet Union would be ready to give Turkey covertly any substantial assistance in present circumstances, his Excellency said that he did not expect any help to be given until Turkey was actually at war. When this occurred, however, he supposed that the Soviet Union would help Turkey in the same way as she was at present helping the Chinese Government. This, he observed, had been definitely stated by the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires at Vichy to the Turkish Embassy there.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Moscow, Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia.

I am, &c.
HALIFAX.

[R 8849/1213/44] No. 114.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 532 E.)
My Lord, *Angora, November 15, 1940.*

WITH reference to Mr. Morgan's despatch No. 386 E. of the 29th June, 1937, reporting the promulgation of Decree No. 2/6792 of the 8th June, 1937, which authorised the transfer of blocked funds, interests and dividends due to persons resident outside Turkey, by means of the purchase and export of Turkish goods, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of Decree 2/14573 of the 23rd October, 1940, which modifies existing regulations in this connexion.

2. The new decree names fifteen Turkish products which may be exported for the purpose indicated, subject (1) to the issue of an export licence by the Ministry of Commerce, and (2) to such shipments being effected exclusively to countries (*a*) of which persons entitled to receive such transfers of blocked funds are nationals, or where they reside; and (*b*) in which the shareholders or head office of the companies or organisations constituted, either wholly or partially, with foreign capital are established.

3. In the event of such countries having concluded a clearing or payments agreement with Turkey, it is necessary to obtain a guarantee from the competent authorities of those countries that such shipments will fall entirely outside existing clearing or compensation payments agreements. These guarantees must accompany any application to the Turkish Ministry of Finance at Angora for permission to effect such exports. (Article 2.)

4. All supplementary expenses, such as freight and insurance charges, commission, &c., must be settled at destination by consignees out of the value of the goods exported. (Article 3.)

5. This decree, which annuls all previous and existing regulations on this subject (article 4), came into force on the date of its publication in the *Official Gazette*, No. 4650 of the 31st October last.

I have, &c.
H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

Enclosure in No. 114

Décret No. 2/14573 du 23 Octobre 1940

SUR la proposition faite par le Ministère des Finances par sa note No. 54271/1/14504 du 16 octobre 1940 avec l'assentiment du Ministère du Commerce, le Conseil des Ministres a, dans sa réunion du 23 octobre 1940, approuvé la mise en vigueur du décret ci-annexé relatif au mode de transfert des intérêts et dividendes que les sociétés indigènes et étrangères travaillant en Turquie sont tenues de régler à leurs actionnaires et obligataires se trouvant à l'étranger, ainsi que des fonds bloqués actuellement auprès de la Banque centrale de la République de Turquie pour des raisons diverses.

Décret relatif au Mode de Transfert des Fonds bloqués, formant Appendice au Décret No. 12.

Article 1er. Les marchandises énumérées ci-bas sont affectées au transfert des créances bloquées des personnes physiques et morales étrangères établies à l'étranger, ainsi que des intérêts et dividendes que les sociétés et établissements ayant entièrement ou en partie un capital étranger sont tenus de remettre à l'étranger (à l'exclusion des dispositions des accords et contrats existants) :

(1) Anis.
(2) Eponges.
(3) Noisettes (récolte 1939).
(4) Légumes frais.
(5) Racines tinctoriales.
(6) Tapis.
(7) Ecume de mer.
(8) Tabac (récolte de l'année 1938 et des années antérieures).
(9) Fruits frais.
(10) Conserves de fruits et de légumes (les récipients en fer blanc devant être fournis par l'acheteur).
(11) Vins.
(12) Liqueurs.
(13) Essence de roses.
(14) Poudre de lait.
(15) Eaux minérales.

Art. 2. Les marchandises indiquées à l'article 1er (celles en regard desquelles une clause spéciale a été prévue, d'après cette clause) peuvent être exportées avec l'autorisation du Ministère du Commerce exclusivement à destination des pays dont ressortissent ou sont établies les personnes étrangères et des pays où se trouvent les actionnaires ou le siège central des sociétés et établissements ayant entièrement ou en partie un capital étranger.

Si ces pays ont conclu avec la Turquie un accord de clearing ou similaire, il faut qu'il soit obtenu des établissements officiels compétents de ces pays une autorisation attestant que la contre-valeur de la marchandise exportée sera laissée hors clearing, compensation ou restriction, et qu'une démarche soit faite auprès du Ministère des Finances avec cette autorisation.

Art. 3. Les frais d'exportation tels que frets, primes d'assurance, commission des marchandises indiquées à l'article 1er, seront réglés à destination par les intéressés avec les devises provenant du transfert de ces marchandises.

Art. 4. Sont abrogées les dispositions jusqu'à présent en vigueur relatives au transfert à l'étranger des fonds entrant dans l'objet de l'article 1er.

Art. 5. Le présent décret entre en vigueur à partir de la date de sa publication.

[R 8727/17/44] No. 115.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 1696.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, December 9, 1940.*

FORTNIGHTLY report.

No change in public opinion. Greek successes cause satisfaction.

2. General regulations of Thrace prohibition of use of private cars, together with proclamation of martial law in Thrace, are accepted by the public as natural precautionary measures. People are gradually becoming accustomed to the idea that the country will one day be at war.

3. The signature of the Anglo-Turkish Payments Agreement on 2nd December is welcomed.

4. Some Turkish technical service experts have been sent to the British forces in Egypt, and some British instructors for the Turkish defence forces have arrived.

5. The Minister of Commerce has resigned as the result of criticism of his policy by members of parliamentary group of the Popular party.

6. German attempts at explaining away the German wireless accounts of von Papen's statements on Turkish policy have met with little credence.

[N 7421/283/38] No. 116.

Sir S. Cripps to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 1096.)
(Telegraphic.) *Moscow, December 11, 1940.*

MY telegram No. 1074.

Please treat as strictly confidential following account of Turkish Ambassador's interview with Molotov last night.

2. Ambassador, who was cordially received, began with a résumé of the situation in the Balkans since his last interview with Molotov, adding that he regarded Dekanozov's statement to him as an official *démenti* of all current rumours (see my telegram No. 1019). He then enquired whether Sobolyev's visit to Sofia had really been to help to tranquillise the Balkans.

3. Molotov replied that he would answer the ambassador's questions fully.

4. Soviet Government has had information that Bulgaria, feeling herself menaced and anticipating an attack, had asked Germany and Italy for guarantees. Thereupon Molotov had immediately sent Sobolyev to Sofia to ask the King whether this news about the guarantees was true and whether Bulgaria felt herself menaced. In the event of an affirmative reply, Sobolyev was instructed to ask the King whether he was prepared to accept a guarantee from the Soviet Government.

5. At this stage Molotov interpolated: "I tell you quite openly that we had the impression that Turkey was preparing to attack Bulgaria, and that we did not regard such a possibility as excluded."

6. In order to safeguard peace in the Balkans, the Soviet Government had proposed the guarantee to Bulgaria, and he (Molotov) had further instructed Sobolyev to ask the King whether Bulgaria was [? ready] for conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance.

7. Molotov had the King's answer in his hands. The King had stated that he noticed an improvement in the situation, and did not find it necessary to accept a Soviet guarantee or to have any pact of mutual assistance.

8. Molotov added that he considered it necessary to tell the ambassador of these proposals in all frankness.

9. Ambassador thanked him, and enquired whence Soviet Government had derived idea that Bulgaria was menaced; adding that they could quite well have asked Turkish Government, who, as he knew well, would take no action in the Black Sea area without prior notification to the Soviet Government. This was a fresh instance of Russian distrust of Turkey. It was unmerited and would make a painful impression on the Turkish Government.

10. Molotov replied that Soviet Government's impression had naturally been derived from the presence of large Turkish forces in Thrace.

11. Ambassador retorted that, as Molotov well knew, these forces were for defence only.

12. To this Molotov did not reply. Ambassador pointed out that Turkey had taken every opportunity of warning Bulgaria of danger, and cited statement broadcast from Angora yesterday at midday regarding Turkey's intentions. He further informed Molotov of approach which Turkey had made to Bulgaria in last few days, adding, however, that he did not yet know how Bulgarians had replied.

13. Molotov stated that these conversations interested him very much, and asked whether there was any suggestion of a mutual assistance pact. Ambassador replied that he could not say, but he would inform Molotov as soon as he heard. In conclusion, the ambassador observed that Soviet-Turkish relations had been much better when the two countries had consulted one another fully and frankly, and it was a pity that practice had been discontinued.

14. Ambassador's general opinion on this interview, which I share, is that there was no agreement in Berlin regarding the Balkan questions. With Germans at the mouth of the Danube, Russia wanted a "point of strength" in the Balkans, and had thought this an opportune moment to try to get what has always been Stalin's wish—a foothold in Bulgaria. Soviet Government had encouraged the idea of a Turkish threat to Bulgaria as the best way of bringing pressure to bear on her to agree to a mutual assistance pact, ostensibly to protect Bulgaria from Turkey, but in practice to protect Russian interests against Germany. In this they have failed; in consequence they are beginning to realise the extent of their isolation. This may cause them to turn more towards those countries, Turkey in particular, which may prove firm friends in the event of a German attack.

[R 8945/4/7] No. 117.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 1720. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, December 13, 1940.*

MOSCOW telegram No. [? 1096], paragraph 7, and Sofia telegram No. 938.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me this morning to inform me as follows of the conversation between the Turkish Ambassador and Molotov.

2. Molotov had explained that Sobolyev had been sent to Sofia because the Soviet Government understood that Bulgaria was anxious about possible Turkish menace and had applied to Germany and Italy for support. Sobolyev had instructions, if Soviet Government were correct, to offer a pact. Sobolyev saw King Boris, who said that the situation had improved and implied that such a pact was not necessary.

3. Turkish Ambassador had pointed out that Turkey had no aggressive designs whatever against Bulgaria but was merely defending herself against [? all] comers.

4. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs added that he had since sent for the Soviet Ambassador here and had expressed satisfaction at Molotov's frankness. He had then gone on to point out what he described as a "delicate matter," viz., that the Soviet Government had made this proposal to the Bulgarian Government without previously informing the Turkish Government as provided for in Russo-Turkish agreement. Turkish Government regarded this provision as still valid and hoped the Soviet Government did so too. He was instructing the Turkish Ambassador to mention [? this] to Molotov, but wished the Soviet Ambassador here to be aware of this beforehand.

5. Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed in general pleased with the Turkish Ambassador's conversation with Molotov.

(Repeated to Sofia, Belgrade and Moscow.)

[R 8530/316/44] No. 118.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 1773.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Angora, December 21, 1940.*
MY telegram No. 1578.
Martial law has been prolonged for three months as from the 20th December.

[R 9042/17/44] No. 119.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 547.)
My Lord, *Angora, November 28, 1940.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that on the 20th November M. Ali Çetinkaya (see Turkey: Personalities No. 6) resigned from his post as Minister of Communications, nominally on the grounds of ill-health, but really, if rumour may be believed, on account of some disagreement of a personal nature with the other six members for Afyon Karahisar; as one of the Deputies for which town he has sat in the Grand National Assembly since 1923. He had held the portfolio of Communications since its creation in April 1939, when the Ministry of Public Works, which he had held since 1934, was sub-divided into two separate departments.

2. M. Çetinkaya is succeeded as Minister of Communications by M. Cevdet Kerim Incedayi, aged 46, who has been Deputy for Sinope since 1935. M. Incedayi is a noted orator, who is frequently used to broadcast explanations of Government policy to the nation.

3. The resignation was also announced on the 26th November of the Minister of Commerce, M. Nazmi Topçuoğlu, whose appointment was reported in my despatch No. 650 of the 3rd November, 1939. It appears that for some months past the Grand National Assembly has not been satisfied with M. Topçuoğlu's conduct of commercial affairs. He is replaced by M. Mümtaz Ökmen, Deputy for Angora.

4. M. Mümtaz Ökmen was born in 1895; he studied law at Istanbul University and was one of three judges appointed at Angora by the National Government immediately after its formation. He was a member of the Republican People's party from the time of its foundation and in 1935 became Deputy for Angora and a member of the General Executive Council of the party.

I have, &c.
H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

[R 9059/203/44] No. 120.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 1793.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, December 24, 1940.*
MY telegram No. 1761.
Minister for Foreign Affairs told me confidentially this morning that, in the course of one of his recent conversations with Molotov, Turkish Ambassador had said that Turkey would take no step in these circumstances previous to consultation with Russia or previous to informing Russia, or words to that effect. His Excellency was a little vague.

2. Soviet Ambassador had called on his Excellency shortly afterwards and asked whether this statement could be confirmed in writing.

3. Minister for Foreign Affairs had replied that he must refer the matter to his colleagues in Turkish Government. Ambassador had asked what his personal view was, and his Excellency had replied in his view [? guarantees] might be arranged on a basis of reciprocity. He is now discussing the matter with his colleagues, and, though final decision has not been taken, he told me that reply would probably be on the lines that, if Soviet Government were anxious to widen their present agreement with Turkey, Turkish Government would be prepared to examine such a suggestion.

4. Turkish Ambassador seems to have spoken [two groups undecypherable], and Minister for Foreign Affairs did not appear necessarily to endorse what he had said.

5. I asked what was meant by "Turkey would take no steps" (paragraph 1 above); did this apply to Turkish entry into the war with us? Minister for Foreign Affairs said: "No." He thought it would boil down to steps affecting political relations with neighbouring Powers, especially Bulgaria. He promised to keep me informed.

(Please repeat to Moscow.)

[R 9090/342/44] No. 121.

Mr. Eden to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Angora).

(No. 372.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 27, 1940.*

THE Turkish Ambassador came to see me for the first time this afternoon, when, after expressing his warm gratification that we were once again working together, his Excellency went on to speak of our recent operations in Libya. These, he said, had finally put an end to the threat to Egypt, and had thereby completely altered the situation in the Near East. The North Sea now seemed to him the vital theatre. As regards Albania, it remained to be seen what success the new Italian generals could bring off. If they failed to achieve anything, the consequences for Italy would be most serious. Signor Mussolini would then be faced with the most unpleasant alternative of either admitting defeat or of inviting the Germans to come to his aid. He did not believe that Germany would go to Italy's help except at Italy's request, or in the event of a complete Italian collapse.

2. His Excellency mentioned that, fortunately, the relations between our two countries were now excellent, as he and I had often laboured together in the past to make them. He was grateful for the help which had been given him by the Admiralty and the War Office, by Sir A. Sinclair and by Lord Beaverbrook. In particular, he much appreciated the attitude of the Minister for Aircraft Production and the frank helpfulness with which he had been treated by him. His country's chief need at the moment was for anti-aircraft guns, but his Government fully understood the difficulty in which we were placed in meeting Turkish needs in this respect.

I am, &c.
ANTHONY EDEN.

[R 9059/203/44] No. 122.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 1810.)
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, December 27, 1940.*
MY telegram No. 1793.
Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that the Turkish Government had decided to reply that they noted from recent conversations which had taken place that the Russian agreement was regarded by both sides as being still in force. They noted also that Soviet Government had expressed a desire to extend the agreement. If this were really the case, Turkish Government were ready to examine favourably any proposal which the Soviet Government might make, provided it were on a reciprocal basis.
(Repeated to Moscow, No. 915.)

END 53